The Second Apocalypse
Miscellaneous Chatter => Philosophy & Science => Topic started by: sciborg2 on October 20, 2018, 11:31:44 pm
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The Mystery of Consciousness | Sam Harris (https://samharris.org/the-mystery-of-consciousness/)
Consciousness—the sheer fact that this universe is illuminated by sentience—is precisely what unconsciousness is not. And I believe that no description of unconscious complexity will fully account for it. It seems to me that just as “something” and “nothing,” however juxtaposed, can do no explanatory work, an analysis of purely physical processes will never yield a picture of consciousness. However, this is not to say that some other thesis about consciousness must be true. Consciousness may very well be the lawful product of unconscious information processing. But I don’t know what that sentence means—and I don’t think anyone else does either.
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The Samster is fun to read. Appears no gains still on where our thoughts come from and worse, the activity we witness in the brain does not seem near enough to produce our conscious experience which occurs without error - unless it doesn't as we can see with survivors of brain trauma/damage. I wonder what fractured/damaged consciousness is like ... but I'm not so curious to find out. That really horrifies me - that one day I fall to cracked/missing parts of consciousness, seems like it's hell, but maybe only as viewed by others - do sufferers actually suffer in such a state, or as their conscious is impaired maybe their experience of suffering is also impaired ... or maybe not and our mind is caged. I have no mouth, but I need to scream.
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The Mystery of Consciousness | Sam Harris (https://samharris.org/the-mystery-of-consciousness/)
Consciousness—the sheer fact that this universe is illuminated by sentience—is precisely what unconsciousness is not. And I believe that no description of unconscious complexity will fully account for it. It seems to me that just as “something” and “nothing,” however juxtaposed, can do no explanatory work, an analysis of purely physical processes will never yield a picture of consciousness. However, this is not to say that some other thesis about consciousness must be true. Consciousness may very well be the lawful product of unconscious information processing. But I don’t know what that sentence means—and I don’t think anyone else does either.
Sam Harris seems to have run into the "Hard Problem of Consciousness", i.e. the relationship between conscious experience and physical processes. If you ask me personally, it's just a trivial non-problem. Why is it such a big deal that we "can't explain consciousness" in intentional terms or what have you? A physical description would be enough, and even if that's not tractable, approximations will do fine. I don't feel uncomfortable thinking about how my conscious experience is the result of proteins opening and closing due to ion concentrations etc. a trillion neurons etc.
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The Mystery of Consciousness | Sam Harris (https://samharris.org/the-mystery-of-consciousness/)
Consciousness—the sheer fact that this universe is illuminated by sentience—is precisely what unconsciousness is not. And I believe that no description of unconscious complexity will fully account for it. It seems to me that just as “something” and “nothing,” however juxtaposed, can do no explanatory work, an analysis of purely physical processes will never yield a picture of consciousness. However, this is not to say that some other thesis about consciousness must be true. Consciousness may very well be the lawful product of unconscious information processing. But I don’t know what that sentence means—and I don’t think anyone else does either.
Sam Harris seems to have run into the "Hard Problem of Consciousness", i.e. the relationship between conscious experience and physical processes. If you ask me personally, it's just a trivial non-problem. Why is it such a big deal that we "can't explain consciousness" in intentional terms or what have you? A physical description would be enough, and even if that's not tractable, approximations will do fine. I don't feel uncomfortable thinking about how my conscious experience is the result of proteins opening and closing due to ion concentrations etc. a trillion neurons etc.
But how/why does consciousness arise from that? If nothing else, it's a cool mystery worth exploring - might find some cool stuff.
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Consciousness may very well be the lawful product of unconscious information processing. But I don’t know what that sentence means—and I don’t think anyone else does either.
Removing 'information' and using 'physical interactions', I don't know why he'd say he doesn't understand it. Maybe he expects to suddenly understand every little part - but that's like looking at a print out of code for a program and if you don't understand all of it then you don't understand any of it. It's just giving up.
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Consciousness may very well be the lawful product of unconscious information processing. But I don’t know what that sentence means—and I don’t think anyone else does either.
Removing 'information' and using 'physical interactions', I don't know why he'd say he doesn't understand it. Maybe he expects to suddenly understand every little part - but that's like looking at a print out of code for a program and if you don't understand all of it then you don't understand any of it. It's just giving up.
As Tao mentioned above, it's more about how e.g. a video-game arises from code. I still have a bit of a hard time wrapping my head around this problem and I still feel inclined to scoff say "what's the fucking problem?" but it's like, you gotta try putting yourself in the shoes of somebody who has spent a lot of time thinking about consciousness and how it arises etc. through intentional means.
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Consciousness may very well be the lawful product of unconscious information processing. But I don’t know what that sentence means—and I don’t think anyone else does either.
Removing 'information' and using 'physical interactions', I don't know why he'd say he doesn't understand it. Maybe he expects to suddenly understand every little part - but that's like looking at a print out of code for a program and if you don't understand all of it then you don't understand any of it. It's just giving up.
IIRC Sam is a Neuroscience PhD, as such I doubt he's telling people in his own field to just give up researching the brain. Rather he's asking how you can go from matter that lacks consciousness to something that has consciousness - his object[ion], AFAICTell, is that there's a Something from Nothing problem.
I think Nagel said something similar, how describing the arrangement of atoms* that bring about consciousness wouldn't give you the answer as to why that arrangement works.
*Or chemicals, or cells depending on how far down you think you can go before you hit some disunity in levels of reduction.
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Perhaps I am simply too dumb to understand Harris' point here, but I read both articles and am none the closer to why he chooses to bridge the gap from "don't understand" to "can't understand." In the same sense, we cannot discern the nature of a human being from an one part. So, my finger nail, so examined does not explain why I like vanilla over chocolate. It also does not explain why there is an I at all. This is self evident. In the same way, I don't see why examine any neuron would give us an "answer" to what consciousness is. Harris is also almost certainly right, in that consciousness is most probably an emergent property. Brains most certainly give rise to consciousness. So, then it must be some property of brains that allow for this, no?
I mean, I must be missing something, because 3,000 years for people way smarter than me have considered this and not gotten an answer...
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Consciousness may very well be the lawful product of unconscious information processing. But I don’t know what that sentence means—and I don’t think anyone else does either.
Removing 'information' and using 'physical interactions', I don't know why he'd say he doesn't understand it. Maybe he expects to suddenly understand every little part - but that's like looking at a print out of code for a program and if you don't understand all of it then you don't understand any of it. It's just giving up.
IIRC Sam is a Neuroscience PhD, as such I doubt he's telling people in his own field to just give up researching the brain. Rather he's asking how you can go from matter that lacks consciousness to something that has consciousness - his object[ion], AFAICTell, is that there's a Something from Nothing problem.
I think Nagel said something similar, how describing the arrangement of atoms* that bring about consciousness wouldn't give you the answer as to why that arrangement works.
*Or chemicals, or cells depending on how far down you think you can go before you hit some disunity in levels of reduction.
Sam Harris payed to do a phd (as opposed from coming up through undergraduate, masters then phd) he didn't do his own experiments, and then he wrote a book based on his phd work.
I'd be astounded if he could add anything to the field.
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Brains most certainly give rise to consciousness. So, then it must be some property of brains that allow for this, no?
I mean, I must be missing something, because 3,000 years for people way smarter than me have considered this and not gotten an answer...
Sam's definitely not saying nervous systems (and possibly other aspects of the body) have nothing to do with consciousness - even Idealists have to find some role for our biological systems, especially our brains.
He's saying there's likely no going further than finding the pattern of matter that corresponds to consciousness, in that we won't understand why that pattern of matter is the right one + why other patterns are wrong.
Of course this isn't something that will be settled by philosophers, barring one of them actually bruising the onta of our reality through sorcery. :-)
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Brains most certainly give rise to consciousness. So, then it must be some property of brains that allow for this, no?
I mean, I must be missing something, because 3,000 years for people way smarter than me have considered this and not gotten an answer...
Sam's definitely not saying nervous systems (and possibly other aspects of the body) have nothing to do with consciousness - even Idealists have to find some role for our biological systems, especially our brains.
He's saying there's likely no going further than finding the pattern of matter that corresponds to consciousness, in that we won't understand why that pattern of matter is the right one + why other patterns are wrong.
Of course this isn't something that will be settled by philosophers, barring one of them actually bruising the onta of our reality through sorcery. :-)
Thinking more about it, I definitely do think I completely agree with Sam Harris in this regard. I don't see us being able to understand why some neurophysical process is accompanied by experience, precisely because this is something that emerges from intentional reasoning.
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Brains most certainly give rise to consciousness. So, then it must be some property of brains that allow for this, no?
I mean, I must be missing something, because 3,000 years for people way smarter than me have considered this and not gotten an answer...
Sam's definitely not saying nervous systems (and possibly other aspects of the body) have nothing to do with consciousness - even Idealists have to find some role for our biological systems, especially our brains.
He's saying there's likely no going further than finding the pattern of matter that corresponds to consciousness, in that we won't understand why that pattern of matter is the right one + why other patterns are wrong.
Of course this isn't something that will be settled by philosophers, barring one of them actually bruising the onta of our reality through sorcery. :-)
Thinking more about it, I definitely do think I completely agree with Sam Harris in this regard. I don't see us being able to understand why some neurophysical process is accompanied by experience, precisely because this is something that emerges from intentional reasoning.
Yeah I share his pessimism - his logic seems sound - but I do accept that it might be awhile before we really get deep into the biological systems of consciousness let alone going down to the chemical then atomic levels.
Only then would this question be somewhat settled, if there were no answers at the bottom.
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IIRC Sam is a Neuroscience PhD, as such I doubt he's telling people in his own field to just give up researching the brain. Rather he's asking how you can go from matter that lacks consciousness to something that has consciousness - his object[ion], AFAICTell, is that there's a Something from Nothing problem.
I think Nagel said something similar, how describing the arrangement of atoms* that bring about consciousness wouldn't give you the answer as to why that arrangement works
They don't seem to be thinking about looking at an arrangement that would result them saying 'wouldn't give you the answer as to to why that arrangement works'.
Their critique is being done at a recursive level and absent a third recursive level to see the second, they don't consider seeing an arrangement that not only shows their critical responce, but makes sense that it would result in those critical words being uttered.
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IIRC Sam is a Neuroscience PhD, as such I doubt he's telling people in his own field to just give up researching the brain. Rather he's asking how you can go from matter that lacks consciousness to something that has consciousness - his object[ion], AFAICTell, is that there's a Something from Nothing problem.
I think Nagel said something similar, how describing the arrangement of atoms* that bring about consciousness wouldn't give you the answer as to why that arrangement works
They don't seem to be thinking about looking at an arrangement that would result them saying 'wouldn't give you the answer as to to why that arrangement works'.
Their critique is being done at a recursive level and absent a third recursive level to see the second, they don't consider seeing an arrangement that not only shows their critical responce, but makes sense that it would result in those critical words being uttered.
I don't understand this reply at all.
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I don't understand this reply at all.
I still don't understand this whole tread, nor Harris' point actually.
I must be missing several somethings...
In my mind, Harris points out that consciousness is an emergent propery of human brains. OK. He points out that emergent properties cannot be discerned by study of it's constituent parts in isolation. OK. Therefor, we cannot understand the emergent phenomena via it's parts alone? This is obvious.
Stars are emergent properties of hydrogen. But studying hydrogen up close doesn't tell us about sun spots. In this same sense, consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, which is a collection of neurons (among other things). Looking just at the neurons, fails to tell me why exactly I like vanilla more than chocolate. Naturally, because we need to take into account the whole system. Consciousness is not just neurons, it's the whole function of all neurons and the whole system of the brain, in a similar way as to how a hydrogen atom doesn't tell us why there are sun-spots.
Clearly my understanding must be flawed.
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I don't understand this reply at all.
I still don't understand this whole tread, nor Harris' point actually.
I must be missing several somethings...
In my mind, Harris points out that consciousness is an emergent propery of human brains. OK. He points out that emergent properties cannot be discerned by study of it's constituent parts in isolation. OK. Therefor, we cannot understand the emergent phenomena via it's parts alone? This is obvious.
Stars are emergent properties of hydrogen. But studying hydrogen up close doesn't tell us about sun spots. In this same sense, consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, which is a collection of neurons (among other things). Looking just at the neurons, fails to tell me why exactly I like vanilla more than chocolate. Naturally, because we need to take into account the whole system. Consciousness is not just neurons, it's the whole function of all neurons and the whole system of the brain, in a similar way as to how a hydrogen atom doesn't tell us why there are sun-spots.
Clearly my understanding must be flawed.
Hmmm, I might be misunderstanding your questioning but it seems to me the question Sam is talking about isn't identifying the correlated patterns, but understanding production. We'll understand (shortly, if you measure by decades) which patterns correlate with which qualia - we already do to an incredible extent if we accept the mind-body problem has been with us, as you say, for 3000 years.
What Sam argues is what's unlikely to be discovered is understanding the "Why" of the correlation. Why is this pattern the taste of chocolate, that the taste of vanilla? And if we get even that far, we also have to explain "Why" any pattern, amenable to reductionism, that can be measured quantitatively gives rise to qualitative, seemingly(?) irreducible experience.
IMO we just don't have the cognitive capacity, something Chomsky concurs with (http://www.second-apocalypse.com/index.php?topic=2767.0). And it makes sense - why would an animal evolved to survive in its niche, lucky enough to gain dominion over the planet, also be expected to have the user interface w/ reality to answer all questions about reality.
Also in what way are stars emergent from hydrogen, as opposed to constituted from hydrogen + other aspects of reality?
Causality is another domain I'm a pessimist about - we can measure change, the foundation of science IMO, but the "Why" of causation will elude us. I don't think humans will have a clear scientific model of causation, at least not until we are at Progenitor levels of technology so far, far beyond my lifetime.
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I don't understand this reply at all.
I still don't understand this whole tread, nor Harris' point actually.
I must be missing several somethings...
In my mind, Harris points out that consciousness is an emergent propery of human brains. OK. He points out that emergent properties cannot be discerned by study of it's constituent parts in isolation. OK. Therefor, we cannot understand the emergent phenomena via it's parts alone? This is obvious.
Stars are emergent properties of hydrogen. But studying hydrogen up close doesn't tell us about sun spots. In this same sense, consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, which is a collection of neurons (among other things). Looking just at the neurons, fails to tell me why exactly I like vanilla more than chocolate. Naturally, because we need to take into account the whole system. Consciousness is not just neurons, it's the whole function of all neurons and the whole system of the brain, in a similar way as to how a hydrogen atom doesn't tell us why there are sun-spots.
Clearly my understanding must be flawed.
Hmmm, I might be misunderstanding your questioning but it seems to me the question Sam is talking about isn't identifying the correlated patterns, but understanding production. We'll understand (shortly, if you measure by decades) which patterns correlate with which qualia - we already do to an incredible extent if we accept the mind-body problem has been with us, as you say, for 3000 years.
What Sam argues is what's unlikely to be discovered is understanding the "Why" of the correlation. Why is this pattern the taste of chocolate, that the taste of vanilla? And if we get even that far, we also have to explain "Why" any pattern, amenable to reductionism, that can be measured quantitatively gives rise to qualitative, seemingly(?) irreducible experience.
Yeah, although to me it's not so much a question of cognitive limitation as a cognitive quirk arising from intentional reasoning, a semantic problem.
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I don't understand this reply at all.
I still don't understand this whole tread, nor Harris' point actually.
I must be missing several somethings...
In my mind, Harris points out that consciousness is an emergent propery of human brains. OK. He points out that emergent properties cannot be discerned by study of it's constituent parts in isolation. OK. Therefor, we cannot understand the emergent phenomena via it's parts alone? This is obvious.
Stars are emergent properties of hydrogen. But studying hydrogen up close doesn't tell us about sun spots. In this same sense, consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, which is a collection of neurons (among other things). Looking just at the neurons, fails to tell me why exactly I like vanilla more than chocolate. Naturally, because we need to take into account the whole system. Consciousness is not just neurons, it's the whole function of all neurons and the whole system of the brain, in a similar way as to how a hydrogen atom doesn't tell us why there are sun-spots.
Clearly my understanding must be flawed.
Hmmm, I might be misunderstanding your questioning but it seems to me the question Sam is talking about isn't identifying the correlated patterns, but understanding production. We'll understand (shortly, if you measure by decades) which patterns correlate with which qualia - we already do to an incredible extent if we accept the mind-body problem has been with us, as you say, for 3000 years.
What Sam argues is what's unlikely to be discovered is understanding the "Why" of the correlation. Why is this pattern the taste of chocolate, that the taste of vanilla? And if we get even that far, we also have to explain "Why" any pattern, amenable to reductionism, that can be measured quantitatively gives rise to qualitative, seemingly(?) irreducible experience.
Yeah, although to me it's not so much a question of cognitive limitation as a cognitive quirk arising from intentional reasoning, a semantic problem.
Can you elaborate? Sounds interesting but have to admit not 100% sure what you're getting at - thanks!
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I don't understand this reply at all.
I still don't understand this whole tread, nor Harris' point actually.
I must be missing several somethings...
In my mind, Harris points out that consciousness is an emergent propery of human brains. OK. He points out that emergent properties cannot be discerned by study of it's constituent parts in isolation. OK. Therefor, we cannot understand the emergent phenomena via it's parts alone? This is obvious.
Stars are emergent properties of hydrogen. But studying hydrogen up close doesn't tell us about sun spots. In this same sense, consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, which is a collection of neurons (among other things). Looking just at the neurons, fails to tell me why exactly I like vanilla more than chocolate. Naturally, because we need to take into account the whole system. Consciousness is not just neurons, it's the whole function of all neurons and the whole system of the brain, in a similar way as to how a hydrogen atom doesn't tell us why there are sun-spots.
Clearly my understanding must be flawed.
Hmmm, I might be misunderstanding your questioning but it seems to me the question Sam is talking about isn't identifying the correlated patterns, but understanding production. We'll understand (shortly, if you measure by decades) which patterns correlate with which qualia - we already do to an incredible extent if we accept the mind-body problem has been with us, as you say, for 3000 years.
What Sam argues is what's unlikely to be discovered is understanding the "Why" of the correlation. Why is this pattern the taste of chocolate, that the taste of vanilla? And if we get even that far, we also have to explain "Why" any pattern, amenable to reductionism, that can be measured quantitatively gives rise to qualitative, seemingly(?) irreducible experience.
Yeah, although to me it's not so much a question of cognitive limitation as a cognitive quirk arising from intentional reasoning, a semantic problem.
Can you elaborate? Sounds interesting but have to admit not 100% sure what you're getting at - thanks!
Well, I could be talking out of my ass, but it seems that the whole /why/ question in itself is unanswerable without intentional reasoning, so it's kind of like a paradox, an artifact of human cognition.
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IMO we just don't have the cognitive capacity, something Chomsky concurs with (http://www.second-apocalypse.com/index.php?topic=2767.0). And it makes sense - why would an animal evolved to survive in its niche, lucky enough to gain dominion over the planet, also be expected to have the user interface w/ reality to answer all questions about reality.
Also in what way are stars emergent from hydrogen, as opposed to constituted from hydrogen + other aspects of reality?
OK, having gotten to watch that video finally, I think I get the point, that if direct mechanicalism isn't true (and it seems not) than simple materialism is also false.
On what Chomsky says about limits, well, Peterson (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6V1eMvGGcXQ) makes a very similar point. Even going so far as to point out (rightly or wrongly, I don't know, I'm not smart enough to read it directly) that Kant's point in Critique of Pure Reason is that there are far too many facts for us to interpret to make full sense of everything, so we need an interpretive structure with which to view and evaluate those facts. That structure must, necessarily, be limiting, because that is exactly what it is made to do.
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IMO we just don't have the cognitive capacity, something Chomsky concurs with (http://www.second-apocalypse.com/index.php?topic=2767.0). And it makes sense - why would an animal evolved to survive in its niche, lucky enough to gain dominion over the planet, also be expected to have the user interface w/ reality to answer all questions about reality.
Also in what way are stars emergent from hydrogen, as opposed to constituted from hydrogen + other aspects of reality?
OK, having gotten to watch that video finally, I think I get the point, that if direct mechanicalism isn't true (and it seems not) than simple materialism is also false.
On what Chomsky says about limits, well, Peterson (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6V1eMvGGcXQ) makes a very similar point. Even going so far as to point out (rightly or wrongly, I don't know, I'm not smart enough to read it directly) that Kant's point in Critique of Pure Reason is that there are far too many facts for us to interpret to make full sense of everything, so we need an interpretive structure with which to view and evaluate those facts. That structure must, necessarily, be limiting, because that is exactly what it is made to do.
I think we're on the same page, that said thinking about it some more I feel like there are two paths to the argument that we won't ever have Materialist/Reductionist account of consciousness:
a) The Mysterian Argument - The one I think Harris is ultimately conceding toward, that we cannot figure out *if* Materialism is true/false b/c we lack the cognitive capacity.
b) The Immaterialist Argument - The stance of Panpsychics, Idealists, Neutral Monists, Dualists, and probably a few more I'm missing. But basically the point they'd agree on is Materialism can logically be shown to be false.
I go back on forth on which one Harris is ultimately gearing toward. I think he may be a Neutral Monist or Panpsychist, but he's conceding that the question is unanswerable until we have more scientific knowledge under our belts.
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From what I understand of Harris from his "talks" with Peterson though is that he thinks we both can and should derive values from facts. Which is a nice idea, were it at all possible.
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From what I understand of Harris from his "talks" with Peterson though is that he thinks we both can and should derive values from facts. Which is a nice idea, were it at all possible.
Oh yeah I think the skeptic Massimo destroyed Harris' arguments about Scienctistic Morality...I'll try to find the paper, i think I posted it years ago on this forum but can't remember.
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https://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/11-02-02/#feature
https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/reflections-on-the-skeptic-and-atheist-movements/
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Atheists are dumb
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Atheists are dumb
Is one an atheist if they think of the Prime Mover & Universal Intellect as lacking self-awareness? 'Cause that''s where I'm at some days, though I'm not closed off from the idea of polytheism though not sure I can point to an instance that is proof of such deities.
https://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/11-02-02/#feature
https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/reflections-on-the-skeptic-and-atheist-movements/
Thanks Merchant!
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Atheists are dumb
Is one an atheist if they think of the Prime Mover & Universal Intellect as lacking self-awareness? 'Cause that''s where I'm at some days, though I'm not closed off from the idea of polytheism though not sure I can point to an instance that is proof of such deities.
So Azazel? And probably no, the average atheist isn't capable of generalizing things to such concepts as "Prime Mover".
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Atheists are dumb
Is one an atheist if they think of the Prime Mover & Universal Intellect as lacking self-awareness? 'Cause that''s where I'm at some days, though I'm not closed off from the idea of polytheism though not sure I can point to an instance that is proof of such deities.
So Azazel? And probably no, the average atheist isn't capable of generalizing things to such concepts as "Prime Mover".
Azazel?
But yes, I do find myself to smarter than the average atheist gaga-ing over GIFS in I Fucking Love Science articles. ;-)
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Atheists are dumb
Is one an atheist if they think of the Prime Mover & Universal Intellect as lacking self-awareness? 'Cause that''s where I'm at some days, though I'm not closed off from the idea of polytheism though not sure I can point to an instance that is proof of such deities.
So Azazel? And probably no, the average atheist isn't capable of generalizing things to such concepts as "Prime Mover".
Azazel?
But yes, I do find myself to smarter than the average atheist gaga-ing over GIFS in I Fucking Love Science articles. ;-)
Ah fuck I meant Azathoth***.
I'm with you on that, although I do like gifs myself.
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Atheists are dumb
Is one an atheist if they think of the Prime Mover & Universal Intellect as lacking self-awareness? 'Cause that''s where I'm at some days, though I'm not closed off from the idea of polytheism though not sure I can point to an instance that is proof of such deities.
So Azazel? And probably no, the average atheist isn't capable of generalizing things to such concepts as "Prime Mover".
Azazel?
But yes, I do find myself to smarter than the average atheist gaga-ing over GIFS in I Fucking Love Science articles. ;-)
Ah fuck I meant Azathoth***.
I'm with you on that, although I do like gifs myself.
Come now, it's fun to worship evil :)
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https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/reflections-on-the-skeptic-and-atheist-movements/
I read the "exchange" between Harris and Chomsky. I imagine this is the intellectual equivalent with what would happen if I were to show up at the Lakers practice facility and hop on the court, clearly challenging Lebron James to a pick up game of basketball, after having empiricism his "basketball sense" and "understanding the fundamental question of basketball." After Lebron thoroughly embarrassed me, complete with okiedokes, dipsey-doodles, Harlem-Globetrotter-style bouncing the ball off my head, and enough fakes that I send more time on prone than on my feet, I decry, "that was hardly a charitable exchange!"
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https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/reflections-on-the-skeptic-and-atheist-movements/
I read the "exchange" between Harris and Chomsky. I imagine this is the intellectual equivalent with what would happen if I were to show up at the Lakers practice facility and hop on the court, clearly challenging Lebron James to a pick up game of basketball, after having empiricism his "basketball sense" and "understanding the fundamental question of basketball." After Lebron thoroughly embarrassed me, complete with okiedokes, dipsey-doodles, Harlem-Globetrotter-style bouncing the ball off my head, and enough fakes that I send more time on prone than on my feet, I decry, "that was hardly a charitable exchange!"
Chomsky is Lebron?
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Chomsky is Lebron?
Most definitely, yes.
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https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/reflections-on-the-skeptic-and-atheist-movements/
I read the "exchange" between Harris and Chomsky. I imagine this is the intellectual equivalent with what would happen if I were to show up at the Lakers practice facility and hop on the court, clearly challenging Lebron James to a pick up game of basketball, after having empiricism his "basketball sense" and "understanding the fundamental question of basketball." After Lebron thoroughly embarrassed me, complete with okiedokes, dipsey-doodles, Harlem-Globetrotter-style bouncing the ball off my head, and enough fakes that I send more time on prone than on my feet, I decry, "that was hardly a charitable exchange!"
Be glad it was Lebron , rather than Larry Bird or MJ as they would have trash talked you down to size at the same time. I knew my 80's basketball knowledge would prove a boon at one time!
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IIRC Sam is a Neuroscience PhD, as such I doubt he's telling people in his own field to just give up researching the brain. Rather he's asking how you can go from matter that lacks consciousness to something that has consciousness - his object[ion], AFAICTell, is that there's a Something from Nothing problem.
I think Nagel said something similar, how describing the arrangement of atoms* that bring about consciousness wouldn't give you the answer as to why that arrangement works
They don't seem to be thinking about looking at an arrangement that would result them saying 'wouldn't give you the answer as to to why that arrangement works'.
Their critique is being done at a recursive level and absent a third recursive level to see the second, they don't consider seeing an arrangement that not only shows their critical responce, but makes sense that it would result in those critical words being uttered.
I don't understand this reply at all.
Yeah, fair enough. I'll just break down the first part - they are not trying to think of how an arrangement of atoms could result in a creature that cannot report how it works.
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Yeah, fair enough. I'll just break down the first part - they are not trying to think of how an arrangement of atoms could result in a creature that cannot report how it works.
Doesn't "report" imply a relationship between a set of data and its observer? Where is the "I"-ness identity of the creature coming from that it precedes the subjective PoV?
Or is the I-ness divorced from the "for-ness" of consciousness? -> By "for-ness" I mean how all the varied qualia are for a someone.
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Yeah, fair enough. I'll just break down the first part - they are not trying to think of how an arrangement of atoms could result in a creature that cannot report how it works.
Doesn't "report" imply a relationship between a set of data and its observer?
Well I did say a creature that cannot report how it works.
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Well I did say a creature that cannot report how it works.
But even the attempt suggests two entities, the reporter and the one given the report?
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Well I did say a creature that cannot report how it works.
But even the attempt suggests two entities, the reporter and the one given the report?
That arrangement 'A: A reporter and B: One who gives the report', why would that have to be the case? Why would there even be two 'entities'
A creature that cannot report how it works can just as much be 'A: A mechanism and B: A verbal system with limited access to the prior mechanism it runs on - much like software running on hardware and the software's code can't access all the hardware because there isn't hardware for accessing the other hardware (also the software isn't even code to show this absence, in much the same way as we all have a blindspot in out sight but it is smudged over and hidden from us, without native documentation)
Otherwise I don't know what you're saying - my computer is going to give the server the SA forums a report. Are these two entities?
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Well I did say a creature that cannot report how it works.
But even the attempt suggests two entities, the reporter and the one given the report?
That arrangement 'A: A reporter and B: One who gives the report', why would that have to be the case? Why would there even be two 'entities'
A creature that cannot report how it works can just as much be 'A: A mechanism and B: A verbal system with limited access to the prior mechanism it runs on - much like software running on hardware and )
Otherwise I don't know what you're saying - my computer is going to give the server the SA forums a report. Are these two entities?
I don't understand this part ->
" the software's code can't access all the hardware because there isn't hardware for accessing the other hardware (also the software isn't even code to show this absence, in much the same way as we all have a blindspot in out sight but it is smudged over and hidden from us, without native documentation"
Could give an example of software and hardware? I don't see how the software/hardware lack of access is at all like the blindspot that is smudged over?
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So, while I never bothered to actually read Harris, because I found his theory so laughable out of hand, this video is pretty funny (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wxalrwPNkNI), funny in the sense of pointing out that Harris' point really doesn't stand to any sort of concerted thinking. Mostly because, as he does at the end of his book, but throughout it as well, he basically, in not so few words, says that moral philosophy is boring and he won't bother with it...
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Well I did say a creature that cannot report how it works.
But even the attempt suggests two entities, the reporter and the one given the report?
That arrangement 'A: A reporter and B: One who gives the report', why would that have to be the case? Why would there even be two 'entities'
A creature that cannot report how it works can just as much be 'A: A mechanism and B: A verbal system with limited access to the prior mechanism it runs on - much like software running on hardware and )
Otherwise I don't know what you're saying - my computer is going to give the server the SA forums a report. Are these two entities?
I don't understand this part ->
" the software's code can't access all the hardware because there isn't hardware for accessing the other hardware (also the software isn't even code to show this absence, in much the same way as we all have a blindspot in out sight but it is smudged over and hidden from us, without native documentation"
Could give an example of software and hardware? I don't see how the software/hardware lack of access is at all like the blindspot that is smudged over?
I don't understand where your position is - does your brain tell you it's smudging over part of your vision or does it just do so without telling you, whether you like it or not? You don't have any part of your brain telling you its doing that trick - there's no hardware or software there to do that. You're left numb to it. How much else are you left numb to? The edges of your vision just kind of run out as well, rather than have any kind of sign of where they end.
Or I don't know, what is your position on the matter? I know your eye is basically smudging over info in part of your eye. That's a fact. Basically it fools your brain/it fools you - or would you put it another way. And your reaction to that fact/your position in regards to that fact, what is it?
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Well I did say a creature that cannot report how it works.
But even the attempt suggests two entities, the reporter and the one given the report?
That arrangement 'A: A reporter and B: One who gives the report', why would that have to be the case? Why would there even be two 'entities'
A creature that cannot report how it works can just as much be 'A: A mechanism and B: A verbal system with limited access to the prior mechanism it runs on - much like software running on hardware and )
Otherwise I don't know what you're saying - my computer is going to give the server the SA forums a report. Are these two entities?
I don't understand this part ->
" the software's code can't access all the hardware because there isn't hardware for accessing the other hardware (also the software isn't even code to show this absence, in much the same way as we all have a blindspot in out sight but it is smudged over and hidden from us, without native documentation"
Could give an example of software and hardware? I don't see how the software/hardware lack of access is at all like the blindspot that is smudged over?
I don't understand where your position is - does your brain tell you it's smudging over part of your vision or does it just do so without telling you, whether you like it or not? You don't have any part of your brain telling you its doing that trick - there's no hardware or software there to do that. You're left numb to it. How much else are you left numb to? The edges of your vision just kind of run out as well, rather than have any kind of sign of where they end.
Or I don't know, what is your position on the matter? I know your eye is basically smudging over info in part of your eye. That's a fact. Basically it fools your brain/it fools you - or would you put it another way. And your reaction to that fact/your position in regards to that fact, what is it?
So you don't think there is hardware/software? I admit I'm not really sure I understand this post either...
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Well I was asking for your reaction on that fact.
On hardware and software I don't think there's a difference and indeed it's actually indicative of the hard problem that general culture describes them that way. If I've used software/hardware in one of my posts then that's my gaff, it wasn't good communication on my part.