[What Came Before]

http://users.ecs.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Py104/searle.comp.html

I don't think this refutation by Searle is limited to the Hard Problem of Consciousness which relates to qualia and self awareness.

In fact, [as far as I can tell] he is claiming that even the "easy" parts relating to sensory interpretation are not "computational", that the very idea is ultimately nonsensical. There's a very subtle point being made, either that or he is shadow boxing against straw men of his own invention.

What's hard to grasp, for me anyway, is his insistence that computational models demand that syntax plays a causal role.

As a layperson who is not a philosopher, I found it worthwhile to read the summary before diving into the paper:

  1.  On the standard textbook definition, computation is defined syntactically in terms of symbol manipulation.

  2.  But syntax and symbols are not defined in terms of physics. Though symbol tokens are always physical tokens, "symbol" and "same symbol" are not defined in terms of physical features. Syntax, in short, is not intrinsic to physics.

  3.  This has the consequence that computation is not discovered in the physics, it is assigned to it. Certain physical phenomena are assigned or used or programmed or interpreted syntactically. Syntax and symbols are observer relative.

  4.  It follows that you could not discover that the brain or anything else was intrinsically a digital computer, although you could assign a computational interpretation to it as you could to anything else. The point is not that the claim "The brain is a digital computer" is false. Rather it does not get up to the level of falsehood. It does not have a clear sense. You will have misunderstood my account if you think that I am arguing that it is simply false that the brain is a digital computer. The question "Is the brain a digital computer?" is as ill defined as the questions "Is it an abacus?", "Is it a book?", or "Is it a set of symbols?", "Is it a set of mathematical formulae?"

  5.  Some physical systems facilitate the computational use much better than others. That is why we build, program, and use them. In such cases we are the homunculus in the system interpreting the physics in both syntactical and semantic terms.

  6.  But the causal explanations we then give do not cite causal properties different from the physics of the implementation and the intentionality of the homunculus.

  7.  The standard, though tacit, way out of this is to commit the homunculus fallacy. The humunculus fallacy is endemic to computational models of cognition and cannot be removed by the standard recursive decomposition arguments. They are addressed to a different question.

  8.  We cannot avoid the foregoing results by supposing that the brain is doing "information processing". The brain, as far as its intrinsic operations are concerned, does no information processing. It is a specific biological organ and its specific neurobiological processes cause specific forms of intentionality. In the brain, intrinsically, there are neurobiological processes and sometimes they cause consciousness. But that is the end of the story.

[What Came Before]

But syntax and symbols are not defined in terms of physics.

Here's the miss step. I'll try and describe his thoughts in my own words, to show I do understand - his thoughts are: The source of syntax and symbols is not related to the source of physics.

The miss step is treating a definition as mattering somehow - did a god define it or something?

So so what if someone, somewhere didn't define syntax and symbols in terms of physics - doesn't mean their definition automatically counts for much, does it?

[What Came Before]

I think he addresses your criticism here:

(click to show/hide)

It took me a long time to figure out what these people were driving at, so in case someone else is similarly puzzled I will explain an example in detail: Suppose that we have a computer that multiplies six times eight to get forty-eight. Now we ask "How does it do it?" Well, the answer might be that it adds six to itself seven times.\** But if you ask "How does it add six to itself seven times?", the answer might be that, first, it converts all of the numerals into binary notation, and second, it applies a simple algorithm for operating on binary notation until finally we reach the bottom level at which the only instructions are of the form, "Print a zero, erase a one." So, for example, at the top level our intelligent homunculus says "I know how to multiply six times eight to get forty-eight". But at the next lower-level he is replaced by a stupider homunculus who says "I do not actually know how to do multiplication, but I can do addition." Below him are some stupider ones who say "We do not actually know how to do addition or multiplication, but we know how to convert decimal to binary." Below these are stupider ones who say "We do not know anything about any of this stuff, but we know how to operate on binary symbols." At the bottom level are a whole bunch of a homunculi who just say "Zero one, zero one". All of the higher levels reduce to this bottom level. Only the bottom level really exists; the top levels are all just as-if.

Various authors (e.g. Haugeland (1981), Block (1990)) describe this feature when they say that the system is a syntactical engine driving a semantic engine. But we still must face the question we had before: What facts intrinsic to the system make it syntactical? What facts about the bottom level or any other level make these operations into zeros and ones? Without a homunculus that stands outside the recursive decomposition, we do not even have a syntax to operate with The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive decomposition fails, because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the physics is to put a homunculus in the physics.

 There is a fascinating feature to all of this. Cognitivists cheerfully concede that the higher levels of computation , e.g. "multiply 6 times 8" are observer relative; there is nothing really there that corresponds directly to multiplication; it is all in the eye of the homunculus/beholder. But they want to stop this concession at the the lower levels. The electronic circuit , they admit, does not really multiply 6X8 as such, but it really does manipulate 0's and 1's and these manipulations, so to speak, add up to multiplication. But to concede that the higher levels of computation are not intrinsic to the physics is already to concede that the lower levels are not intrinsic either. So the homunculus fallacy is still with us.

For real computers of the kind you buy in the store, there is no homunculus problem, each user is the homunculus in question. But if we are to suppose that the brain is a digital computer, we are still faced with the question "And who is the user?" Typical homunculus questions in cognitive science are such as the following: "How does the visual system compute shape from shading; how does it compute object distance from size of retinal image?" A parallel question would be, "How do nails compute the distance they are to travel in the board from the impact of the hammer and the density of the wood?" And the answer is the same in both sorts of case: If we are talking about how the system works intrinsically neither nails nor visual systems compute anything. We as outside homunculi might describe them computationally, and it is often useful to do so. But you do not understand hammering by supposing that nails are somehow intrinsically implementing hammering algorithms and you do not understand vision by supposing the system is implementing, e.g, the shape from shading alogorithm.

[What Came Before]

But if we are to suppose that the brain is a digital computer, we are still faced with the question "And who is the user?"

So reminds me of 'If conciousness is an illusion, then who is being fooled?'

It's sublime semantic martial arts - as I understand it, he's basically using the argument against him, but attempting to turn it around at the last second to support him.

I don't know what the people he talked to about computers said, but it doesn't come down to "zeros and ones". A series of physical interactions occur. May as well say when the tide is out it's zero, when the tide is in it's one. In as much as it's not. The tide is out. The tide is in. Various electrical currents affect chemistries which affect the flow of other electrical currents. No zeros. No ones.

He's taken what little remnant human projection of values remains in the phrase 'digital computer' and really worked to make them the be all and end all of 'digital computer' (his homonculi), then here's the sublime bit - he's said "How can we be a computer, when that homonculi is us, eh?". Karate!

I love this phrase

they admit, does not really multiply 6X8 as such, but it really does manipulate 0's and 1's

How he makes it them admitting. When really it's better read "I admit" at the start. "I admit it doesn't do 6X8...but it REALLY DOES manipulate 0's and 1's!". Judo flip that claim onto someone else by making them admit what you want to be the case! Brilliant!

So yeah, the people who spoke to weren't semantically hygenic - they used a phrase still containing their projections of value - they still projected ones and zero's, instead of clensing that from their descriptor. And you judo flipped that shit right back at 'em!

But you do not understand hammering by supposing that nails are somehow intrinsically implementing hammering algorithms and you do not understand vision by supposing the system is implementing, e.g, the shape from shading alogorithm.

Oooh, then twist and pop the shoulder, mofo! Dislocate that bitch!

USE that naturalism of the hammering absent an algorithm to like it SUPPORTS your supernatural! Hey, now weve prised algorithms away by saying it still comes down to 1's and 0's, now utterly dislocate even the algorithm with a swift comparison between not using it with a hammer then *snap pop!* not using it with --- oooh, not even a direct reference to the mind, but not using it with a a vision system! Sublime sideswipe! Implication is your final weapon! All based on ostensibly turning naturalism, of all things, to his supernatural favour!

Fuck yeah, this is gunna convince alot of people! What a beutiful train wreck!

It's shit like this that makes me KNOW a universe exists outside of my mind (to touch on an old philosophical chest nut)! I could NEVER make up shit like this!

[What Came Before]

AFAIK Searle is a materialist. Not sure why you think he is supporting the existence of something supernatural.

His point is not to promote dualism or idealism. His point it just that the comparison of a brain to a computer, or more specifically a Turing Machine, is flawed and nonsensical.

[What Came Before]

As far as I understand the term 'materialist', he aint. Otherwise he'd have let go of 1's and 0's as well instead of building an empire on other peoples mistaken wording.

I mean, ask yourself why he says 'For real computers of the kind you buy in the store, there is no homunculus problem, each user is the homunculus in question' if he's a materialist? He's dualist - he even follows up with

But if we are to suppose that the brain is a digital computer, we are still faced with the question "And who is the user?"

because he has this special user position in mind.

[What Came Before]

His point is that saying the brain is a computer means accepting a form of dualism, because it implies someone is reading the programs.

Look at his final point in the summary quote in OP.

I actually struggled with the paper at first because I swore he was trying to say something about what consciousness is, but then I realized the entirety of the paper is talking about what consciousness isn't.

[What Came Before]

His point is that saying the brain is a computer means accepting a form of dualism, because it implies someone is reading the programs.

Look at his final point in the summary quote in OP.

I know - after considerable effort on his part to put homonculi in, which he does by getting a few people to blunder into saying 1's and 0's are 'in' the machine he's JUDO FLIPPED those people into claiming dualism, whilst he's just the practical materialist.

Read it through - who is saying there are 1's and 0's IN the digital computer? Are there quotes in the full version from the people who said this?

Do you read them as genuinely believing there are 1's and 0's in the machine?

Or did they describe things in a ham fisted, kludgey and inaccurate way...and they don't actually believe there are little homonculi in the machine who know only 1's and 0's? But he's gone and taken them as having said that...or more accurately, said what HE says.

[What Came Before]

So you're saying he's wrong, and that signals firing and not firing (or firing at different voltages) ultimately leads to consciousness?

That's fine, but not sure why that makes Searle a dualist?

[What Came Before]

So you're saying he's wrong, and that signals firing and not firing (or firing at different voltages) ultimately leads to consciousness?

Ultimately leads to something, yes.

That's fine, but not sure why that makes Searle a dualist?

The 'were the homonculous' part and in conjunction with that, his careful preservation of 1's and 0's.

How do you identify a dualist, Saajan? Specifically when they wont say they are?

[What Came Before]

The 'were the homonculous' part and in conjunction with that, his careful preservation of 1's and 0's.

I think all he is saying is that there can never be a program that mimics conscious awareness. As I recall he's said that a physical copy of a brain would bring about consciousness whereas that wouldn't happen with a mere program.

Of course, Searle does get accused of being a "dualist in denial" so you're in good company but AFAIK that has more to do with his explanations on how consciousness arises from physical processes than his refutation of consciousness as only computation.

Also, dualist to me is someone who thinks there is a component to consciousness that interacts with the material world but is not part of it. It's admittedly hard to pin down people like Penrose and Chalmers, as AFAIK they base consciousness in the material but ascribe [what I would consider] supernatural properties to matter or programs respectively.

[What Came Before]

The thing is, computation is just physical processes as well. It's just he's tripped up a few people into accidentally saying that 1's and 0's exist, to make it look like computation somehow isn't related to physical processes.

It would actually make a brilliant novel, I think, the way he's constructed that.

[Callan S.]

Aww, what would be cool in a story is to use that word play of his to trick some supernatural entities into the story to say the 1's and 0's existed, and then as they treat it existing, it comes to life magically - then as he switches the homonculi from being in the computer to being in us, it supernaturalises people. So he'd be working a kind of hacking magic! In a story, I mean, of course!

[sciborg2]

From Conscious Entities:

Our thinking is currently so coloured by the seductive analogy between brains and computers that this is hard to accept, but it must be remembered that the human brain is not a discrete-state machine. Computers are constituted that way precisely in order to guarantee that their behaviour is predictable with certainty (or in practice, with a very high degree of probability), and can be specified by the designer or programmer. Human beings, on the other hand, are not artefacts; they were never designed, or specified; they are the products of intentionless evolution, and no one ever declared that they should have only a finite number of valid states. In fact, just as the map shows an infinite number of routes, our brains have an infinite number of valid states.

It's clear, back on the mentalistic level, that if we had been the products of design rather than evolution, with our behaviour carefully specified in advance by a designer or programmer, we really could not be free, responsible, or indeed, people. The causal relations which operate within a brain are determined by the detailed physical constitution of that particular brain, but the causal relationships which operate within a computer are independent of its physical details, barring accidents.

Curiously enough, then,  it turns out that those who see people as programs or data have something in common with those who would see them as immaterial spirits. The computationalists, at the end of the day, are not materialistic enough: they want people to be Platonic abstractions rather than the one-off physical objects they really are...

[Callan S.]

It's curious how it tries to insist I adopt a very discrete state in regard to thinking the brain is an infinite state thing. "Like it just is! It's a binary, okay! That the brain isn't binary! That is definately just true!"

And again it seems more putting of a homonculous in the machine (to latter take out for ourselves again, perhaps?) - sorry, why on earth are the causal relationships in a computer independent of it's physical details? Now computers have dualism as well?

rather than the one-off physical objects they really are...

The one off objects which aren't like computers, because computers causal relationships have nothing to do with their physical details?

It's almost ascribing some mysticism to us by making computers dualist, somehow operating beyond their physical material, then saying we aren't like the dualist computer. They aren't saying computers have souls and we don't - so it seems it's saying it the other way around - that computers have souls, but we don't have that - we have something even more mystical!

Sorry, it seems blind brain problems projected onto computers, then the blind perception is used as a baseline argument. Were talking blind to how a computer works - the author simply says how it doesn't work (and ignores stating how it DOES work), ie 'he causal relationships which operate within a computer are independent of its physical details'.

How does that computer work, if we were to talk about that?