So Yatwer sees everything that has happened in the sense of a Block Universe...of sorts. But the No God represents the end of that sight, IIRC Bakker said the Hundred are all getting fucked by Alzheimers or some such.
Of course this would suggest Yatwer *never* saw an accurate picture, just an accurate enough picture to presume everything flowed in the "currents of Causality" as the Godhand would say.
It makes me think of the Eternal, Time Transcendent torment shown by the Inverse Fire...which always happens to be different each time you look at it.
I can't help but feel that if one view of Time is the correct one it's the Present, the Now, and the Eternal is in some [way] illusory...
Hmm, took me long enough, but I'm now kind of considering this again. The notion here, that is problematic, seems to be the "notion of time" and the "notion of causality."
That is to say, could it be, that the "paradox" of little Kel being the No-God, in the sense that he always was, despite the fact that he was also, not always the No-God, be a case of our implicit enforcing of our a priori notion of time? Not only that, but of our notion of causality? And more specifically, about necessity and contingency? In this sense, of course Kel was always the No-God, as he was never not going to be the No-God. Not because he always was, but because he always would be.
In the same sort of way, the No-God would always rise, not because it must, but because it would.
I like this, because it means Kellhus wasn't fated to fail his spiritual test, the call to sacrifice, but rather he simply was just a failure. Not predetermined to be so, simply determined, then in that moment. There was a choice, it wasn't that he couldn't make the "right" choice, it's that he wouldn't.
If any of that makes sense...
Not only does it indeed make sense, but I actually think this is pretty much the only semi-rational method of interpreting the large-scale metaphysics such as they've been presented to us (both in text and from RSB's commentary). Mostly because, in Earwa, to have a Soul is to possess Free Will, and this is I think is most crucial to the framework of the metaphysics insofar as it underscores the laws of Damnation/Salvation (such as what Kellhus describes to Esmenet in the beginning of TUC, regarding the relevance of premeditated actions and the responsibility that comes with power and/or knowledge over those more ignorant/innocent souls). It's a detail that is at once integral to much of what RSB is trying to communicate through this series, yet also can be surprisingly easy to forget (or at least, overlook the importance of) in the shuffle.
I've ran through some of the general beats you bring up here regarding the God’s POV and time/causality in my head before and came to a vague but similar-ish conclusion that you have, however you've quite finely outlined all of what I'd considered and more, and in far greater detail and precision then I’d been able to articulate even to myself. Good stuff as always!
This is also relevant for me in regards to my personal interpretation of how the mechanics play out with regards to how a mortal soul can become a 'vessel' for an agency of the Outside while still retaining their freedom of will, since as we know this not just a simple case of traditional spiritual possession, or to quote Oinaral, "possession is an imprecise term". I've described my thoughts here several times on the forum before, but essentially it boils down to the idea that in cases of an entity from the Outside inhabiting a soul, it is erroneous to presume that the soul of any such vessel has been utterly supplanted or over-ridden by that of the agency in question, but rather, that the intentions of the mortal’s soul have become reflective or similar enough to that of a particular deity, and thus in a sense becomes an optional opportunity for that God to slip into the vessel at their discretion, so as to exercise their own intentions more directly in the World (with these vessels presumably being only one among many at any given instance, and across all of time, or at least the time as determined by the limitations of that deity's "lifespan", however that works). This is similar in some ways to the theological concept of "theosis" in Christian Eastern Orthodox religions.
This is consistent, I think, with what we see in the text of basically every effectively 'confirmed' case in the series, those being Psatma-Yatwer, Ajokli-Cnaiur & Ajokli-Kellhus*, Mimara-God* and Kelmomas-Mog*. The most contention over this comes with Kellhus and Ajokli, but I think it's slightly misguided.
In each case here, it's pretty clear that the individuals in question are never really acting "out of character" once they've become a conduit for their respective deity. Psatma is the most clear cut of these, as is Cnaiur in my opinion. Cnaiur's probably the best example of all because we get the most backstory and internal POV of the character. An interesting thing to contrast between Cnaiur and Psatma, however, is that while it seems one does retain their will even after becoming a vessel, one does not need to be willing to become a vessel, nor do they need to be
aware that they've become a vessel after-the-fact (this is only slightly murky because we don't get a Cnaiur POV past his final scene in PON, and his outward actions in TUC do not directly indicate that he is aware of what precisely is happening to him, however he definitely seems to understand that, on some level, he has been altered by some kind of metaphysical association with Hell, if not specifically the God-named-Ajokli itself).
Returning to the example of Kellhus, and given all aforementioned statements, I do not interpret the scenes of Kellhus-Ajokli in the the Golden Room as being an example of Kellhus's statements and actions being "overridden" or entirely swapped out with those of Ajokli, but rather, that Kellhus himself is in fact still expressing his own freedom of will -- or at least he's simulating the appearance of such. This right here is itself an interesting quandary. Could it be that Kellhus was essentially "role-playing" as Ajokli in terms of his declared intentions, while also using the literal fact of his own 'vesselization' to genuinely wield the divine powers of a God? We know that Kellhus at least claims to Proyas in TUC that lying is not an option for him now and that "Truth is his only recourse" (not verbatim) this close to the Ark, since he can perceive the strength of the Darkness there and his vulnerability to it? And so then, when he does confront the Mutilated and play out his whole "I am Master, here!" shtick -- knowing full-well that this is not quite the case -- that the very act of deception here is what, in part, allowed Ajokli to manifest so vividly (besides the degree to which the Golden Room is a topos anyway)? Just some speculation on my part, but I do think the notion of free will and how it works in the grand scheme of all the other metaphysical systems in play (such as when the Gods get involved) is an interesting one that still has some room for exploration.
*I put asterisks on these particular examples only because they involve a bit of a wrinkle that may or may not alter the circumstances, although with the possible exception of Kelmomas I do not personally think it's any different. I single out Mimara and Kellhus mainly because the specific deity for which they are become a vessel stand out from the rest of the known pantheon in some manner, and aren't "just another God". Again though, I don't actually think this makes much, if any, difference in the jist of my point.
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