The Second Apocalypse
Miscellaneous Chatter => Philosophy & Science => Topic started by: H on February 27, 2020, 10:52:42 pm
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The Gamification of Public Discourse (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1LpbGW3qLVg)
An interesting talk.
Some "notes:"
Interesting distinction between echo chambers and filter bubbles.
How echo chambers maximize intelligibility.
How we tend to "trust" numbers more than qualitative results.
Even touches a little on our usual "hot button" education topic.
Is there any interest in my posting videos like this? Will anyone watch them? Maybe if I take some better notes and do better write ups?
OK, let me try again with some better notes:
A sort of initial thesis presented that we might be using, as a society, simplified morals as "pleasure." That is, complex or nuanced morality is uncomfortable, so simplified, or clear morality has the pleasure of making us feel more secure and confident. The speaker's concern though is that if this is the case, it does allow for the "gaming" of this system, where agents could present simplified moral stances to essentially manipulate people. And, (maybe, possibly) since people enjoy the clarity, they are more than willing to accept the manipulation, even were it exposed as manipulation [my editorialized stance here].
A distinction, credited to the book Echo Chambers, by Jamieson and Campbell, between filter bubbles and echo chambers. Filter bubbles as the case where you do not hear the "other side" and an echo chamber where you are informed to essentially not trust the "other side." The speaker wants to note that we seem to be, as a society, much more in the latter than the former. This is an interesting distinction and I would tend to agree, it is less of a non-hearing, and far more of a blanket mistrust of the "other side."
Clarity appeals to us because we need to sort of ration out our time and attention. So we develop heuristic methods to give us a sense of when to begin and end investigations. The sort of aesthetic quality is maybe one those those sort of heuristic method, so when things are clear we "feel" like an investigation has been sufficiently done. Appeals to quantitative results, i.e. numbers, often give us this feeling of clarity because they eschew all the contextual details and relate, essentially, extremely well to themselves (i.e. makes comparison easy).
A notion of what the sort of social proliferation of "porn," in the sense of "food porn" and so on. Pleasure without the attending costs and consequences of actually engaging with the thing. So, food enjoyed without having to bother cooking it, paying for it, and the consequence of actually eating it. So, the speaker draws the comparison that the echo chamber, the moral simplification is of the same sort, moral simplification for pleasure without having to engage in the more uncomfortable engagement with the complexity of the moral issues.
That means all this can be "gamed" by agents, looking to promote the moral simplification.
Of course the video lays all this out better than I can summarize though.
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Yes, I love this stuff. I don't always have the time to read if life sweeps me away, but I have been able to check out most of what's posted here.
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Definitely post. Some kind of summary or writeup would be interesting - with full knowledge that I'm likely not going to watch the video. A with sci's posts, I almost never read the full article but I do usually read his quoted bit and at least some of the commentary from you and others.
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I tried to do a better summary. The video is still better though, haha.
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I tried to do a better summary. The video is still better though, haha.
Summary was good, thanks for that, will try to watch the video though I am really bad at watching this sort of content even with the new speed up features on Youtube.
I think the challenge here is moral quales often do suggest a "purity" regarding particular issues. Sadly they are not the same issues for everyone [nor the same quales for the same issues].
Perhaps what's needed is a way to get people to reflect on morality itself, and how it is worth considering the quales you feel are not necessarily the ones others feel. OTOH, as the author Matthew Stover once noted, morality is precisely those rules that you think need to be enforced as otherwise we're talking about mere preferences.
I mean I do think people are gaming the "system" - see all the political pundits whoring themselves out to whatever mob will have them on Patreon - but I am not sure the issue is complexity. For example is the complexity of fetal biology really what makes someone pro-choice or pro-life? For the former the complexity is all the varied examples where delivering a baby would likely result in adverse outcomes whereas for the latter any argument for complexity is equivalent to trying to justify killing babies.
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I mean I do think people are gaming the "system" - see all the political pundits whoring themselves out to whatever mob will have them on Patreon - but I am not sure the issue is complexity. For example is the complexity of fetal biology really what makes someone pro-choice or pro-life? For the former the complexity is all the varied examples where delivering a baby would likely result in adverse outcomes whereas for the latter any argument for complexity is equivalent to trying to justify killing babies.
Well, IIRC, I think the speaker's point was that engagement with morality is generally complex, unless you just take a "my way or the highway" approach. So, anyone, or anything, offering up a "simplified" view on it can "game" the system, because that sort of approach has a good bit of "intrinsic" value to many people. That value being, in part, the "pleasure" of not having to think things through, or bear the often uncomfortable results of seeing the world as thoroughly ambiguous, or at least not in some way "objectively" clear.
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I mean I do think people are gaming the "system" - see all the political pundits whoring themselves out to whatever mob will have them on Patreon - but I am not sure the issue is complexity. For example is the complexity of fetal biology really what makes someone pro-choice or pro-life? For the former the complexity is all the varied examples where delivering a baby would likely result in adverse outcomes whereas for the latter any argument for complexity is equivalent to trying to justify killing babies.
Well, IIRC, I think the speaker's point was that engagement with morality is generally complex, unless you just take a "my way or the highway" approach. So, anyone, or anything, offering up a "simplified" view on it can "game" the system, because that sort of approach has a good bit of "intrinsic" value to many people. That value being, in part, the "pleasure" of not having to think things through, or bear the often uncomfortable results of seeing the world as thoroughly ambiguous, or at least not in some way "objectively" clear.
I guess this depends on what we mean by complexity - is it that situations are complex or morality is complex? I think most people have principles they feel are important with some of these being shifted depending on context. For example "stealing is wrong" can be mitigated by circumstance, whereas "raping a child is wrong" is one of those things that is wrong no matter context.
I do think where we go wrong is assuming morality that is clear to us now is somehow evident across ages, versus the flip side that morality is relative. As a "Hermeticist" w.r.t morality I think moral truths are out there but obfuscated. [So the relativist is wrong but so is the Platonist to an extent.]
To give an example, was reading a murder mystery written in the 50s where the characters end up debating homosexuality. While the authorial tone seems to suggest being gay isn't "Evil" with a capital E it is an erroneous choice. At first glance I could say, "wow what a homophobe!" but my own opinions about homosexuality started with believing gays were as fictional as unicorns to thinking it was some odd lifestyle [of the mentally ill]. I only figured homosexuality was something worthy of civil rights after watching the movie Philadelphia.
So this author's moral grasp in 1950 would, arguably, be better than my own as he could see farther through greater fog. But it also gets into the question of moral transference - since morality is always a set of qualia how do we even convert people to the right way of thinking? What does it mean to instill moral principles?
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I guess this depends on what we mean by complexity - is it that situations are complex or morality is complex?
Well, I think I mean, more so, that both are complex, because Being is complex. That simply flows from the issue that the Universe itself (whatever that is) is complex. It's all complex, we just do all sorts of things to "flatten" it, by heusitics, by concepts, and so on, so that we can get anything done at all.
I do think where we go wrong is assuming morality that is clear to us now is somehow evident across ages, versus the flip side that morality is relative. As a "Hermeticist" w.r.t morality I think moral truths are out there but obfuscated. [So the relativist is wrong but so is the Platonist to an extent.]
I don't know, I'm not sure how to summarize my views. I do agree with you final point, that the relativist and the Platonist are both incorrect, because I don't think there are "moral truths" just waiting "out there" but I also do not think that it's just a fun-to-go where everything is "relative" and there isn't anything to Ground anything.
For example, I read this paper: Why I am an Objectivist about Ethics (And Why You Are, Too) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57a4a2e215d5db0bee15a947/t/5aa07d73085229a9c062382c/1520467318329/Why+I+am+an+Objectivist+about+Ethics+%28And+Why+You+Are%2C+Too%29.pdf) and while I was agreeing at points, I disagree in the end (I think). But I am probably working with a different notion of what "Objective" means. Really, I'd take more of a hard-line and say Objective as the paper wants to use it, isn't an opposite of Subjective, but rather means something more of "reaching an objective" that is, a goal.
In that sense, I could see the point being made then.
To give an example, was reading a murder mystery written in the 50s where the characters end up debating homosexuality. While the authorial tone seems to suggest being gay isn't "Evil" with a capital E it is an erroneous choice. At first glance I could say, "wow what a homophobe!" but my own opinions about homosexuality started with believing gays were as fictional as unicorns to thinking it was some odd lifestyle [of the mentally ill]. I only figured homosexuality was something worthy of civil rights after watching the movie Philadelphia.
So this author's moral grasp in 1950 would, arguably, be better than my own as he could see farther through greater fog. But it also gets into the question of moral transference - since morality is always a set of qualia how do we even convert people to the right way of thinking? What does it mean to instill moral principles?
That is the crux though, right? Is there a "right way" of thinking? Isn't it all just sorts of "normative claims" all the way down?
See, what is why, above, I can't take "Objective" to mean anything like a thing-in-itself, a non-Subjective. Rather, I can only really take it seriously as a "goal-orientation." So, where the 1950's wanted to make the claim that homosexuality is an "error" based on the normative stance that a romantic relationship's "objective" (read: goal) is procreation. From that line of thinking, you can surely make the case that is rational to then conclude it is an "error."
The thing is, what if we don't share that goal? What if we have different "objectives?" What happens to that "Objective" morality?
OK, this is probably a bit too much for a pre-coffee rant. Hopefully there is something lucid in here that can be salvaged.
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I guess this depends on what we mean by complexity - is it that situations are complex or morality is complex?
Well, I think I mean, more so, that both are complex, because Being is complex. That simply flows from the issue that the Universe itself (whatever that is) is complex. It's all complex, we just do all sorts of things to "flatten" it, by heusitics, by concepts, and so on, so that we can get anything done at all.
I do think where we go wrong is assuming morality that is clear to us now is somehow evident across ages, versus the flip side that morality is relative. As a "Hermeticist" w.r.t morality I think moral truths are out there but obfuscated. [So the relativist is wrong but so is the Platonist to an extent.]
I don't know, I'm not sure how to summarize my views. I do agree with you final point, that the relativist and the Platonist are both incorrect, because I don't think there are "moral truths" just waiting "out there" but I also do not think that it's just a fun-to-go where everything is "relative" and there isn't anything to Ground anything.
For example, I read this paper: Why I am an Objectivist about Ethics (And Why You Are, Too) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57a4a2e215d5db0bee15a947/t/5aa07d73085229a9c062382c/1520467318329/Why+I+am+an+Objectivist+about+Ethics+%28And+Why+You+Are%2C+Too%29.pdf) and while I was agreeing at points, I disagree in the end (I think). But I am probably working with a different notion of what "Objective" means. Really, I'd take more of a hard-line and say Objective as the paper wants to use it, isn't an opposite of Subjective, but rather means something more of "reaching an objective" that is, a goal.
In that sense, I could see the point being made then.
To give an example, was reading a murder mystery written in the 50s where the characters end up debating homosexuality. While the authorial tone seems to suggest being gay isn't "Evil" with a capital E it is an erroneous choice. At first glance I could say, "wow what a homophobe!" but my own opinions about homosexuality started with believing gays were as fictional as unicorns to thinking it was some odd lifestyle [of the mentally ill]. I only figured homosexuality was something worthy of civil rights after watching the movie Philadelphia.
So this author's moral grasp in 1950 would, arguably, be better than my own as he could see farther through greater fog. But it also gets into the question of moral transference - since morality is always a set of qualia how do we even convert people to the right way of thinking? What does it mean to instill moral principles?
That is the crux though, right? Is there a "right way" of thinking? Isn't it all just sorts of "normative claims" all the way down?
See, what is why, above, I can't take "Objective" to mean anything like a thing-in-itself, a non-Subjective. Rather, I can only really take it seriously as a "goal-orientation." So, where the 1950's wanted to make the claim that homosexuality is an "error" based on the normative stance that a romantic relationship's "objective" (read: goal) is procreation. From that line of thinking, you can surely make the case that is rational to then conclude it is an "error."
The thing is, what if we don't share that goal? What if we have different "objectives?" What happens to that "Objective" morality?
OK, this is probably a bit too much for a pre-coffee rant. Hopefully there is something lucid in here that can be salvaged.
Question - do you think the statement "It's wrong to rape a child" is dependent on cultures and goals or is it as true today as it was in antiquity and will be as true in when we're past the Singularity?
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Question - do you think the statement "It's wrong to rape a child" is dependent on cultures and goals or is it as true today as it was in antiquity and will be as true in when we're past the Singularity?
You bait me with a loaded question, ;D
I think it does depend on something. Now, if we want to call whatever that is culture, then sure. The thing, to me, is that it depends on whatever it is that "tells" us that children are valuable things to be protected. I mean, consider, if somehow someone was a member of a society of people for whom there was no value to children for some reason, then it would likely not be normative to ascribe any particular sentiment or moral value to your given case, right?
In the end though, I think we are probably working with differing ideas of Objective though. To me, we might be able to get at something "objective seeming" but never the Objective in-itself. In this way, morals might seem objective, in so far as they lack the distinct subjective quality. To me, though, that doesn't make morals objective, rather something more like a collective or shared subjective ground (maybe).
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Question - do you think the statement "It's wrong to rape a child" is dependent on cultures and goals or is it as true today as it was in antiquity and will be as true in when we're past the Singularity?
You bait me with a loaded question, ;D
I think it does depend on something. Now, if we want to call whatever that is culture, then sure. The thing, to me, is that it depends on whatever it is that "tells" us that children are valuable things to be protected. I mean, consider, if somehow someone was a member of a society of people for whom there was no value to children for some reason, then it would likely not be normative to ascribe any particular sentiment or moral value to your given case, right?
In the end though, I think we are probably working with differing ideas of Objective though. To me, we might be able to get at something "objective seeming" but never the Objective in-itself. In this way, morals might seem objective, in so far as they lack the distinct subjective quality. To me, though, that doesn't make morals objective, rather something more like a collective or shared subjective ground (maybe).
So if you were transported to a culture that celebrated child rape you wouldn't try to change the system?
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So if you were transported to a culture that celebrated child rape you wouldn't try to change the system?
Well, of course I would, but that is because I am already "raised into" a different set of normative expectations. That is, I am already a product of a different system. I could label my view as "objective" but what makes it demonstrably so?
Unless I could point to something at least "objective seeming" like a goal, or something, I could likely make the case that there is something immoral about it. But if I were to just say, "that's not right" on what am I going to be basing that other than subjective valuation?
I just don't see how anything could be a "pure" objectively moral. You need subjectivity to even have a notion of the moral. I'd see it as a related, but ultimately still different, case if we want to say that moral can have an "objective seeming" ground. But again, that would not make morality objective, rather, we are just beginning with a ground that seems so.
Does this distinction make sense? Not a rhetorical question, it seems so to me, but I am not sure I am making the case in a way that is understandable.
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So if you were transported to a culture that celebrated child rape you wouldn't try to change the system?
Well, of course I would, but that is because I am already "raised into" a different set of normative expectations. That is, I am already a product of a different system. I could label my view as "objective" but what makes it demonstrably so?
Unless I could point to something at least "objective seeming" like a goal, or something, I could likely make the case that there is something immoral about it. But if I were to just say, "that's not right" on what am I going to be basing that other than subjective valuation?
I just don't see how anything could be a "pure" objectively moral. You need subjectivity to even have a notion of the moral. I'd see it as a related, but ultimately still different, case if we want to say that moral can have an "objective seeming" ground. But again, that would not make morality objective, rather, we are just beginning with a ground that seems so.
Does this distinction make sense? Not a rhetorical question, it seems so to me, but I am not sure I am making the case in a way that is understandable.
It seems to me like you're saying that while it would feel visceral, the moral quales would just have to be conditioned...but this seems like - to rephrase - that while you do feel visceral moral quales that seem closer to mathematical truths than gustatory preferences you cannot reconcile this notion of Truth with a picture of the world you're holding in your head?
But if the issue with moral and mathematical truth claims is they rely on subjective feeling arguably distinct from and removed from whatever the Actual is...then how much more removed is the intellectual picture of the world you're constructing from your philosophical reading?
Another way of looking at it from the Tart Toter in Adventure Time** (https://vladimirslav.com/2014/05/adveture-time-tart-toter/) ->
This cosmic dance of bursting decadence
and withheld permissions twists all our arms collectively,
but if sweetness can win, and it can,
then I’ll still be here tomorrow,
to high five you yesterday my friend.
Peace
**One of the great anti-mechanistic, pro-initatory works of our time
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It seems to me like you're saying that while it would feel visceral, the moral quales would just have to be conditioned...but this seems like - to rephrase - that while you do feel visceral moral quales that seem closer to mathematical truths than gustatory preferences you cannot reconcile this notion of Truth with a picture of the world you're holding in your head?
I think it would be more with the notion of Objectivity or the Objective in-itself I hold. To me, I still can't wrap my head around how, even if morality were Objective, that we would access them without somehow Subjectively evaluating, or valuating, them. In this case, while there might have been a moral Noumenal from which the moral Phenomena might thus flow, what can we justifiably say that we know of the Noumenal, when all we have access to is the Phenomenal?
There seems to me to be only two options, we either assume the Noumenal (Objective) and the Phenomenal (Subjective) are the same, or we assume they are not the same. The issue though, to me, is that no matter which we choose, we are still just assuming. This is why, to me, while we might make the claim that we ground this, or that moral principle in the Objective, there is no way we are, since all we actually have is the Subjective experience not immediate access to the Objective in-itself.
So, I am still lost how, even if there is Objective Morality, we might come to know it? All we could, as far as I could tell, Subjectively evaluate the Objective at which point it is no longer Objective, but mediated by Subjectivity.
But if the issue with moral and mathematical truth claims is they rely on subjective feeling arguably distinct from and removed from whatever the Actual is...then how much more removed is the intellectual picture of the world you're constructing from your philosophical reading?
Hmm, well, I am certainly not making the case that I have access to the Objective, or Noumenal, at all. At best, all I could possibly claim is to document the disconnect (or possible disconnect) between the Phenomenal and the Noumenal. I could not say what the Actual is, only to say that I don't see how we could have anything but mediated access to it.
Then that leaves us in the same sort of place that Euthyphro was, right? We'd claim the moral is moral because the Objective Moral tells us so, yet, the only way we'd know those via some Subjective method, no? Then we are still in the same place we were before, with only Subjective valuation to go off of, whether or not the Objective is "truly" out there or not.
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I think it would be more with the notion of Objectivity or the Objective in-itself I hold. To me, I still can't wrap my head around how, even if morality were Objective, that we would access them without somehow Subjectively evaluating, or valuating, them. In this case, while there might have been a moral Noumenal from which the moral Phenomena might thus flow, what can we justifiably say that we know of the Noumenal, when all we have access to is the Phenomenal?
There seems to me to be only two options, we either assume the Noumenal (Objective) and the Phenomenal (Subjective) are the same, or we assume they are not the same. The issue though, to me, is that no matter which we choose, we are still just assuming. This is why, to me, while we might make the claim that we ground this, or that moral principle in the Objective, there is no way we are, since all we actually have is the Subjective experience not immediate access to the Objective in-itself.
So, I am still lost how, even if there is Objective Morality, we might come to know it? All we could, as far as I could tell, Subjectively evaluate the Objective at which point it is no longer Objective, but mediated by Subjectivity.
Hmm, well, I am certainly not making the case that I have access to the Objective, or Noumenal, at all. At best, all I could possibly claim is to document the disconnect (or possible disconnect) between the Phenomenal and the Noumenal. I could not say what the Actual is, only to say that I don't see how we could have anything but mediated access to it.
Then that leaves us in the same sort of place that Euthyphro was, right? We'd claim the moral is moral because the Objective Moral tells us so, yet, the only way we'd know those via some Subjective method, no? Then we are still in the same place we were before, with only Subjective valuation to go off of, whether or not the Objective is "truly" out there or not.
Is the atomic composition of salt subjective? The gravitational constant? The truth of the Pythagorean theorem?
I realize people claim to be suspicious of, say, mathematical truths, all the while confidently relying on the technology born of that mathematics. But to me this is the distinction between the armchair philosophizing of academia and the real world living of truth claims.
That said I would agree we could always be wrong about our morality, based on historical shifts...but then why did moral quales bring about changes in history? We can intellectualize this but moral quales seem of a piece with the quales that ground Reason. To me the statement, "Raping a child is wrong" doesn't seem bound by culture or context, and is as true as Pythagoras' Theorem.
I could be wrong, just as the proofs underlying the algorithms we use for flight could be wrong, just as we could be in the Matrix or this could all be a dream...but does anyone really take that seriously in their actual course of life besides maybe the insane?
As for Euthyphro, I think that specifically is an argument against Divine Command given Plato had no qualms with making a distinction between the Good and mere sophistry. Of course Plato also realized that getting to the Good was itself not an easy task...and he did seem pretty okay with slaver if not some pedo shit...
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Is the atomic composition of salt subjective? The gravitational constant? The truth of the Pythagorean theorem?
I realize people claim to be suspicious of, say, mathematical truths, all the while confidently relying on the technology born of that mathematics. But to me this is the distinction between the armchair philosophizing of academia and the real world living of truth claims.
Hmm, well, yes, but also no. There is an "objective" atomic composition of salt, at least in theory. In actual practice though, what we have is the notional composition built upon our concept of an atom, our concept of composition, and so on. What is an atom in-itself? Well, here again, we get to a place where the answer seems kind of fuzzy. Are atoms particles or waves? What is the difference? What says it should be one or the other? And so on. We don't have atoms in-themselves. We simply employ pragmatic methods of "understanding" in so far as it can predict results to various degrees.
This is where I would use the notion of something "objective seeming." That is what science largely tends to do, right? Move knowledge ever toward the thing-in-itself by discarding any sort of "error" or "bias" found. Still though, throughout this process, we can never get to the thing-in-itself, because it is not accessible. We still need some Subject to "read" or "interpret" the result.
That said I would agree we could always be wrong about our morality, based on historical shifts...but then why did moral quales bring about changes in history? We can intellectualize this but moral quales seem of a piece with the quales that ground Reason. To me the statement, "Raping a child is wrong" doesn't seem bound by culture or context, and is as true as Pythagoras' Theorem.
I could be wrong, just as the proofs underlying the algorithms we use for flight could be wrong, just as we could be in the Matrix or this could all be a dream...but does anyone really take that seriously in their actual course of life besides maybe the insane?
Well, I would not discount the notion that I might well actually be insane. But, just because we might engage in pragmatic heuristic thinking to make it though a day, doesn't, to me, mean it must be the case that it is giving us bedrock-like Truth.
The thing is, the assumptions that base how and why the Pythagorean Theorem is true aren't really like the assumptions that go in to deciding if something is, or is not, moral. I mean, they share the character of assumptions, but because of the manner of human action, determining the constituent parts of why someone take an action or another is not, to me, the same as enumerating the constituent number of sides that constitute a triangle.
So, where the sort of geometrical system can be laid out quite clearly, could we do the same for the moral system? In fact, isn't this exactly what the speaker of the video is sort of getting at, with how we give deference to quantifiable measures, since they have the sort of "objective character?"
To me, I don't see why we should equate math and morals at all, really. Again, to me, this is the same sort of move Harris wants to make in his usual, "science can determine 'correct' morals." No, it can't, in my opinion. One, because I still don't buy the notion that there is a "moral object" to measure, quantify or experiment with, and two, because even science is still subjective, just an evolutionary sort of move toward notional "objectivity."
As for Euthyphro, I think that specifically is an argument against Divine Command given Plato had no qualms with making a distinction between the Good and mere sophistry. Of course Plato also realized that getting to the Good was itself not an easy task...and he did seem pretty okay with slaver if not some pedo shit...
Well, my typical loose associations likely lead me astray. I still feel like something is there, leading me to think they are somehow akin, but I will chalk it up to a likely flawed reading on my part.
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Hmm, maybe I have sort of figured why I wanted to bring in Euthyphro. Could it not be read as sorting asking if the Holy depended on God to make it so, or if God simply favored that which was intrinsically Holy?
In the same way, do we discover what it is that adheres to an Objective Morality, or do we simply ascribe to the Objective Morality that which we already find moral?
Does that make for a sensible reading at all? I am certainly no Platonic scholar...
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Hmm, well, yes, but also no. There is an "objective" atomic composition of salt, at least in theory. In actual practice though, what we have is the notional composition built upon our concept of an atom, our concept of composition, and so on. What is an atom in-itself? Well, here again, we get to a place where the answer seems kind of fuzzy. Are atoms particles or waves? What is the difference? What says it should be one or the other? And so on. We don't have atoms in-themselves. We simply employ pragmatic methods of "understanding" in so far as it can predict results to various degrees.
The particle/wave duality is something that was empirically found to go against the expectation of physicists in their time, insofar as I understand my science history. Isn't that the subjective running up against the objective?
This is where I would use the notion of something "objective seeming." That is what science largely tends to do, right? Move knowledge ever toward the thing-in-itself by discarding any sort of "error" or "bias" found. Still though, throughout this process, we can never get to the thing-in-itself, because it is not accessible. We still need some Subject to "read" or "interpret" the result.
To say things-in-themselves are not accessible just seems to be question begging to me. For an Idealist, to give the extreme example, the thing-in-itself simply is the collection of phenomenal properties. We simply have to accept that we don't know - in the intellectualizing sense - whether we're in the Matrix, in a dream, etc. But then we might as well accept the rules of Logic themselves have no Ground for the extreme skeptic and there's no point to philosophy at all.
Well, I would not discount the notion that I might well actually be insane. But, just because we might engage in pragmatic heuristic thinking to make it though a day, doesn't, to me, mean it must be the case that it is giving us bedrock-like Truth.
What is heuristic about mathematics? I think this is a claim that needs some convincing argument for it?
The thing is, the assumptions that base how and why the Pythagorean Theorem is true aren't really like the assumptions that go in to deciding if something is, or is not, moral. I mean, they share the character of assumptions, but because of the manner of human action, determining the constituent parts of why someone take an action or another is not, to me, the same as enumerating the constituent number of sides that constitute a triangle.
Well if two statements - one moral, the other mathematical - have the same kind of quale, that of Objective Truth, that seems to be a worthwhile commonality?
So, where the sort of geometrical system can be laid out quite clearly, could we do the same for the moral system? In fact, isn't this exactly what the speaker of the video is sort of getting at, with how we give deference to quantifiable measures, since they have the sort of "objective character?"
To me, I don't see why we should equate math and morals at all, really.
I think the commonality is not at the level of systems but rather commonality of feeling.
Again, to me, this is the same sort of move Harris wants to make in his usual, "science can determine 'correct' morals." No, it can't, in my opinion. One, because I still don't buy the notion that there is a "moral object" to measure, quantify or experiment with, and two, because even science is still subjective, just an evolutionary sort of move toward notional "objectivity."
Well Harris is wrong that we can use science to find the exact correct moral position. [OTOH] I think the practice of science does have subjective aspects, but I think no one lives their actual lives with the belief that scientific findings underpinning technology (along with, say, proofs of computational algorithms) are akin to the opinions someone has about the latest pop musician's album.
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The particle/wave duality is something that was empirically found to go against the expectation of physicists in their time, insofar as I understand my science history. Isn't that the subjective running up against the objective?
Honestly, I don't know and I think I am getting beyond myself here. What I meant was more so that the label of particle or wave isn't an atom, it is a concept we use to try to categorize whatever an atom is, in-itself.
To say things-in-themselves are not accessible just seems to be question begging to me. For an Idealist, to give the extreme example, the thing-in-itself simply is the collection of phenomenal properties. We simply have to accept that we don't know - in the intellectualizing sense - whether we're in the Matrix, in a dream, etc. But then we might as well accept the rules of Logic themselves have no Ground for the extreme skeptic and there's no point to philosophy at all.
I don't know about that sort of slippery slope there. We keep math and logic because they have practical utility. I don't know that there is "Objective Logic" or "Objective Math" any more than I know that there is "Objective Morality." That there is utility in any/all of those isn't "proof" to me, any more than the utility of believing in God proves God's existence. As for the "use" of Philosophy, well, I don't know that either, but I would probably tend to think of it more as creative than descriptive.
What is heuristic about mathematics? I think this is a claim that needs some convincing argument for it?
Well, no doubt I use the word "wrongly" for certain. However, working from this sort of definition, of "employing a practical method that is not guaranteed to be optimal, perfect or rational, but which is nevertheless sufficient for reaching an immediate, short-term goal. Where finding an optimal solution is impossible or impractical, heuristic methods can be used to speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution." So, where math is rational and sometimes even optimal, what lacks, to me, is the guarantee of such, because I don't think math gives us the Noumenal, in-itself. Now, I think in the actual common parlance of the word, heuristic is used more to specifically call out things that are considered in-exact, so for instance, estimation, or the like. A formal calculation is largely considered to simply be the answer. To me though, the math, the calculation doesn't give us the Noumenal though, just what is usually, practically, the "good enough" descriptor that can facilitate the use at hand.
Once again though, perhaps my loose associations lead me astry.
Well if two statements - one moral, the other mathematical - have the same kind of quale, that of Objective Truth, that seems to be a worthwhile commonality?
Well, I personally don't find the similarity to denote a necessarily actual commonality. Let me pretend for a moment that I have Number-Color Synesthesia, because the number 2 and the color red share qualia, then I should say they must be the same? I use the edge-case here to point out that, to me, I don't find it necessarily convincing that just because we might, in a collective Subjective manner, share quale, that this must mean that we are getting something Objective, something Noumenal.
But, maybe I am just a radical Skeptic in this, I don't know.
Well Harris is wrong that we can use science to find the exact correct moral position. [OTOH] I think the practice of science does have subjective aspects, but I think no one lives their actual lives with the belief that scientific findings underpinning technology (along with, say, proofs of computational algorithms) are akin to the opinions someone has about the latest pop musician's album.
Well, we know we both agree on the Harris issue and I would agree that most people don't live in a way that discounts quantitative results in the same way they discount qualitative results. Again, going right back to the video here's point out that we defer to the quantitative, because it has the sort of "objective character" we want to appeal to. And that is not to say that this approach does not work. It certainly does. If it didn't, I could not type this message, let alone send it to you.
That being said, this is where, to me, the notion of the heuristic kicks me. Because, for all the quantitative, practical use, we get from all that, it still doesn't give (me) the access to the Noumenal. So, it is still an estimation, but likely a pretty damn good and practical one. However, we don't really, to me, have the same methods or techniques available with respect to morality.
So, for me, where we want to appeal to the objective mathematical "truth" of how the internet works, we can't really do the same for morals. Where we can "measure" the spin of an electron, we can't "measure" the moral worth of compassion. If we could, we would have Harris' paradigm, no?
But we both agree we don't and can't. So, to me, in the sort of Deleuzian way, math is a great tool on the "plane of reference" but to me, that doesn't make it truly objective, just a strong descriptor of what might be objective. On the "plane of immanence" though, where we can't make that reference, where we can't measure, math is not of much use, which is where we stand with morals. Again, because, in the Is-Ought distinction paradigm, measuring the Is will not give us the Ought. So, the moral is not "out there" to be measured, it is within the Subjective "future" projected "plane of immanence" where we must make it so.
To me, appealing to a "Objective morality" does nothing different, really, than an appeal to God does. It isn't up to us then, to reason our morals, they are simply "out there" to be uncovered. I disagree, the morals are "in us" to be brought forth and while we might, in pursuit of this, invoke a notion of "Objective morality" as an appeal to an authority, it does not make it so that such an authority is really "out there." At least, not to me. So, since we can't know that God, or "Objective morality" or whatever, is, in fact, out there, we are ultimately left, in my opinion, in the exact same position regardless: the morality must come from us, Subjects, and so be a product of Subjectivity.
I just don't see a way out of this cage, but maybe the bars are just my own bias.
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Honestly, I don't know and I think I am getting beyond myself here. What I meant was more so that the label of particle or wave isn't an atom, it is a concept we use to try to categorize whatever an atom is, in-itself.
Well I would agree that we may not be at the level of actual reality, like this could be the Matrix, but underlying a simulation is some Ground. I think our search gives us some feel for the Objective Ground, and perhaps more importantly our inner selves accept the Objectivity of the world around us. Perhaps, to make things tricky, it's a seeming Objectivity to our Subjectivity but we simply don't.
I don't know about that sort of slippery slope there. We keep math and logic because they have practical utility. I don't know that there is "Objective Logic" or "Objective Math" any more than I know that there is "Objective Morality." That there is utility in any/all of those isn't "proof" to me, any more than the utility of believing in God proves God's existence. As for the "use" of Philosophy, well, I don't know that either, but I would probably tend to think of it more as creative than descriptive.
Even here you seem to be using the assumption of logic to make an argument. This throws shanks to the wolves of my argument - how we actually live is quite different than the sophistry of mere intellectualizing. People can muse about logic or math being subjective, but I've yet to see someone make a coherent argument for why proofs of theorems or modus ponens would fail under a coherent Other-Logic. How could we even, for example, identify the syllogisms if all we ever had were approximations to them?
Well, no doubt I use the word "wrongly" for certain. However, working from this sort of definition, of "employing a practical method that is not guaranteed to be optimal, perfect or rational, but which is nevertheless sufficient for reaching an immediate, short-term goal. Where finding an optimal solution is impossible or impractical, heuristic methods can be used to speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution." So, where math is rational and sometimes even optimal, what lacks, to me, is the guarantee of such, because I don't think math gives us the Noumenal, in-itself. Now, I think in the actual common parlance of the word, heuristic is used more to specifically call out things that are considered in-exact, so for instance, estimation, or the like. A formal calculation is largely considered to simply be the answer. To me though, the math, the calculation doesn't give us the Noumenal though, just what is usually, practically, the "good enough" descriptor that can facilitate the use at hand.
I wasn't talking about calculation, but the proofs and theorems underlying all the applied math. We proceed from proof of an algorithm to its implementation, so the Truth of math affects our causal chains. But what does it mean to prove any theorem but to set up an argument that leads to the consensus feeling of a particular quale...yet sometimes even a proof starts with one person feeling the "this is logically sound" quale, and only over time do others come to agree...
Well, I personally don't find the similarity to denote a necessarily actual commonality. Let me pretend for a moment that I have Number-Color Synesthesia, because the number 2 and the color red share qualia, then I should say they must be the same?
But do they really share a quale? Does a person with synesthesia see the number 2 as red or associate the number with the color?
In any case, my point wasn't that O.M. is a special kind of mathematical system, but rather it is perfectly reasonable to believe in O.M. b/c we already depend on quales giving us access to Truths.
Well, we know we both agree on the Harris issue and I would agree that most people don't live in a way that discounts quantitative results in the same way they discount qualitative results. Again, going right back to the video here's point out that we defer to the quantitative, because it has the sort of "objective character" we want to appeal to. And that is not to say that this approach does not work. It certainly does. If it didn't, I could not type this message, let alone send it to you.
That being said, this is where, to me, the notion of the heuristic kicks me. Because, for all the quantitative, practical use, we get from all that, it still doesn't give (me) the access to the Noumenal. So, it is still an estimation, but likely a pretty damn good and practical one. However, we don't really, to me, have the same methods or techniques available with respect to morality.
I still don't see where heuristics fit in with mathematical reasoning when it comes to proofs. And again, if it's all estimation, how do we even comprehend (not to mention teach) the syllogisms if we never actually grasp them in our use of Reason?
So, for me, where we want to appeal to the objective mathematical "truth" of how the internet works, we can't really do the same for morals. Where we can "measure" the spin of an electron, we can't "measure" the moral worth of compassion. If we could, we would have Harris' paradigm, no?
Well, again, the commonality is meant to counter the idea that O.M. can't exist because it relies on feeling. I mean to even type out an argument refers a similar feeling of Truth with regard to Memory. Everything relies on quales - the feeling of Truth, so O.M. is just of a piece with the rest of our existence.
But we both agree we don't and can't. So, to me, in the sort of Deleuzian way, math is a great tool on the "plane of reference" but to me, that doesn't make it truly objective, just a strong descriptor of what might be objective. On the "plane of immanence" though, where we can't make that reference, where we can't measure, math is not of much use, which is where we stand with morals. Again, because, in the Is-Ought distinction paradigm, measuring the Is will not give us the Ought. So, the moral is not "out there" to be measured, it is within the Subjective "future" projected "plane of immanence" where we must make it so.
How does one decide which morality to "make it so"...seems like you'd need some kind of Principles about what is right or wrong...oh wait ;-)
To me, appealing to a "Objective morality" does nothing different, really, than an appeal to God does.
Appealing to God is saying, "No matter your moral quales this other dude's opinion supercedes it". It is kind of the opposite of appealing to an O.M.?
It isn't up to us then, to reason our morals, they are simply "out there" to be uncovered. I disagree, the morals are "in us" to be brought forth and while we might, in pursuit of this, invoke a notion of "Objective morality" as an appeal to an authority, it does not make it so that such an authority is really "out there." At least, not to me. So, since we can't know that God, or "Objective morality" or whatever, is, in fact, out there, we are ultimately left, in my opinion, in the exact same position regardless: the morality must come from us, Subjects, and so be a product of Subjectivity.
Goes back to the question of how to decide which morality comes from us - seems like you need morality to generate morality?
I just don't see a way out of this cage, but maybe the bars are just my own bias.
Well my critique is the critique against a good bit of modern philosophy, in that we live our lives with bedrock assumptions even philosophers rely on until they start intellectualization. But this to me is is having a map in our heads and confusing it with the territory.
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Appealing to God is saying, "No matter your moral quales this other dude's opinion supercedes it". It is kind of the opposite of appealing to an O.M.?
Well, I'm not using God as "another subject" in this case. I am talking about God as the Objective Foundation, of sorts, to the Universe. In reality, what I am more doing is pointing out the external, appeal to the notional "objective source." That is, the move to shift what I see as the subjective quale to an external, "objective" source. In this way, I don't see any significant difference between notional "objective morality" and notional deity. They can both be the same. Exerternal, "objective" source for the foundational start to morality. The only thing, to me, that changes is the name we give it and possibly, some other quantities we might want or not want to ascribe to it. In the case of a deity, we might want to ascribe it intentionality, in the case of objective morals, we might not. In either case, we are still making the external appeal to "authority."
My posts are just burgeoning though and I am likely getting further and further from an actual point. Let me see if I can try to summarize what I see your view as and, if you like, you can see if you could summarize mine.
I believe you are making the case that moral quale, or if we like, moral intuition, can and does guide us to objective moral truth, in the same sort of way that you see mathematical "proofs" guide us toward objective truths about nature.
Now, my broad point is that, if there are objective moral truths, or not, we cannot access them in any case, because all we have at our disposal would be subjective moral intuitions, or whatever it is we want to call "reason." Now, in the case of "moral intuition" I think the case is fairly clear to draw a line to the inherent Subjectivity there. In the case of "reason" though, I do admit the line is less clear. Now, broadly speaking, my point is that while it would be nice to say that since we are unsure about the line from reason to Subjectivity, then the line from reason to Objectivity must be more clear. To that, I cannot really agree, because the line there runs direct to an almost brick wall, to me, of the break between the phenomenal and the noumenal.
Now, I am not well versed in the philosophy of math, by any stretch of the imagination, but I do think that math and logic do tend to, essentially, push right up to that Phenomenal/Noumenal wall, but I do not see how it would break through that wall. So, once again, I am still finding myself "locked" on the Phenomenal side of the break. With morals, while we can use logic to push against that wall again, we are still locked on what I can only think of as the Phenomenal and Subjective side of the wall.
This does not mean that I am saying that there can be no actual morality, but rather, that morals are always subjective to some degree. What we can do, like the scientific method does, is try to, ever more, push on toward something objective, but, asymptotically, we can never get there. So, perhaps wrongly, I don't think logic or math gives us Objective Truth. I also don't think that moral intuition gives is access to Objective Moral Truth.
To me, all we have is the Subjective valuation. Where that comes from, if there is an Objective Source to which we make our Subjective valuations based off of, or not, still must come from we Subjects in the end. Because, if we are agents at all, we are not bound by this Objective Source, we could only consider our perception of it, not access it immediately. And that is the key, to me, that it is all mediated. That mediating factor, to me, must be Subjectivity, as far as I can tell.
And, as a matter of disclosure, I have no inkling that any moral philosopher, current or not, would actually would espouse my likely poor take on things.
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Appealing to God is saying, "No matter your moral quales this other dude's opinion supercedes it". It is kind of the opposite of appealing to an O.M.?
Well, I'm not using God as "another subject" in this case. I am talking about God as the Objective Foundation, of sorts, to the Universe. In reality, what I am more doing is pointing out the external, appeal to the notional "objective source." That is, the move to shift what I see as the subjective quale to an external, "objective" source. In this way, I don't see any significant difference between notional "objective morality" and notional deity. They can both be the same. Exerternal, "objective" source for the foundational start to morality. The only thing, to me, that changes is the name we give it and possibly, some other quantities we might want or not want to ascribe to it. In the case of a deity, we might want to ascribe it intentionality, in the case of objective morals, we might not. In either case, we are still making the external appeal to "authority."
My posts are just burgeoning though and I am likely getting further and further from an actual point. Let me see if I can try to summarize what I see your view as and, if you like, you can see if you could summarize mine.
I believe you are making the case that moral quale, or if we like, moral intuition, can and does guide us to objective moral truth, in the same sort of way that you see mathematical "proofs" guide us toward objective truths about nature.
Now, my broad point is that, if there are objective moral truths, or not, we cannot access them in any case, because all we have at our disposal would be subjective moral intuitions, or whatever it is we want to call "reason." Now, in the case of "moral intuition" I think the case is fairly clear to draw a line to the inherent Subjectivity there. In the case of "reason" though, I do admit the line is less clear. Now, broadly speaking, my point is that while it would be nice to say that since we are unsure about the line from reason to Subjectivity, then the line from reason to Objectivity must be more clear. To that, I cannot really agree, because the line there runs direct to an almost brick wall, to me, of the break between the phenomenal and the noumenal.
Now, I am not well versed in the philosophy of math, by any stretch of the imagination, but I do think that math and logic do tend to, essentially, push right up to that Phenomenal/Noumenal wall, but I do not see how it would break through that wall. So, once again, I am still finding myself "locked" on the Phenomenal side of the break. With morals, while we can use logic to push against that wall again, we are still locked on what I can only think of as the Phenomenal and Subjective side of the wall.
This does not mean that I am saying that there can be no actual morality, but rather, that morals are always subjective to some degree. What we can do, like the scientific method does, is try to, ever more, push on toward something objective, but, asymptotically, we can never get there. So, perhaps wrongly, I don't think logic or math gives us Objective Truth. I also don't think that moral intuition gives is access to Objective Moral Truth.
To me, all we have is the Subjective valuation. Where that comes from, if there is an Objective Source to which we make our Subjective valuations based off of, or not, still must come from we Subjects in the end. Because, if we are agents at all, we are not bound by this Objective Source, we could only consider our perception of it, not access it immediately. And that is the key, to me, that it is all mediated. That mediating factor, to me, must be Subjectivity, as far as I can tell.
And, as a matter of disclosure, I have no inkling that any moral philosopher, current or not, would actually would espouse my likely poor take on things.
This all seems very much like a post-modern take...but I thought you were a Jordan Peterson fan? ;-)
I still see a distinction between Objective Morality as an assumption and the idea that what is Objectively Moral can be determined by the opinions of a particular deity. This is the same distinction I believe Plato to be making, as otherwise there would be no dialogue specifying Euthyphro's Dilemma. In fact Plato's whole reason for writing that dialogue - if my history of philosophy is on point - is that some of his moral quales went against some particular religious dictates.
That said, I don't think we are as far apart as I originally thought. I also think the Good is something society ideally moves toward, MLK Jr.'s Arc of Justice and all that. Though I can't see how you could say Science or any other system could move toward an Objective if all we can grasp is the Subjective.
I think a major point of my disagreement is the notion that the usual examples for neurological heuristics and phenomenal/noumenal distinctions are related to our sensory apparatus and even there mostly seem to revolve around seeing. But it's a quite a leap to note some User Illusion aspects of our interfacing with the world and the idea that mathematics and logic are somehow muddied by our subjective apprehension. Getting past the fact this sort of argument undermines itself by chewing on the foundations of logic the "Everything is muddied by Subjectivity" argument seems hard to disentangle from the assertion of Hyperchaos. (Of course for me Logical Universals are the only good argument against Hyperchaos...)
Additionally, I still don't get what exactly it means to say Mathematics & Logic are muddied by subjective apprehension. It seems to me these come to us "pure", and my reason to bring up such Universals is to note that quales can lead us to such bedrock Truth.
I've seen this sort of argument, that what we think of as Universals are really evolutionary neurology, posited - that aliens could have their own Logic - though this also only seems to come up when someone wants to champion Physicalism by negating the necessary existence of Universals. Meanwhile even grade schoolers seem capable of grokking that the reason SETI sends mathematical knowledge into space is precisely because of said Universals being, well, Universal...
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This all seems very much like a post-modern take...but I thought you were a Jordan Peterson fan? ;-)
Well, I certainly never said I was anything but an idiot. However, my interest in Peterson was an interest was an interest in a sort of phenomenology into his original reference material, not his "straight out of Stephen Hicks" notion of what post-Modern philosophy is, that is for certain.
I still see a distinction between Objective Morality as an assumption and the idea that what is Objectively Moral can be determined by the opinions of a particular deity. This is the same distinction I believe Plato to be making, as otherwise there would be no dialogue specifying Euthyphro's Dilemma. In fact Plato's whole reason for writing that dialogue - if my history of philosophy is on point - is that some of his moral quales went against some particular religious dictates.
That said, I don't think we are as far apart as I originally thought. I also think the Good is something society ideally moves toward, MLK Jr.'s Arc of Justice and all that. Though I can't see how you could say Science or any other system could move toward an Objective if all we can grasp is the Subjective.
Well, maybe my take is a bad one. However, I just do not see how we "grasp the Objective" through the Phenomenal/Noumenal gap. Now, we could simply surmise that there is no gap. That what we get simply is the Noumenal and that any mediation from/through consciousness/perception is nothing. However, I have my doubts about that. I can't "prove" a difference in the Noumenal but not one can "prove" the similarity either. So, where does that leave me, epistemically? To me, all we can access is the Phenomenal, so I will say that all we have is the Phenomenal. Is the Phenomenal influenced by something Noumenal? That certainly is plausible, but again, what could we say about that but to just assume it so?
I think a major point of my disagreement is the notion that the usual examples for neurological heuristics and phenomenal/noumenal distinctions are related to our sensory apparatus and even there mostly seem to revolve around seeing. But it's a quite a leap to note some User Illusion aspects of our interfacing with the world and the idea that mathematics and logic are somehow muddied by our subjective apprehension. Getting past the fact this sort of argument undermines itself by chewing on the foundations of logic the "Everything is muddied by Subjectivity" argument seems hard to disentangle from the assertion of Hyperchaos. (Of course for me Logical Universals are the only good argument against Hyperchaos...)
Additionally, I still don't get what exactly it means to say Mathematics & Logic are muddied by subjective apprehension. It seems to me these come to us "pure", and my reason to bring up such Universals is to note that quales can lead us to such bedrock Truth.
I've seen this sort of argument, that what we think of as Universals are really evolutionary neurology, posited - that aliens could have their own Logic - though this also only seems to come up when someone wants to champion Physicalism by negating the necessary existence of Universals. Meanwhile even grade schoolers seem capable of grokking that the reason SETI sends mathematical knowledge into space is precisely because of said Universals being, well, Universal...
Well, let me be clear, I am certainly not a logician, nor a mathematician, so I could certainly well be wrong. However, I do think I have heard the idea from either mathematicians or philosophers, that there are alternate possible mathematics. That doesn't really mean they aren't all describing the same thing (Reality, for example), but I don't think any of them would give you immediate access to Reality in-itself. Now, maybe this guy, Stephen Wolfram, is a total crackpot, and if so, if I saw the evidence that he is flatly wrong, or could not be correct (https://www.closertotruth.com/interviews/4017), I really would not hesitate to change my view.
So, does Math have some Subjective component? To me, the answer is yes. If we can reference Mathematical "beauty" for example, then I think that is a sort of tell that we are not on a "truly" Objective system. Again, I can't seem to break myself out of the Kantian cage I am thinking of. So, to me, while Math might, ultimately be only minutely, minisculely subjective, still don't see that getting across the Phenomenal/Noumenal boundary. Again though, this does not assume that the Phenomena and the Noumenal must be different, but at the same time, provides to real way to say they must be the same.
So, for me, I am left in the lurch here. To get back to morality, to say that our moral intuitions access noumenal morality, to me, just does not make sense. Were that the case, how could we, as you point out above, make "moral progress?" What mediated the access, for example, between Plato and the notion that "slavery is wrong." Plato's moral quale that this was perfectly justifiable, was the from the Objective Moral? If so, what happened now? How do we now get a different answer? Did the Objective Moral change, or did the Subjective Moral change? In either case, how can we know which moral quale is closer to, or further away from the Objective Moral?
So, let us pretend that tomorrow, someone takes up Plato's case on slavery. This person's moral quale says it is perfectly justifiable. Now, if we have the sort of view that moral quale is pointing to the Objective Moral, how do we refute that? Assert that this person does not truly have the quale? We don't have access to that. Do we say that, for some reason, they are wrongly accessing the Objective Moral? OK, but on what grounds, when our access to the Objective Moral is our moral quale? Now we have our Subjective quale versus their Subjective quale, which is the "right" one? You see how I am not getting out of a Subjective trap here?
As always though, I am likely just doing a poor job explaining my position. Maybe it is the case that my position is not tennible, but I still can't see how, even if there is Objective Truth out there, we do not get it mediated by Subjectivity. Not in science, not in math, and definitely not in morals. Now, one day I will get down the brass tacks and finally read Karl Popper's Objective Knowledge and maybe some of his other work, but, this quote from the SEP on Karl Popper (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/):
"Scientific theories, for him, are not inductively inferred from experience, nor is scientific experimentation carried out with a view to verifying or finally establishing the truth of theories; rather, all knowledge is provisional, conjectural, hypothetical—we can never finally prove our scientific theories, we can merely (provisionally) confirm or (conclusively) refute them; hence at any given time we have to choose between the potentially infinite number of theories which will explain the set of phenomena under investigation. Faced with this choice, we can only eliminate those theories which are demonstrably false, and rationally choose between the remaining, unfalsified theories. Hence Popper’s emphasis on the importance of the critical spirit to science—for him critical thinking is the very essence of rationality. For it is only by critical thought that we can eliminate false theories, and determine which of the remaining theories is the best available one, in the sense of possessing the highest level of explanatory force and predictive power."
Emphasis this their's, not mine, but points to what I am sort of saying, I think. And to me, part of that mediation is a Subjective gap, the inability to ever completely remove the Subjective from ourselves, or our theory, observation, formulation, or what have you.
While Math is so expressly formal that it gives us a very "unique" ability to lay out, view and consider foundational assumptions, that sort of thing is not, as far as I can tell, the same for morals. The foundational assumptions in morals lay in a much "darker" less formally drawn out place, so, this might be why our mathematical intuitions are likely closer to something Noumenal than our moral ones are (to me). Because in moral reasoning, we are likely making foundational assumptions are are very Subjective in nature, where mathematical ones are at least notionally Objective in the sense of being less Subjective (as far as I could tell).
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This all seems very much like a post-modern take...but I thought you were a Jordan Peterson fan? ;-)
Well, I certainly never said I was anything but an idiot. However, my interest in Peterson was an interest was an interest in a sort of phenomenology into his original reference material, not his "straight out of Stephen Hicks" notion of what post-Modern philosophy is, that is for certain.
I still see a distinction between Objective Morality as an assumption and the idea that what is Objectively Moral can be determined by the opinions of a particular deity. This is the same distinction I believe Plato to be making, as otherwise there would be no dialogue specifying Euthyphro's Dilemma. In fact Plato's whole reason for writing that dialogue - if my history of philosophy is on point - is that some of his moral quales went against some particular religious dictates.
That said, I don't think we are as far apart as I originally thought. I also think the Good is something society ideally moves toward, MLK Jr.'s Arc of Justice and all that. Though I can't see how you could say Science or any other system could move toward an Objective if all we can grasp is the Subjective.
Well, maybe my take is a bad one. However, I just do not see how we "grasp the Objective" through the Phenomenal/Noumenal gap. Now, we could simply surmise that there is no gap. That what we get simply is the Noumenal and that any mediation from/through consciousness/perception is nothing. However, I have my doubts about that. I can't "prove" a difference in the Noumenal but not one can "prove" the similarity either. So, where does that leave me, epistemically? To me, all we can access is the Phenomenal, so I will say that all we have is the Phenomenal. Is the Phenomenal influenced by something Noumenal? That certainly is plausible, but again, what could we say about that but to just assume it so?
I think a major point of my disagreement is the notion that the usual examples for neurological heuristics and phenomenal/noumenal distinctions are related to our sensory apparatus and even there mostly seem to revolve around seeing. But it's a quite a leap to note some User Illusion aspects of our interfacing with the world and the idea that mathematics and logic are somehow muddied by our subjective apprehension. Getting past the fact this sort of argument undermines itself by chewing on the foundations of logic the "Everything is muddied by Subjectivity" argument seems hard to disentangle from the assertion of Hyperchaos. (Of course for me Logical Universals are the only good argument against Hyperchaos...)
Additionally, I still don't get what exactly it means to say Mathematics & Logic are muddied by subjective apprehension. It seems to me these come to us "pure", and my reason to bring up such Universals is to note that quales can lead us to such bedrock Truth.
I've seen this sort of argument, that what we think of as Universals are really evolutionary neurology, posited - that aliens could have their own Logic - though this also only seems to come up when someone wants to champion Physicalism by negating the necessary existence of Universals. Meanwhile even grade schoolers seem capable of grokking that the reason SETI sends mathematical knowledge into space is precisely because of said Universals being, well, Universal...
Well, let me be clear, I am certainly not a logician, nor a mathematician, so I could certainly well be wrong. However, I do think I have heard the idea from either mathematicians or philosophers, that there are alternate possible mathematics. That doesn't really mean they aren't all describing the same thing (Reality, for example), but I don't think any of them would give you immediate access to Reality in-itself. Now, maybe this guy, Stephen Wolfram, is a total crackpot, and if so, if I saw the evidence that he is flatly wrong, or could not be correct (https://www.closertotruth.com/interviews/4017), I really would not hesitate to change my view.
So, does Math have some Subjective component? To me, the answer is yes. If we can reference Mathematical "beauty" for example, then I think that is a sort of tell that we are not on a "truly" Objective system. Again, I can't seem to break myself out of the Kantian cage I am thinking of. So, to me, while Math might, ultimately be only minutely, minisculely subjective, still don't see that getting across the Phenomenal/Noumenal boundary. Again though, this does not assume that the Phenomena and the Noumenal must be different, but at the same time, provides to real way to say they must be the same.
So, for me, I am left in the lurch here. To get back to morality, to say that our moral intuitions access noumenal morality, to me, just does not make sense. Were that the case, how could we, as you point out above, make "moral progress?" What mediated the access, for example, between Plato and the notion that "slavery is wrong." Plato's moral quale that this was perfectly justifiable, was the from the Objective Moral? If so, what happened now? How do we now get a different answer? Did the Objective Moral change, or did the Subjective Moral change? In either case, how can we know which moral quale is closer to, or further away from the Objective Moral?
So, let us pretend that tomorrow, someone takes up Plato's case on slavery. This person's moral quale says it is perfectly justifiable. Now, if we have the sort of view that moral quale is pointing to the Objective Moral, how do we refute that? Assert that this person does not truly have the quale? We don't have access to that. Do we say that, for some reason, they are wrongly accessing the Objective Moral? OK, but on what grounds, when our access to the Objective Moral is our moral quale? Now we have our Subjective quale versus their Subjective quale, which is the "right" one? You see how I am not getting out of a Subjective trap here?
As always though, I am likely just doing a poor job explaining my position. Maybe it is the case that my position is not tennible, but I still can't see how, even if there is Objective Truth out there, we do not get it mediated by Subjectivity. Not in science, not in math, and definitely not in morals. Now, one day I will get down the brass tacks and finally read Karl Popper's Objective Knowledge and maybe some of his other work, but, this quote from the SEP on Karl Popper (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/):
"Scientific theories, for him, are not inductively inferred from experience, nor is scientific experimentation carried out with a view to verifying or finally establishing the truth of theories; rather, all knowledge is provisional, conjectural, hypothetical—we can never finally prove our scientific theories, we can merely (provisionally) confirm or (conclusively) refute them; hence at any given time we have to choose between the potentially infinite number of theories which will explain the set of phenomena under investigation. Faced with this choice, we can only eliminate those theories which are demonstrably false, and rationally choose between the remaining, unfalsified theories. Hence Popper’s emphasis on the importance of the critical spirit to science—for him critical thinking is the very essence of rationality. For it is only by critical thought that we can eliminate false theories, and determine which of the remaining theories is the best available one, in the sense of possessing the highest level of explanatory force and predictive power."
Emphasis this their's, not mine, but points to what I am sort of saying, I think. And to me, part of that mediation is a Subjective gap, the inability to ever completely remove the Subjective from ourselves, or our theory, observation, formulation, or what have you.
While Math is so expressly formal that it gives us a very "unique" ability to lay out, view and consider foundational assumptions, that sort of thing is not, as far as I can tell, the same for morals. The foundational assumptions in morals lay in a much "darker" less formally drawn out place, so, this might be why our mathematical intuitions are likely closer to something Noumenal than our moral ones are (to me). Because in moral reasoning, we are likely making foundational assumptions are are very Subjective in nature, where mathematical ones are at least notionally Objective in the sense of being less Subjective (as far as I could tell).
If you can never be sure you've grasped the Noumenal, why do you think there is one separate from consciousness? Why not just be an Idealist then?
The very idea there could be moral progress would require some kind of Absolute measure right?
As for alternative mathematical systems, these still require Grounding in Logical Universals.
All this, to me, suggests that while we cannot intellectualize our way toward O.M. we use Truth quales so often in life it would seem odd to make a special case against O.M. - especially since any serious argument against O.M. assumes Truth quales are useful in terms of logical reasoning + memory of what just occurred.
Now I agree that the biggest issue for O.M. is the feeling of certainty about things [like slavery in the past] we generally now recognize as unacceptable. But for someone like myself who ascribes to a Hermeticist view of reality this obfuscation and gradual movement toward the Truth is just par for the course.
I also feel O.M. isn't a long list of infinite rules codified somewhere in the universe like a program consisting of countless if-then statements. I suspect it is more an impetus, a suggestive force...but then this will likely only be of interest to my fellow immaterialists...who are out there I hope....Bueler? Buelerrrrrrr....
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If you can never be sure you've grasped the Noumenal, why do you think there is one separate from consciousness? Why not just be an Idealist then?
The very idea there could be moral progress would require some kind of Absolute measure right?
Well, to me, that is the thing. I don't want to just be an Idealist and I don't want to just be a Physicalist. This is why the sort of Hegelian "openness" to an Absolute does appeal to me, because it can sort of suppose that the Absolute is not a "completeness" of the unity, but rather an sort of conjunction of opposites.
Now, granted, I am only slightly smarter than a paramecium, so not doubt there are numerous "problems" with this. Still though, it is what I find myself drawn toward. One day, perhaps I will have read enough to know how or why this couldn't or shouldn't work.
Still though, the notion that we make "moral progress" does suppose an Absolute morality, I would not contest it. What I would contest is if that Absolute morality exists Objectively, or as a matter of something more like communal Subjectivity. I can't possibly tell you that you would be "wrong" in supposing that the Objective Morality we are appealing to exists as a Noumena, but also, I see no (from my perspective) compelling reason to follow along there. So, as always, I am just left with an indeterminacy. However, given my bias toward thinking in terms of a Kantian divide, I would err on the side of figuring that even if there is an Objective Morality, that we have nothing but Subjective takes on it, at best.
At this point, I need to just evolve my philosophical view. Perhaps a couple years more reading and I might be at the point where I could seriously contest my own stance here. But, at the moment, I am still left largely where I was, Kantian divide in place. I don't think Idealism or Physicalism are, either, sufficient, nor do a know the bridge to get from one to the other though.
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At this point, I need to just evolve my philosophical view. Perhaps a couple years more reading and I might be at the point where I could seriously contest my own stance here. But, at the moment, I am still left largely where I was, Kantian divide in place. I don't think Idealism or Physicalism are, either, sufficient, nor do a know the bridge to get from one to the other though.
Hmmmm....But in the actual living of your life, you will raise your children according to a moral standard + make reasoned arguments based on a sense of communicable Logical standard + assume without reflection that memory (like the memory of the post you read & replied to) is largely accurate.
[When I say without reflection I don't mean that as an insult but rather how we have to live our lives - if we continually reflected on every aspect of memory nothing could be accomplished.]
Am I correct in that?
It's kind of like people who don't believe in free will nevertheless seem happy to act as if it were exactly what libertarians purport it to be. :-)
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Hmmmm....But in the actual living of your life, you will raise your children according to a moral standard + make reasoned arguments based on a sense of communicable Logical standard + assume without reflection that memory (like the memory of the post you read & replied to) is largely accurate.
[When I say without reflection I don't mean that as an insult but rather how we have to live our lives - if we continually reflected on every aspect of memory nothing could be accomplished.]
Am I correct in that?
It's kind of like people who don't believe in free will nevertheless seem happy to act as if it were exactly what libertarians purport it to be. :-)
Well, largely, yes. Although in some cases, maybe not. I mean, I am not something like a "memory worshiper" or anything, I don't think it is infallible. But I also don't believe that there is something like "one right way" to live. I would make appeals to math, or logic, but my stance was not anti-math, or anti-logic. Or, for that matter, anti-morals. My only point is that math or logic, appeals to a "hypothetical" (in my view) Objective Morality, does not make it objective. We can think it is, we can appeal to it as if it were, we could even, somehow, through means of, say, math or logic or something else, press ourselves against that wall of the Noumenal, but I just am highly skeptical that we even break through that wall.
Does it matter? I don't know. Do I know there is a wall there? No, all I can do though is think things through as I am able. I can't tell you if the difference between Phenomenal and Noumenal morals would be the same or different. But I am just not, personally, prepared to just assume then, though, that we have the Noumenal.
But, I do have to be somewhat pragmatic. I mean, I do tend to be a skeptic, but one can't realistically be the apocryphal Pyrro, so skeptical that you nearly die all the time. I do see value is skepticism, but it, of course, must be tempered. At some point, you have to just take a sort of Kierkegaardian leap and just have something like faith. To me, I don't have access to the Objective, I can't and I won't ever, but I have to use what to me seem like sorts of heuristic methods to just get by. That doesn't really bother me, personally. I don't feel cognitive dissonance or anything in having one pseudo-intellectual stance and one pragmatic one. But, maybe that is just me. Or maybe I am just deluding myself.
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Hmmmm....But in the actual living of your life, you will raise your children according to a moral standard + make reasoned arguments based on a sense of communicable Logical standard + assume without reflection that memory (like the memory of the post you read & replied to) is largely accurate.
[When I say without reflection I don't mean that as an insult but rather how we have to live our lives - if we continually reflected on every aspect of memory nothing could be accomplished.]
Am I correct in that?
It's kind of like people who don't believe in free will nevertheless seem happy to act as if it were exactly what libertarians purport it to be. :-)
Well, largely, yes. Although in some cases, maybe not. I mean, I am not something like a "memory worshiper" or anything, I don't think it is infallible. But I also don't believe that there is something like "one right way" to live. I would make appeals to math, or logic, but my stance was not anti-math, or anti-logic. Or, for that matter, anti-morals. My only point is that math or logic, appeals to a "hypothetical" (in my view) Objective Morality, does not make it objective. We can think it is, we can appeal to it as if it were, we could even, somehow, through means of, say, math or logic or something else, press ourselves against that wall of the Noumenal, but I just am highly skeptical that we even break through that wall.
Does it matter? I don't know. Do I know there is a wall there? No, all I can do though is think things through as I am able. I can't tell you if the difference between Phenomenal and Noumenal morals would be the same or different. But I am just not, personally, prepared to just assume then, though, that we have the Noumenal.
But, I do have to be somewhat pragmatic. I mean, I do tend to be a skeptic, but one can't realistically be the apocryphal Pyrro, so skeptical that you nearly die all the time. I do see value is skepticism, but it, of course, must be tempered. At some point, you have to just take a sort of Kierkegaardian leap and just have something like faith. To me, I don't have access to the Objective, I can't and I won't ever, but I have to use what to me seem like sorts of heuristic methods to just get by. That doesn't really bother me, personally. I don't feel cognitive dissonance or anything in having one pseudo-intellectual stance and one pragmatic one. But, maybe that is just me. Or maybe I am just deluding myself.
Ah I wasn't talking about memory as in "What did I have for lunch?" but rather the memory of the last 30 seconds to ensure a conversation flows - remembering what the last person said as well as whatever part of your reply you've finished so far.
So do you think there's a situation where, "Raping kids is wrong" would not apply? Or the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus would fail to be true within the mathematical context it is presented it? (I realize there could be an unusual mathematical foundation that renders it false, like Geometrical theorems might be false under Non-Euclidean Geometry).
Beyond all that it seems you are trusting your Reasoning ability that leads to the conclusion that there is a gap between the Noumenal and the Phenomenal in all contexts, though AFAIK the known examples all relate to the differences between the Subjective of the First Person and the Agreed Consensus of what is happening "Out there".
So it would seem there is some Ground on which one must stand to even begin to suspect the Noumenal/Phenomenal Gap, and even more pillars are added to said Ground to make any real argument for this Gap?
To bring it all back to the original topic, how can we even say Morality is being "Gamified", and that this is a bad thing, without some assumption of a standard metric itself grounded in some Universals?
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So it would seem there is some Ground on which one must stand to even begin to suspect the Noumenal/Phenomenal Gap, and even more pillars are added to said Ground to make any real argument for this Gap?
To bring it all back to the original topic, how can we even say Morality is being "Gamified", and that this is a bad thing, without some assumption of a standard metric itself grounded in some Universals?
Well, the thing is, I am not "anti-Ground" at all though. In fact, I am very much pro-Ground! My qualm is only that I don't, or should I say, I can't seem to, think that we should really call the Ground "objective." While it is well and good to have a Ground, and the appeal of the "authority" of the "objective" serves us well, I do have my sort of "technical" nit-picks on that. In the end, maybe that is all it is, but to me, it seem noteworthy to note that.
To me, the "issue" of the gamification is that, to me, it absolutely lowers the bar of conversation and discourse. Also, since it presupposes a notion of "winning" and "scoring points," for example, it flattens the whole plurality of Being, in a way. That is, it establishes a Ground of Being as Winning. Not to mention, presupposes that then there must be "One Right Way To Be" because there can only be "one" winner, of course.
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To me, the "issue" of the gamification is that, to me, it absolutely lowers the bar of conversation and discourse. Also, since it presupposes a notion of "winning" and "scoring points," for example, it flattens the whole plurality of Being, in a way. That is, it establishes a Ground of Being as Winning. Not to mention, presupposes that then there must be "One Right Way To Be" because there can only be "one" winner, of course.
So gamification is bad? As [in] actually bad or just something you dislike but is perfectly fine for others to participate in?
Personally I think this gamification is a result of academia's obsessive usage of post-modernism, atheism, and materialism as weapons against religious authoritarianism. Problem is these are weapons that, in combination, chew away at any sense of Ground. But humans then attach themselves to moral differences in "battle" with their neighbors, and so we have the tendency toward extremism in discourse that we see to day.
This isn't to rant about Cultural Marxism or some other silliness the Anti-SJWs peddle as a way to get Patreon dollars. I think the original intent was to some degree sound, as Russell notes Materialism was a dogma meant to challenge religious dogma. And of course the danger of moral certainty leads to a temptation toward Evil as "Greater Good". But to even have this conversation requires some appeal to O.M. of some variety as we're noting the negative course of assuming one has sussed out the correct O.M. and using that assumption to do Evil.
No one who doubts O.M. can hope to make a dent in Gamification, as all too few (if anyone) are going to abandon the rush of moral self-righteousness for an Ocean of Meaninglessness. There's a reason the Ctrl-Left and Alt-Right have gained so many followers while university philosophy departments are losing funding or at best are seen as amusing but fundamentally irrelevant institutions. Extremists appeal to Noumenal access where philosophy departments in the West seem to by & large fellate the assumed materialism of the STEM departments or just dither about in a circle jerk of intellectual co-masturbation.
If you want to save the human species, you have to commit to the idea that humanity's well being has objective worth.
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So gamification is bad? As [in] actually bad or just something you dislike but is perfectly fine for others to participate in?
Well, I have no idea if it is bad in-itself, or just has been applied in ways that are not conducive, in my opinion, toward anything like even notionally "harmonious Being." If we can't have productive discourse, if we can't successfully mediate yourselves with ourselves, if we want to exist in a polar and oppositional way, then I do think that is a net negative for humanity.
Personally I think this gamification is a result of academia's obsessive usage of post-modernism, atheism, and materialism as weapons against religious authoritarianism. Problem is these are weapons that, in combination, chew away at any sense of Ground. But humans then attach themselves to moral differences in "battle" with their neighbors, and so we have the tendency toward extremism in discourse that we see to day.
This isn't to rant about Cultural Marxism or some other silliness the Anti-SJWs peddle as a way to get Patreon dollars. I think the original intent was to some degree sound, as Russell notes Materialism was a dogma meant to challenge religious dogma. And of course the danger of moral certainty leads to a temptation toward Evil as "Greater Good". But to even have this conversation requires some appeal to O.M. of some variety as we're noting the negative course of assuming one has sussed out the correct O.M. and using that assumption to do Evil.
No one who doubts O.M. can hope to make a dent in Gamification, as all too few (if anyone) are going to abandon the rush of moral self-righteousness for an Ocean of Meaninglessness. There's a reason the Ctrl-Left and Alt-Right have gained so many followers while university philosophy departments are losing funding or at best are seen as amusing but fundamentally irrelevant institutions. Extremists appeal to Noumenal access where philosophy departments in the West seem to by & large fellate the assumed materialism of the STEM departments or just dither about in a circle jerk of intellectual co-masturbation.
If you want to save the human species, you have to commit to the idea that humanity's well being has objective worth.
Well, I don't know, but I do think that anything that wants to, in a way, "flatten out" the questions and issue of Being, to be simply this, or just that, are not helpful and ultimately likely harmful. I have my doubts that we need the Objective Moral, but we certainly do need something. In the end, I think we are mostly quibbling about terms for what is, in practical use, the same functional thing.
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Well, I don't know, but I do think that anything that wants to, in a way, "flatten out" the questions and issue of Being, to be simply this, or just that, are not helpful and ultimately likely harmful. I have my doubts that we need the Objective Moral, but we certainly do need something. In the end, I think we are mostly quibbling about terms for what is, in practical use, the same functional thing.
Well if one simply speaks of morals without mentioning the Ground we can probably get away with not worrying about O.M. But I think that, given the Internet has exacerbated the "gamification" of disagreement to the level of Manichean conflict, one would find it difficult to make people change their behavior when they use the "greater good" excuse to revel in transgression (doxxing, harassment, death threats, etc).
The Evil that we face - the world has never seen the like.
I think it we are so far past the point of no return that only something "spiritual"/numinous, something that at least *seems* to touch the Noumenal Good, is going to get humanity past our current Great Filter situation. Why I think modern philosophy departments have by & large betrayed the human race.
"We stood across from each other like two libertines. I think it was then that I told him truly why I was not on his side. Because the Good was more of an adventure."
-R.Calasso, Ruins of Kasch
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I think it we are so far past the point of no return that only something "spiritual"/numinous, something that at least *seems* to touch the Noumenal Good, is going to get humanity past our current Great Filter situation. Why I think modern philosophy departments have by & large betrayed the human race.
Well, while I do sort of share your notion of the prognosis, I don't really share your identification of "cause" though.
Because I don't think academia, or intellectuals, or just people thinking is what got us here. I'm far more apt to place more scrutiny on the side of the systemic factors that incentivize moral simplicity. And to me, that is the real sort of "key" take away from the video. We want moral simplicity, be in from gamification, appeals to authority, sheltering the notional Objective Moral, the appeals to reason or rationality, and so on. We do this for pleasure, we do this because it gives us the clarity we want the world to have.
To blame "intellectuals" for possibly uncovering how this cognitive bias plays out, how the fundamental is not clear, concise and unambiguous, well, just doesn't seem fair or really justified, in my opinion. The thing is, just intellectual speculation and theory, to me, is not what "got us here." What got us here is the bare, seeming fact that we don't have access to the Objective Moral, we don't have an outside authority to appeal to, so all we are left with is our subjective manners. And, those manners, the manner of wanting things to be clear for the pleasure of clarity, is what gets us here.
That is not to say that any and all intellectual, or pseudo-intellectualism is "good." Nope, scientism is no better than any other ideology. Blindly worshiping rationality, or to me, even worshiping the notion of Objectivity, is no better either. But, as always, what do I know? Certainly nothing, very likely less than nothing.
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Because I don't think academia, or intellectuals, or just people thinking is what got us here. I'm far more apt to place more scrutiny on the side of the systemic factors that incentivize moral simplicity. And to me, that is the real sort of "key" take away from the video. We want moral simplicity, be in from gamification, appeals to authority, sheltering the notional Objective Moral, the appeals to reason or rationality, and so on. We do this for pleasure, we do this because it gives us the clarity we want the world to have.
Where is "here", and why is it bad? Seems like you're using some kind universal measure? ;-)
And I didn't mean every intellectual, just those who were committed to the goal of using atheism, materialism, and post-modernism as weapons against religious dogma. Sadly in doing so they threw baby Jesus out with the bath water - trying to cobble together some kind of ethical schema in absence of the Good as a Transcendent Real.
I don't disagree that any time someone is absolutely convinced they can use the excuse of O.M. to transgress accepted norms - norms they probably accept for discourse in their "tribe" - it leads to bad ends. But I don't think this is simply an appeal to O.M., rather it's carving out different rules for discourse in different tribes. If anything this is a betrayal of morals as Universals, as pleasure is derived from transgression and conflict rather than acting in accordance with the Good. It's a step backward in our thinking as a species, and I don't think we'll see a course correction without offering the pleasure of acting in accordance with Virtue as a replacement for the pleasure one feels when they hurt others in the name of their tribe.
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Where is "here", and why is it bad? Seems like you're using some kind universal measure? ;-)
Am I? I was just evoking the transcendental a priori notion of space and time. But I know, or "know,"
in the sense of General Relativity, that this isn't spacetime in-itself. Right?
And I didn't mean every intellectual, just those who were committed to the goal of using atheism, materialism, and post-modernism as weapons against religious dogma. Sadly in doing so they threw baby Jesus out with the bath water - trying to cobble together some kind of ethical schema in absence of the Good as a Transcendent Real.
I don't disagree that any time someone is absolutely convinced they can use the excuse of O.M. to transgress accepted norms - norms they probably accept for discourse in their "tribe" - it leads to bad ends. But I don't think this is simply an appeal to O.M., rather it's carving out different rules for discourse in different tribes. If anything this is a betrayal of morals as Universals, as pleasure is derived from transgression and conflict rather than acting in accordance with the Good. It's a step backward in our thinking as a species, and I don't think we'll see a course correction without offering the pleasure of acting in accordance with Virtue as a replacement for the pleasure one feels when they hurt others in the name of their tribe.
Well, to me, this is key. I am skeptical of the, lets call it, Religious Symbolic/Imaginary Order, but you better believe I am also skeptical of the Atheist Symbolic/Imaginary Order as well. So, I think, again, that we are really quite akin on your critiques, we just approach and apply them somewhat differently.
The thing is, I still don't think we actually get anything like an Objective Morality, ever. I still think of it in terms of a collective Subjective Morality, that we base, in part, on appeals to a notion of an Objective Morality. I simply cannot say, one way or the other, if there really is, or is not, an Objective Morality "out-there" (that is, a Noumena) and I'm inclined to just push on the issue then. To me, I want to really question and interrogate (as I am always wont to do) the very nature of that appeal. Again, not to really question what Objective Morality would be, in-itself (again, because I do not really see how we have access to it), but to question all the Subjective factors in, what to me, seems like an ultimately Subjective formulation then of morality.
So, I guess to summarize in a way, my point is that it is always mediated. What I want to question is the nature and facts of the mediation, not the nature and fact of the in-itself, because, in a way, I don't see how we ever get the in-itself in-itself.
Let me slam the breaks on my usual train of thought careening toward jargon-ville here though.
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So, I guess to summarize in a way, my point is that it is always mediated. What I want to question is the nature and facts of the mediation, not the nature and fact of the in-itself, because, in a way, I don't see how we ever get the in-itself in-itself.
Let me slam the breaks on my usual train of thought careening toward jargon-ville here though.
Is there a purpose to this? You seem to have some telos in mind here, where you think we as humanity will end up via this process? I guess it would be different than the "here" that currently describes our mortal condition, a condition you seem to think is "bad" in some sense beyond "this state is unappealing to me in the same way I don't like chocolate ice cream."
To me the asterisk you're putting on your own statements dilutes them. "Child pornography is Evil" vs "Well, you know, this pornography made by exploiting kids isn't to my taste but maybe it is actually Good cause of the Phenomenal Veil that separates us from the Noumenal"...
Sometimes you have to consciously take a leap of faith, as you are by virtue of your existence continually taking the "icons" in your supposed "User Illusion" as pointing to something True. And all the icons are Grounded in quales. Why I return to the mystical roots of Philosophy, noting the Neoplatonists did not see themselves as "Neo" but rather a continuation of Plato's initiation school attempting to grasp the Mystery of the Good...
"What is ethical cannot be taught. If I could explain the essence of the ethical only by means of a theory, then what is ethical would be of no value whatsoever."
-Wittgenstein
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Well, let me try, in light of our conversation yesterday, to try to refocus and maybe introduce something more of a formalism.
From my understanding of your position:
1) Objective Morality (OM) exists outside any subjectivity and is an Absolute coding of what is, or is not moral.
2) OM is accessible via moral intuitions, or, moral quales.
3) OM is measurable by means of consensus (?) (which might mean a simply majority of agreement of moral intuitions between subjects).
4) Appealing to OM justifies certainty and certainty justifies OM because it can likely lead to a consensus.
5) Certainty "wins" over any notion of uncertainty, therefor, there can be no case against it except certainty. So, certainty is the Absolute.
I just realized that this is a futile exercise. In the end, you are certain and with the circular logic of 4 wedded with the notion of winning of 5 means there is no point in belaboring it.
So, you have it, you win. I had no intent on "winning," or desire to do so, therefor, I'll just cut to the chase and give you what you were after without belaboring it.
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Well, let me try, in light of our conversation yesterday, to try to refocus and maybe introduce something more of a formalism.
From my understanding of your position:
1) Objective Morality (OM) exists outside any subjectivity and is an Absolute coding of what is, or is not moral.
2) OM is accessible via moral intuitions, or, moral quales.
3) OM is measurable by means of consensus (?) (which might mean a simply majority of agreement of moral intuitions between subjects).
4) Appealing to OM justifies certainty and certainty justifies OM because it can likely lead to a consensus.
5) Certainty "wins" over any notion of uncertainty, therefor, there can be no case against it except certainty. So, certainty is the Absolute.
I just realized that this is a futile exercise. In the end, you are certain and with the circular logic of 4 wedded with the notion of winning of 5 means there is no point in belaboring it.
So, you have it, you win. I had no intent on "winning," or desire to do so, therefor, I'll just cut to the chase and give you what you were after without belaboring it.
But that isn't my position at all - I don't think there is any "winning" here, though with all the skepticism you have about your own subjective apprehension it does seem odd to see your certainty about what I supposedly want?
I've noted multiple times the issues with moral certainty so not sure where you got this reading...
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But that isn't my position at all - I don't think there is any "winning" here, though with all the skepticism you have about your own subjective apprehension it does seem odd to see your certainty about what I supposedly want?
I've noted multiple times the issues with moral certainty so not sure where you got this reading...
Well, if I misunderstood our conversation yesterday, then I misunderstood.
I can't go back and quote, since that is all lost. I am not certain about what you want. I wasn't making an attempt to issue out any proclamation of certainty either. All I could do was try to formally write out what seemed to be your case. If I failed, then I failed, I made no claim to ever be, nor did I mean to insinuate, that I have the clear knowledge of something like Objective Truth.
You did not make the case that the Objective Moral does not bring with it certainty? Again, access to the Objective Moral does not then mean that Moral Certainty is, well, certain? Well, then I misunderstood just what we were talking about. Seems that I have no grasp then on your case honestly, so maybe I well and don't have a case at all.
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But that isn't my position at all - I don't think there is any "winning" here, though with all the skepticism you have about your own subjective apprehension it does seem odd to see your certainty about what I supposedly want?
I've noted multiple times the issues with moral certainty so not sure where you got this reading...
Well, if I misunderstood our conversation yesterday, then I misunderstood.
I can't go back and quote, since that is all lost. I am not certain about what you want. I wasn't making an attempt to issue out any proclamation of certainty either. All I could do was try to formally write out what seemed to be your case. If I failed, then I failed, I made no claim to ever be, nor did I mean to insinuate, that I have the clear knowledge of something like Objective Truth.
You did not make the case that the Objective Moral does not bring with it certainty? Again, access to the Objective Moral does not then mean that Moral Certainty is, well, certain? Well, then I misunderstood just what we were talking about. Seems that I have no grasp then on your case honestly, so maybe I well and don't have a case at all.
Well I don't think I was making a complete case necessarily regarding the metaphysics of morality, though I do think if morality isn't referring to some kind of Objective measure it becomes pretty much impossible to make a dent in the "gamification" problem.
Of course it is complicated - doubts about statements like "Black people aren't full people" and "Women shouldn't get the vote" is what led to moral change. OTOH, the road to Evil runs along the same path - making people doubt universal principles of decency.
But if statements like "Child pornography is Evil" or "Anti-Semitism is Evil" cannot be held as an Absolute then I can't see any real road toward moral progress as it would be hard to even find the measure of progress being used if such is the case? And if we cannot even regard the underpinnings of Logic/Math as [Objective] Universals I'd say there is no Ground to rationally discuss anything at all?
Regarding Gamification, I would hesitate to think that people who "fall" for this sort of thing are completely duped. People derive pleasure from being self-righteous and transgressive, so I don't think an intellectual argument will suffice to pull them away from pernicious behavior. [Which isn't to say you or anyone else is thinking people are simply duped, just throwing out my own thinking that I believe aligns with the video.]