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Abstract:My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that those who believe that they have mounted a decisive, logically and scientifically based case against the existence of a human capability to engage in deliberate action, and thus that there is "no such thing as free will", have not in fact done so. It is to argue that, certainly at the present historical moment and perhaps in principle, there is no strong reason to distrust our experience in the matter of whether or not we possess the ability to make genuine choices. In part 1 of the paper, I state what I have observed to be the standard arguments in favor of causal determinism of human behavior, with an emphasis on the determinist principle itself and on the experimental work of Benjamin Libet and John Dylan-Haynes. In parts 2 and 3, I present a series of counterarguments which, taken collectively, militate strongly against the soundness of the hard determinist position regarding human behavior and its purported scientific foundation.
