31
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by BeardFisher-King on January 06, 2018, 02:54:27 pm »No, that's not correct. The second way is not a negation of science, but an alternative to science.
Recent Posts
32
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by TLEILAXU on January 06, 2018, 02:45:51 pm »But what he's basically saying is "you can view humans as biological/physical systems, and you can not", but this is precisely what e.g. Bakker talks about when he says stuff like "medial neglect". It might be useful for some philosophical theory of what do I know, but it neglects certain information when assuming certain properties.Sure, if you assume theology has a monopoly on souls, divinities etc. and their functional equivalents. In the end it's semantics. Feel free to forget everything I said regarding this and replace it with "ontologically different from the rest of matter".1. For Tleilaxu, a rejection of free will is important because that rejection "delegitimizes certain worldviews and legitimizes others". Since elsewhere in the thread he asserts that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul", I think it's clear that Tleilaxu is referring to the Christian worldview that formulated arguments defending free will despite an omniscient God that go back to Aquinas.No, that's not it. I'm rejecting intentionalism, the notion of an ontological difference specific to human beings, the dualism. Also, some Christians rejected free will https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Bondage_of_the_Will
Of course, some Christians rejected free will. That's why there was a debate. That's why the case for free will had to be made in the first place.
What about your claim that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul"? This is not the case at all, and if you truly believe it to be the case, then the intentionalism that you reject must rest on a theological foundation of some kind, correct?
OK. My reading of Scruton is that the specific point of this dualistic approach is that it does not claim an separate ontological status for human beings. Again, this is not ontological dualism; this is cognitive dualism. You might reread my excerpt from Scruton above (point #4).
33
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by BeardFisher-King on January 06, 2018, 02:30:04 pm »Sure, if you assume theology has a monopoly on souls, divinities etc. and their functional equivalents. In the end it's semantics. Feel free to forget everything I said regarding this and replace it with "ontologically different from the rest of matter".1. For Tleilaxu, a rejection of free will is important because that rejection "delegitimizes certain worldviews and legitimizes others". Since elsewhere in the thread he asserts that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul", I think it's clear that Tleilaxu is referring to the Christian worldview that formulated arguments defending free will despite an omniscient God that go back to Aquinas.No, that's not it. I'm rejecting intentionalism, the notion of an ontological difference specific to human beings, the dualism. Also, some Christians rejected free will https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Bondage_of_the_Will
Of course, some Christians rejected free will. That's why there was a debate. That's why the case for free will had to be made in the first place.
What about your claim that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul"? This is not the case at all, and if you truly believe it to be the case, then the intentionalism that you reject must rest on a theological foundation of some kind, correct?
OK. My reading of Scruton is that the specific point of this dualistic approach is that it does not claim an separate ontological status for human beings. Again, this is not ontological dualism; this is cognitive dualism. You might reread my excerpt from Scruton above (point #4).
34
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by TLEILAXU on January 06, 2018, 02:15:53 pm »Sure, if you assume theology has a monopoly on souls, divinities etc. and their functional equivalents. In the end it's semantics. Feel free to forget everything I said regarding this and replace it with "ontologically different from the rest of matter".1. For Tleilaxu, a rejection of free will is important because that rejection "delegitimizes certain worldviews and legitimizes others". Since elsewhere in the thread he asserts that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul", I think it's clear that Tleilaxu is referring to the Christian worldview that formulated arguments defending free will despite an omniscient God that go back to Aquinas.No, that's not it. I'm rejecting intentionalism, the notion of an ontological difference specific to human beings, the dualism. Also, some Christians rejected free will https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Bondage_of_the_Will
Of course, some Christians rejected free will. That's why there was a debate. That's why the case for free will had to be made in the first place.
What about your claim that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul"? This is not the case at all, and if you truly believe it to be the case, then the intentionalism that you reject must rest on a theological foundation of some kind, correct?
35
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by BeardFisher-King on January 06, 2018, 02:06:34 pm »1. For Tleilaxu, a rejection of free will is important because that rejection "delegitimizes certain worldviews and legitimizes others". Since elsewhere in the thread he asserts that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul", I think it's clear that Tleilaxu is referring to the Christian worldview that formulated arguments defending free will despite an omniscient God that go back to Aquinas.No, that's not it. I'm rejecting intentionalism, the notion of an ontological difference specific to human beings, the dualism. Also, some Christians rejected free will https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Bondage_of_the_Will
Of course, some Christians rejected free will. That's why there was a debate. That's why the case for free will had to be made in the first place.
What about your claim that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul"? This is not the case at all, and if you truly believe it to be the case, then the intentionalism that you reject must rest on a theological foundation of some kind, correct?
36
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by TLEILAXU on January 06, 2018, 01:14:22 pm »1. For Tleilaxu, a rejection of free will is important because that rejection "delegitimizes certain worldviews and legitimizes others". Since elsewhere in the thread he asserts that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul", I think it's clear that Tleilaxu is referring to the Christian worldview that formulated arguments defending free will despite an omniscient God that go back to Aquinas.No, that's not it. I'm rejecting intentionalism, the notion of an ontological difference specific to human beings, the dualism. Also, some Christians rejected free will https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Bondage_of_the_Will
37
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by BeardFisher-King on January 06, 2018, 05:09:33 am »Thus we arrive at the dangerous precipice of "can't know nuffin" where all discussions eventually go once they have lingered long enough.But that's not correct if you ask me.So this is my point entirely. Its not real, yet you choose to use your preconceptions to justify why all the information pointing otherwise justifies your reaction, because you don't fully understand the phenomenon.
Just like everyone else.
All I'm saying is you're not special, which seems to be exactly what you're saying about everyone else, so I'm not sure why the cognitive dissonance.No, there's a tremendous difference. What I'm trying to say is that just realizing we don't have free will isn't going to shut down everything, we'll still be driven to do things because that's what we are, but this is not the same thing as there being no difference.So then what is the difference and how does a change in self-understanding affect reality?
It changes our self-understanding.
Maybe not having free will doesn't change anything for you, but it does for me. It delegitimizes certain world views and legitimizes others, because like everybody else I must believe in something, right?
It took me awhile to wrap my mind around this exchange, and I still don't understand it fully, but let me weigh in.
1. For Tleilaxu, a rejection of free will is important because that rejection "delegitimizes certain worldviews and legitimizes others". Since elsewhere in the thread he asserts that "free will necessitates some kind of divine aspect, a soul", I think it's clear that Tleilaxu is referring to the Christian worldview that formulated arguments defending free will despite an omniscient God that go back to Aquinas.
2. But, in fact, free will does not need to rest on a theological foundation. Kant, Hume, Spinoza and others marshaled various arguments in favor of human freedom of action. In short, it is not necessary to believe in God to defend free will.
3. Specifically, the cognitive dualism of Roger Scruton (which, I believe, is a refinement of the Kantian position) gives us two ways of looking at reality: the way of science, which reduces and explains; and the way of "intentional understanding" (or Verstehen, a term from Kantian philosopher Dilthey), which describes and interprets.
4. From Scruton's "Modern Philosophy: An Introduction And Survey":
"Here, then, is how we should express the Kantian theory of freedom: people may be conceptualized in two ways, as elements in nature, or as the objects of interpersonal attitudes. The first way employs the concept [of] human being...it divides our actions at the joints of explanation and derives our behavior from a biological science of man. The second way employs the concept [of] person...Through this concept, and the associated notions of freedom, responsibility, reason for action, right, duty and justice, we gain the description under which a human being is seen, by those that respond to him as a person. Our response is locked into the web of interpersonal feeling. Each of us demands justification of the other, and the resulting give and take of reasons is the root of social harmony." (italics added)
38
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by TaoHorror on January 04, 2018, 11:33:38 pm »My above post wasn't a complete thought, just a rebuttal to TL's apparent "concern" on the matter. Referencing my earlier posts in this thread, I did say avoidance of pain/misery would still be valid ( didn't put it that way, of course, but re-organizing to address your point ). So if we have no free-will, then it appears to me that the only real concern is minimizing misery as any "achievements" would be the result of your programmed responses to stimuli and situations. My toaster fight was a metaphor addressing why be in a tiff over that which ( now, if we have no free will ) does not matter. Misunderstanding no longer matters, all intellectual expression is coming from somewhere other than me.
39
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by Wilshire on January 04, 2018, 05:27:32 pm »Not to beat up on you, TL, since others are challenging your position, but seems like a contradiction to me ... if there's no self, why care about misunderstanding ... who cares if machines bloody themselves up. No more relevant than my toaster getting into a fight with my micro-wave.
Why does not having free will drain all the meaning from the world?
Who cares is the individual. I'd, for one, care if my toaster got into a fight with my microwave, presumably because I'd be the one suffering the consequences. I'd have to clean up the mess, probably replace one or the other, maybe both. How very irritating.
In the same way, I treat animals kindly because I'd feel bad should I choose otherwise. The existence or non-existence of free-will doesn't at all affect how I feel about it.
The effects still exist, even if the impetus for action does not.
If I told you that broccoli and brusslesprouts are the same plant (they are), but you hate one and like the other, that knowledge doesn't affect how you perceive the flavor. For this same reason, knowing that free-will is here or isn't really doesn't impact how it affects you.
Even if its an illusion, the illusion still has consequences. Drinking a poison that you thought was healthy will still kill you. Whether you knew about it or not isn't particularly important.
40
Neuropath / Re: Countering the Argument with Thorsten
« Last post by TaoHorror on January 04, 2018, 05:15:08 pm »Quote
No, there's a tremendous difference. What I'm trying to say is that just realizing we don't have free will isn't going to shut down everything, we'll still be driven to do things because that's what we are, but this is not the same thing as there being no difference. It changes our self-understanding.
Not to beat up on you, TL, since others are challenging your position, but seems like a contradiction to me ... if there's no self, why care about misunderstanding ... who cares if machines bloody themselves up. No more relevant than my toaster getting into a fight with my micro-wave.
