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Countering the Argument with Thorsten

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H:

--- Quote from: sciborg2 on December 11, 2019, 12:30:50 am ---When you say lapsing into a real Phenom. Stance, do you mean a position where there is something mental or at least proto-mental (whatever that means) in Nature?

I guess I'm curious because you seem to be trying to reconcile Hegel's Idealism with a more Physicalist position, or am I reading you wrong there?
--- End quote ---
I don't know about that.  I think it would depend on what "in nature" means.  Because, of course, to me, humans are in (and of nature).  But I think I mean, more so, that I am taking for granted, or making the assumption that what self-consciousness seems to be, experientially or phenomenologically, it somewhat actually is (or that it is at all).  And also, what just consciousness (i.e. non-self consciousness) is, also actually is what it seems (to us) to be (and not be).

But I think you are right, I find myself being something of both a bad Hegelian and a bad Psysicalist.  I'm also (something of) a Monist, probably.  I think "mentality" isn't an innate state of matter, in the same way that "wetness" isn't.  It's a product of structure and relation.  Matter can deliver what we call "mind" in the same sort of way that matter can deliver a house or a pile of rubble, just depending on how it's structured in relation to us.

sciborg2:

--- Quote from: H on December 11, 2019, 03:41:47 pm ---But I think you are right, I find myself being something of both a bad Hegelian and a bad Psysicalist.  I'm also (something of) a Monist, probably.  I think "mentality" isn't an innate state of matter, in the same way that "wetness" isn't.  It's a product of structure and relation.  Matter can deliver what we call "mind" in the same sort of way that matter can deliver a house or a pile of rubble, just depending on how it's structured in relation to us.

--- End quote ---

Wetness as in the feeling of something being wet, or liquid as a matter-state?

So some structures are special, giving feels/thoughts/etc, and other structures are not? Or do all structures have something-it-is-to-be-like them?

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