Recent Posts

Pages: [1] 2 3 ... 10
1
Semantica / Re: The thing I look forward to most about Semantica is...
« Last post by Athorn "FB" Gallizur on February 17, 2018, 09:03:27 pm »
Good points, I do think a break from TSA could potentially have net-positive results (I can't see it making the series worse-off, anyway) and I personally would take a longer gap between whatever the first book of TSA: The Next Generation is, though I have a feeling we may be somewhat in the minority there ;).
2
Semantica / Re: The thing I look forward to most about Semantica is...
« Last post by Wilshire on February 12, 2018, 02:25:24 pm »
I picture it as a one off like Neuropath. A PKD style fast paced big ideas novel, heavy on action and cyberpunk trashy.

+1 - Semantica, for sure. Or a duology or something.

But SF deserves a full-on Bakker/TSA epic.

I want this so bad but I'm afraid he's just going to keep writing TSA material.

Which is itself not a bad thing (I feel like a prequel series after TNG is almost inevitable) but...a legit Bakker epic SF would be so. fucking. good.

I think given the choice between a new Bakker scifi series, or an immediate continuation of TSA through the end of TNG, I'd pick the former. Given what appears to be his present focus, based on his TPB posts and such, I think he's in a better headspace for a new scifi, and a break from TSA might make for better books in the future.
3
Semantica / Re: The thing I look forward to most about Semantica is...
« Last post by Athorn "FB" Gallizur on February 09, 2018, 09:19:52 pm »
I picture it as a one off like Neuropath. A PKD style fast paced big ideas novel, heavy on action and cyberpunk trashy.

+1 - Semantica, for sure. Or a duology or something.

But SF deserves a full-on Bakker/TSA epic.

I want this so bad but I'm afraid he's just going to keep writing TSA material.

Which is itself not a bad thing (I feel like a prequel series after TNG is almost inevitable) but...a legit Bakker epic SF would be so. fucking. good.
4
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by BeardFisher-King on January 06, 2018, 04:16:43 pm »
You wouldn't say, for example, "You can look at the painting as an accumulation of paint, or you can not." You would say, "You can view that painting as an mere accumulation of paint and you can view that painting as a landscape."
Viewing it as a landscape does not change the fact that it's an accumulation of paint, with all the implications of being an accumulation of paint.

Very true. That is exactly correct. As an accumulation of paint, for example, it will require care, restoration, a controlled environment. And, viewing it as an accumulation of paint does not change the fact that it is an aesthetic object, a portrait of a landscape, with its corresponding implications.
5
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by TLEILAXU on January 06, 2018, 04:07:00 pm »
You wouldn't say, for example, "You can look at the painting as an accumulation of paint, or you can not." You would say, "You can view that painting as an mere accumulation of paint and you can view that painting as a landscape."
Viewing it as a landscape does not change the fact that it's an accumulation of paint, with all the implications of being an accumulation of paint.
6
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by BeardFisher-King on January 06, 2018, 04:00:53 pm »
You wouldn't say, for example, "You can look at the painting as an accumulation of paint, or you can not." You would say, "You can view that painting as an mere accumulation of paint and you can view that painting as a landscape."
7
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by BeardFisher-King on January 06, 2018, 02:54:27 pm »
No, that's not correct. The second way is not a negation of science, but an alternative to science.
8
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by TLEILAXU on January 06, 2018, 02:45:51 pm »
1. For Tleilaxu, a rejection of free will is important because that rejection "delegitimizes certain worldviews and legitimizes others". Since elsewhere in the thread he asserts that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul", I think it's clear that Tleilaxu is referring to the Christian worldview that formulated arguments defending free will despite an omniscient God that go back to Aquinas.
No, that's not it. I'm rejecting intentionalism, the notion of an ontological difference specific to human beings, the dualism. Also, some Christians rejected free will https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Bondage_of_the_Will

Of course, some Christians rejected free will. That's why there was a debate. That's why the case for free will had to be made in the first place.

What about your claim that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul"? This is not the case at all, and if you truly believe it to be the case, then the intentionalism that you reject must rest on a theological foundation of some kind, correct?
Sure, if you assume theology has a monopoly on souls, divinities etc. and their functional equivalents. In the end it's semantics. Feel free to forget everything I said regarding this and replace it with "ontologically different from the rest of matter".

OK. My reading of Scruton is that the specific point of this dualistic approach is that it does not claim an separate ontological status for human beings. Again, this is not ontological dualism; this is cognitive dualism. You might reread my excerpt from Scruton above (point #4).
But what he's basically saying is "you can view humans as biological/physical systems, and you can not", but this is precisely what e.g. Bakker talks about when he says stuff like "medial neglect". It might be useful for some philosophical theory of what do I know, but it neglects certain information when assuming certain properties.
9
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by BeardFisher-King on January 06, 2018, 02:30:04 pm »
1. For Tleilaxu, a rejection of free will is important because that rejection "delegitimizes certain worldviews and legitimizes others". Since elsewhere in the thread he asserts that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul", I think it's clear that Tleilaxu is referring to the Christian worldview that formulated arguments defending free will despite an omniscient God that go back to Aquinas.
No, that's not it. I'm rejecting intentionalism, the notion of an ontological difference specific to human beings, the dualism. Also, some Christians rejected free will https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Bondage_of_the_Will

Of course, some Christians rejected free will. That's why there was a debate. That's why the case for free will had to be made in the first place.

What about your claim that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul"? This is not the case at all, and if you truly believe it to be the case, then the intentionalism that you reject must rest on a theological foundation of some kind, correct?
Sure, if you assume theology has a monopoly on souls, divinities etc. and their functional equivalents. In the end it's semantics. Feel free to forget everything I said regarding this and replace it with "ontologically different from the rest of matter".

OK. My reading of Scruton is that the specific point of this dualistic approach is that it does not claim an separate ontological status for human beings. Again, this is not ontological dualism; this is cognitive dualism. You might reread my excerpt from Scruton above (point #4).
10
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by TLEILAXU on January 06, 2018, 02:15:53 pm »
1. For Tleilaxu, a rejection of free will is important because that rejection "delegitimizes certain worldviews and legitimizes others". Since elsewhere in the thread he asserts that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul", I think it's clear that Tleilaxu is referring to the Christian worldview that formulated arguments defending free will despite an omniscient God that go back to Aquinas.
No, that's not it. I'm rejecting intentionalism, the notion of an ontological difference specific to human beings, the dualism. Also, some Christians rejected free will https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Bondage_of_the_Will

Of course, some Christians rejected free will. That's why there was a debate. That's why the case for free will had to be made in the first place.

What about your claim that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul"? This is not the case at all, and if you truly believe it to be the case, then the intentionalism that you reject must rest on a theological foundation of some kind, correct?
Sure, if you assume theology has a monopoly on souls, divinities etc. and their functional equivalents. In the end it's semantics. Feel free to forget everything I said regarding this and replace it with "ontologically different from the rest of matter".
Pages: [1] 2 3 ... 10