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Messages - H

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I believe the correct terminology is “immersive post-material interface”.

That's Xir’kirimakra to you, sir.

General Misc. / Re: Board Games and Miniatures
« on: August 02, 2019, 04:46:14 pm »
15 days left and it's at 1.3 million - this thang is going north of 2 million when all said and done. 25% of the final number of backers pledge in the last 24 hours.

Yeah, I think that is likely.  But I'm more apt to make conservative estimates, haha.

Anecdotally, I am usually a late backer and would be in this case as well, although probably next week, not in the last 24 hours though.

General Misc. / Re: Board Games and Miniatures
« on: August 02, 2019, 02:53:48 pm »
There's 15 people at the top $5k level lol. It seems this is a very popular KS.

Yeah, I don't quite understand how people have 5k to drop on a game, but hey, more power to them, haha.

Indeed though, the IP itself is pretty strong.  I can see this Kickstarter coming in at 1.75 million or so, which seems supported by the data.

General Misc. / Re: Board Games and Miniatures
« on: August 02, 2019, 01:28:48 pm »
I've not played it. 1.3 million KS, impressive :)

It's an "old, old game."  I think this year is actually it's 35th anniversary, we played it as kids back in the early 90's.  It's a very un-Modern game, in the sense that it is relatively rules-heavy and accounting-heavy compared to any game that people would be likely to make nowadays.  But I think that honestly is part of the appeal though.

Obviously the license has been used on a number of computer games throughout the years though too.  I'm going to back that Kickstarter, not that I really play any more, but just to have and to paint.  Just haven't really decided at what level yet...

General Misc. / Re: Board Games and Miniatures
« on: August 01, 2019, 12:58:39 pm »
I doubt it, but on the off chance there are some MechWarrior/BattleTech fans here that haven't seen this yet, I'll post it.

BattleTech: Clan Invasion Kickstarter is over 1.2 million dollars right now.  Plastic redesigns of Clan and Inner Sphere mechs, plus lots of other add ons.

As per the Tallis article, how can measure have meaning without a conscious mind?

And if you tell someone you are getting angrier or even sleepier, you are making a qualitative measurement right? Perhaps it can be seen as a partial ordering?

But the Numena would seem to exist, Meaning or not, right?  Or so we'd be likely to surmise.  Would be strange indeed if, say, a cesium atom only vibrates when we "look."  Of course, Tallis is "right" in the sense that the vibration of that cesium atom has no "Meaning" in-itself, we just arbitrarily decree the number of them that denotes a "second."

But, thinking about it, I'm not so sure that is not just a biased, or privilated frame of reference.  I mean, it would seem like cesium atoms vibrate at a particular rate for some reason, or reasons.  Therefor, well, cesium vibration does, in a way, have content, that is, it is about something, that is, about the conditions that give rise to cesium's vibration.  It would seem, to an idiot like me, absurd to assume that cesium vibrates absent of any intrinsic and/or extrinsic properties/conditions.

I might be totally off the rails here though...

Hmm, wake me up when we have the Subparticular Intentional Field Machine please.

General Misc. / Re: Board Games and Miniatures
« on: July 31, 2019, 11:49:52 am »
If this is a reprint of the Avalon Hill original - man, this is one fun game. Thanks for the heads up :) ... will any pre-order online from any online shop get them or from a specific site?

Yes, it's a reprint of that game.  From what I understand, it is a pretty good game, expensive and somewhat hard to find on the secondary market.

The preorder must be direct from GF9, my fault, I meant to put a link to their shop to preorder.

General Misc. / Re: Board Games and Miniatures
« on: July 30, 2019, 08:21:56 pm »
If you preorder the rerelease of the Dune board game, you get free shipping and some game markers.

(Yeah, it says at the show, but you can preorder online and get the markers too.)

I dont understand how (F) can be true, unless you're accepting of something that is simply divine and magical that we 'know' without needing to have evidence... Which seems like shaky ground to base anything off of.

Also, I'm not sure I see the issue with consciousness not existing. Since, as detailed, we can't observe/measure it, and have (at least as laid out above) there's no reason to believe it exists.

Maybe I've missed something.

Well, the reference there to Descartes, I think, is a call to a sort of "foundational epistemology."  For Descartes, his "radical doubt" leads to the "bottom" being something like: dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum ("I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am").  So, what does it mean then, to "know?"

On one hand, I agree, if we can't "observe/measure" it, we could rightly question, does it exist?  So, if we can't directly observe thinking, and then if I doubt that thinking exists, there seems to still be a problem.  That problem, of course, is that in order to doubt, well, doubt seems to be a thought, and then if there is a thought, seemingly something is thinking.  In any case, there seems to be no "way out" from a skeptical point of view, that thinking seems to be occurring.  Of course though, this does not actually answer what thinking is, rather only speaks to it as being something (seemingly) experientially "real."

Even if consciousness is a delusion, that is, not what it "seems" experientially, it does still seem to be.  Unless we suppose that consciousness, thinking, is actually nothing, then we are really no better off in "knowing" what it is we are then experiencing as consciousness.  Is thinking then an experience of nothing?  Even so, thinking is still then an experience and so not nothing.

Of course though, I think the author here is likely making something of a "mistake" to be casting in lots with Descartes here (in the grand scheme of things).  Because, despite the above, all he gets is a sort of phenomenology.  All Descartes can really speak then of, is that experience is all that can be known.  Be that, experience of thinking.  In the end, everything is a sort of "something" born of the Substance called Experience.

So, in the end, what this is saying, I think, is that we can't doubt away consciousness, we can't (yet) prove or disprove consciousness, therefor, we can't prove or disprove panpsychism.  Since we "have" experience, we don't doubt consciousness (generally), but since we can't quantize "experience" or "consciousness" we can't say what rightly has it or does not, since we can't observe it in the the first (experianiental) case.

TL;DR: Descartes says we can't doubt away consciousness, therefor we can't doubt away panpsychism.

(I think, I'm not sure I didn't just vomit out a word salad though.)

Philosophy & Science / Re: In Measure Began Our Might
« on: July 30, 2019, 03:01:40 pm »
A seemingly interesting take on the "Measurement Problem."  I like Tallis, but I wish his books weren't so expensive...

General Misc. / Re: Quotes
« on: July 29, 2019, 12:35:39 pm »
"Mathematics as such is always a measure, not the thing measured."

All philosophies are mental fabrications. There has never been a single doctrine by which one could enter the true essence of things.


Reminds me of what Deleuze and Guattari say in What is Philosophy?

"Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, without consequence. Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and disappearance. Now philosophy wants to know how to retain infinite speeds while gaining consistency, by giving the virtual a consistency specific to it. The philosophical sieve, as plane of immanence that cuts through the chaos, selects infinite movements of thought and is filled with concepts formed like consistent particles going as fast as thought. Science approaches chaos in a completely different, almost opposite way: it relinquishes the infinite, infinite speed, in order to gain a reference able to actualize the virtual. By retaining the infinite, philosophy gives consistency to the virtual through concepts; by relinquishing the infinite, science gives a reference to the virtual, which actualizes it through functions. Philosophy proceeds with a plane of immanence or consistency; science with a plane of reference."

Yeah I think she's right that there needs to be something more than the bare difference measurements, or as Hawking put it something needs to "breathe fire" into the equations.

Now the challenge is whether consciousness is this intrinsic thing-in-itself, or rather is simply intrinsic to each POV. For example causation has to, on some level, concern things-in-themselves...but no one really says the ontological primitive is Causation b/c causal power is an intrinsic property not a substance.

There are of course Idealist arguments that can bear more scrutiny, but I do admit the "for-ness" of consciousness always seems a bit of a challenge for Idealism IMO. I do think you're right that Leibniz wanted to solve this issue via Monadology, by making PoVs themselves a kind of particle that makes up the Real...but it all goes beyond my paygrade...

Well, it certainly is hard to say if consciousness is or is not a thing-in-itself, because, in different ways, it's hard to imagine that is is and also hard to imagine that it isn't.

I mean, consciousness must relate to the brain?  Or at least, so we think, since no one without a brain seems to be conscious.  Or at least, not that we can tell.  But, that leaves us in the same place where "all swans are white" because no one ever saw one that wasn't.  Problem being, there were black swans, just no one had seen it.

So, we don't know if neuro-correlates are consciousness, or just related to consciousness, or are superfluous to consciousness.  In any case, how could we know, as a fact, that, say, a rock is not conscious?  It could not tell us.  It also possesses no manner of self-agency that we can discern.  So, even were it conscious, how could we know?

So, it sure is not clear if consciousness could be a thing-in-itself, or if it couldn't be.  It might not even be something that is falsifiable, since, well, how could we know something is certainly not conscious?  But maybe that just brings us right back to the whole Subject-Object dichotomy and how could it be that, if everything is it's own subject, how is anything an object.  With no objects, then there really aren't any subjects.

Confusing to say the least...

Hmm, I'm genuinely unsure what to think of this article.

On the one hand, I think what this article is referencing, that is, in this part:
"In the same way, if the universe is to actually exist, its properties can’t be exclusively relational/dispositional. Something in the universe has to have some kind of quality in and of itself to give all the other relational/dispositional properties any meaning. Something has to get the ball rolling.

That something (at least in our universe) is consciousness..."

This is, from what little I understand, the idea of Substance.  And, again, from what little I understand, is what Leibnitz was "after" with Monadology,  In this sense, of being "stand alone" that is, the way in which each Monad is the entire universe, in-itself, it needs to relata, since it is relational to all things, in-itself.

The thing is, I am not so sure that Leibnitz was right.  That is, that the Monad, Substance, is something small, almost "atomic."  Deleuze, via a sort of Bergsonism, I think, goes the opposite direction.  The Whole of Being is Substance, not that the Whole of Being is comprised of Substance.  In this sense, I think the article has a "good point" in that we are "ontologically inclined" to deconstruct the Universe in the "wrong direction."  However, despite agreeing with the diagnosis, I'm not sure about the proscription.

In any case, I'm unsure about the very notion "Consciousness as Substance" point though.  It seems "clear" that the Universe existed before humans were ever conscious, so, what, in that case, was Substance?  The idea of Consciousness?

As a sort of aside, where Hegel seems, to me, apt to point out that self-consciousness is akin to substance, that it, only referring it itself, that is still referential, and so, would seem, to a idiot like me, to reinforce his idea that phenomenologically this is Substance, but not Empirically (Objectively?).  Which is exactly why, "science" empirically would reject the notion, well, categorically...

If any of that made sense, of course...

Philosophy & Science / Is "Realism" Real?
« on: July 22, 2019, 01:02:16 pm »
Hmm, yeah, I'm really unsure how I should be considering Moral Realism.  I find it hard to believe, but on the other hand, it seems weird if there isn't.

Do you believe in Mathematical Realism? But yes, Moral Realism has a "leap of faith" aspect.

So as to not clutter the quotes thread, I'll drop this here.

I have the same sort of problem with what little I know about the topic of mathematical realism as I do with the notion of moral realism.  That is, it seems absurd to think that "realism" applies here to something that is clearly a "function" of mind, yet, also seems absurd as if there were not something outside mind then.

So, I'm not sure.  I guess I'd take something more of a position that there is something "real" there, but as for what, well, I guess I'd be skeptical that it is what, exactly, we could say were what we think of as our mental concepts.

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