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The Unholy Consult / Re: [TUC Spoilers] Inchoroi souls
« on: June 14, 2019, 06:10:19 pm »
Though, this doesn't seem terribly likely given that I'm pretty sure the IF was used to keep the Inchoroi in line through the eons.

I think this is likely the best evidence that all Inchoroi were souled.  Because they were specifically made to work toward the end of saving the Progenitor's souls, with the goad of saving their own.  Would not make much sense for them to not have any then.

The Unholy Consult / Re: [TUC] The Gods and Their Agency
« on: June 14, 2019, 06:08:04 pm »
Wait, what is the evidence that topoi are not visible by the gods and/or Outside entities?

Is it because of what Kellhus tells us about the 100 not being able to view the inside of The Ark?

Philosophy & Science / Re: The mindfulness conspiracy
« on: June 14, 2019, 03:49:32 pm »
So yeah, emotion is immaturity and we can choose how to react to events - but at times we need the child in us to drive us into adventure and embrace/enjoy wonder.

Well, I'm not sure I agree with the characterization fully, but I think I understand what you are getting at.  I think that in a sense, it is possible that emotion is the "raw" mind, where the thought is the "re-filtered" mind.  So, in one way, raw and unrefined might be "less mature" but as you say, maturity is not necessarily de facto "better."  It would certainly depend on the application.  Also, emotion is, I think, more "immediate" that is, less mediated, so it can often be "correct" in a way that thought often is not.  That sense of "trusting the gut" likely is not entirely nonsense.

Of course though, the entire idea of "mindfulness" kind of would seem to be predicated on our "default" theory of mind as being true.  That is, partly, the notion that consciousness is directive, that thinking is, perhaps, immediate to action.  But Neuroscience might tell us the opposite, that consciousness and thinking are mediate and delayed, post-hoc and perhaps something of literal afterthoughts.

So, this article seems to spin this off in a very political direction, but what might also, or "really," be at hand is simply that our entire notion of mind, our "theory of mind" is simply not correct.  So, "mindfulness" might work, might not, might just be a ratification on the same "error" we've been operating under since we started talking (as a species).

Philosophy & Science / Re: The Tyranny of Simple Explanations
« on: June 14, 2019, 02:36:45 pm »
Well, I think this last part is a major key to this:

But this is all just special pleading. Occam’s razor was never meant for paring nature down to some beautiful, parsimonious core of truth. Because science is so difficult and messy, the allure of a philosophical tool for clearing a path or pruning the thickets is obvious. In their readiness to find spurious applications of Occam’s razor in the history of science, or to enlist, dismiss, or reshape the razor at will to shore up their preferences, scientists reveal their seduction by this vision.

Because Occum's Razor tells you absolutely nothing about something's actual "truth value."  Perhaps, like much of "philosophy" that enters in to something like "popular culture" the whole notion is somewhat misunderstood and then misapplied.  To my primative mind, the Razor only tells you to apply the minimum necessary to get "explainative" results.  So, for example, there is no need to say 2E=mC²/2 becuase that is literally just adding reducible terms in there for no real reason.

However, I think this might speak to something of a vary "human desire" to render things "simple" in the sense of "comprehendable."  This is plausibly what all of philosophy "really is" a sort of "creative" way of taking something (the universe) and making it "sensable" to human minds via some conceptual framework, which is really, in every case, necessarily simplification.  It seems no wonder that it would "fail to get things right" because it must, by it's very nature, fail to capture the full complexity of the thing at hand, which could be nothing less than the entire universe.  All that could capture that complexity is the universe itself, it would seem to me.

OK, I might be off the rails now...

Philosophy & Science / Re: The Worth of an Angry God
« on: June 04, 2019, 01:09:12 pm »
One thing to note is the idea that religion with its rituals and sacrifice follows from agriculture seems challenged by Göbekli Tepe?

I thought that site showed that "The Cathedral preceded The City"?

Hmm, yeah, I am not too knowledgeable about the site, but that seems like what I've heard too.  Stonehenge, as well, also was not part of any "big cities" that I know of either.  I think that the sort of thinking this article is sort of "banking on" is perhaps a sort of misapprehension about what the correlation between "religious thinking" and "complex society" would be and what the difference between a sort of correlation and what we think would be causation.

I think this is akin to asking something like, "does our a priori notion of time and space allow society to bond and spread?"  I mean, of course, if we didn't know where or when we were doing things, of course no one could agree on anything.  But no one would think that society created the notion of time, for example, but it did put emphasis on it, it did "formalize" it, it was, in some sense, "necessary" for society to function.  But that doesn't mean that society created "time" nor would it mean that the notion of "time" created society.

To me, that would be a bit like asking if the notion of a flat plane created a table.  Or that the notion of a table, created the notion of a flat plane.  Not really, I don't feel like either of those statements can mean anything.  Sure, one might have preceeded the other, but they didn't "cause" each other, no more than night causes day, or day causing night.

Philosophy & Science / Re: The Worth of an Angry God
« on: June 04, 2019, 12:22:20 pm »
Well, I think maybe this sort of thinking, that there must be "an answer" to which preceded which, to maybe be a little nonsensical to ask.

I mean, the question "makes sense" in the asking, but I don't think it's something to which you get a real answer.  It's like asking if environment precedes genetics, but genetics only exists in the environment.  So, while it is sort of "trivially true" that one of them must have "came first" the answer is, maybe, one, unknowable and two, possibly, not explanatory of anything in reality.

To me, it would seem more that they are relational sorts of principles.  The capacity for "religious thinking" was either latent or basally existent.  Technology and/or environmental factors placed a sort of pressure on humans which caused that latent, or simply unused capacity, to become more relevant/necessary.

So, I don't know that it makes too much sense to wrack our minds to ask if the pressure made the capacity, or if the capacity allowed the response to the pressure.  The answer, I'd guess, is simply "yes."

I don't know, it isn't really that the ending was bad, but it also wasn't very good and really had nothing interesting in it to me...

Well, I liked that when the "thing" that Daenerys had so hinged her identity on was threatened, she dropped the "false veneer" of principles and revealed herself no different than any other tyrant.

What I didn't like is how they go there.  Or, rather, just arrived via dues ex machina really.  Actually, maybe not even that tenuously at all, but just spontaneously, as if from no where.

At the very least, they should have actually shown people rallying to Jon calling off the attack and standing down.  That would have at least been an actual catalyst to spur her to force the action, invoke the fear she feels she had to, to enforce her will over Jon.

Instead we just got nothing.

Well, this article somehow irrationally bothered me.

Common notions of mental disorder remain only elaborations of ‘error’, conceived of in the language of ‘internal dysfunction’ relative to a mechanistic world devoid of any meaning and influence. These dysfunctions are either to be cured by psychopharmacology, or remedied by therapy meant to lead the patient to rediscover ‘objective truth’ of the world. To conceive of it in this way is not only simplistic, but highly biased.

Maybe it was this part, because I don't know if this is or is not a "common notion."  It is, however, to me a serious error to suppose that anyone holds "objective truth."  I think, and maybe I have just been reading too much physics stuff lately, but any "truth" or "objectivity" will be relative as a matter of necessity.

So, what one should be doing is offering perspective.  My loosely associated mind jumps to Sartre's sort of example, where we meet someone who believes he is Napoleon Bonaparte.  One would, of course, be tempted to say, this person is obviously wrong, because it is the year 2019, the facts are simply against this.  And so, indeed, in a sense, we can enforce the perspective of this "facticity" to display that this person's "error."  But this is a biased perspective all the same, because, as Sartre is apt to point out, because we are saying that the "facts" trump this person's experience and attempt at transcendence of mere facts.

Of course, though, not all perspectives are "equal" that would be a silly statement.  But bias is still bias.  We might be "biased" toward facticity over trancendance, but that does not mean it must be the case that we should always be.

But maybe I am off the rails...

Well, in this case, I really don't mind where they went with the plot, but how they got there was really ham-handed.

I don't even know what to say any more.  Anything that might be decent and meaningful is so ensconced in nonsense that to disentangled it would be to arrive at essentially nothing in the end but some tropes.

actually it's a totally generic way to kill someone in media.

loads of examples

You mean these show writers don't have any original ideas and are just bartering on tropes and cliches?  Shocked I tell you, shocked.

Finished the book.  Pretty good and interesting.  It really is not an anti-pharma book at all.  I think the end sums it up fairly:

The 1980s bilogical revolutionaries were not the first group in the history of psychiatry to make audacious promises on which they could not deliver. The nineteenth-century mental hospital has failed as a therapeutic institution? All right, forget about therapy, and focus on learning what you can from the brains of your patients after they die. The anatomical research program has been a disappointment? No problem: focus instead on collecting all possible relevant facts and pursuing any and all somatic therapies, because times are desperate, and one can never have too much data. All those diverse facts have turned out not to add up to very much? The Wild West world of shock and surgical treatments has likely caused more harm than good? That’s okay: the postwar world is in crisis and needs the insights provided by psychoanalysis and social science. Things haven’t worked out with the Freudians’ expansive social agenda? Psychiatry is on the brink of losing all credibility as a profession? Not to worry: let the biologists take over!

The bold 1980s venture to bring about a “biological revolution” has now run into the sand as well. Far from flocking to psychiatry, many pharmaceutical companies have recently been fleeing it, as the prospects for new and potentially lucrative psychiatric drugs have dimmed. The manual on which the profession has rested so much of its biological authority has come under sharp attack, not just by cranky outsiders but by informed insiders committed to the mission. Too many of the severely mentally ill remain shamefully underserved in prisons and elsewhere. Mental illness still is stigmatized in ways that other kinds of illness are not.1 Racial bias and other inequities persist. And of course, firm understandings of psychiatry’s illnesses, of their underlying biology, continue to elude the field.

So where should the profession go from here? Can today’s biological psychiatry resist the temptation to lurch into yet another chapter of overpromising zealotry that is likely to end in tears? Can it appreciate that trashing all rivals generally means that everyone becomes more ignorant, not smarter? Can it rein in its professional insecurities and see that there is nothing to be gained from premature declarations of victory? Can it acknowledge and firmly turn away from its ethical lapses—and especially the willingness of so many of its practitioners in recent decades to follow the money instead of the suffering?

Reading more, I think it's clear that Pauli had at least read Hegel.  Anyway, moving on in the pdf, I really like this part:

Pauli’s suggestion to consider mind and matter as complementary aspects of the same reality has sometimes been misunderstood in the sense that conscious human observers need to be included as an essential new feature of quantum mechanics. Pauli clarified this misrepresentation succinctly:

“Once the physical observer has chosen his experimental arrangement, he has no further influence on the result which is objectively registered and generally accessible. Subjective properties of the observer or his psychological state are as irrelevant in the quantum mechanical laws of nature as in classical physics.”

That makes a ton of sense to me, that they would be "complementary" but not dependent.  Also, it would seem to me sort of self-evident that in setting up the experiment, the experimenter is enforcing a certain conceptual frame in what is to be (or even could be) observed, by virtue of the scope of the experiment.  This is part of why I do imagine there being a very real limit to "science."

If one takes the idea of a symmetry breaking seriously for the relation between mind and matter, the starting point for advancements in its understanding has to be the relationship between parts and wholes.

This makes me wonder about sort of categorizing Mind as something that can imagine (rightly or not) itself as something apart from Matter.

That is to say, something that can direct itself, rather than only be directed?

42 pages?  Going to have to find some time to really sit and read this one, thanks.

I think you'll like it H. You [might] want to start with Section 3 then work your back around...

Hmm, well, when one invokes Jung, one has my attention.

This part is an interesting notion:

All animals know how to interpret and react on signals. Cassirer characterizes human beings by their unique ability to use symbolic forms. A symbol cultivates ideas and concepts. Symbols are the vehicles of meaning (Langer 1978, p. 52).

In a sense, this might be a sort of Heglian notion as well, because I believe I recall hearing that Hegel regarded the "unit of thought" to be "concept" not so much "proposition" as with Kant.

Another quote from the book, which this historical point likely also connects with a different point about how we came to, now, proscribe anphatamines to people now on large scales:

Then in 1955, meprobamate arrived on the scene (see Chapter 3), sold under the brand names Miltown and Equanil and known to the public as a “minor tranquilizer.” Unlike Benzedrine and Dexedrine, it did not treat depression or fatigue. It treated anxiety, now understood to be the problem underlying virtually every neurotic complaint.

That was all well and good, but many family doctors pointed out that their allegedly anxious patients frequently suffered from symptoms of depression as well. They worried incessantly but also felt despondent and had no energy. Some drug companies, responding to this market opportunity, therefore began offering “combination” drugs to doctors. In 1950, before meprobamate came on the market, Smith, Kline & French had already begun selling a drug that combined the lift of an amphetamine (Dexedrine) with the sedative properties of a barbiturate (amylobarbitone). Called Dexamyl, it targeted (in the words of one ad) “the depressed and anxiety-ridden housewife who is surrounded by the monotonous routine of daily problems, disappointments and responsibilities.” Within a few years, the drug became a staple of family medicine.

A few years later, after Carter-Wallace realized it had a best seller on its hands with Miltown, it developed a combination drug of its own that it called Deprol, which combined the active ingredient of Miltown (meprobamate) with a muscle relaxant (benactyzine). Like Dexamyl, it targeted the depressed and anxiety-ridden housewife.

It is important to realize that none of these widely dispensed combination drugs were prescribed to cure a specific disease called depression—they were prescribed to treat a symptom of neurosis. Depression was still generally assumed, by analysts and family doctors alike, to be a mask that hid something deeper. As one Philadelphia physician, writing about Dexamyl, admitted: “Of course, the ideal treatment would be to discover the causes of the patient’s emotional turmoil—the nagging wife or husband; the tyrannical parent; the unsuitable job; the financial burden—and remove it. Unfortunately, this is impracticable. Although dragging a secret worry out in the open—‘getting it off one’s chest’—is often in itself of benefit, it is not always enough.” When it was not practical to try to dig deeper, the pills could help.

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