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Topics - sciborg2

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151
Philosophy & Science / Physicalism and the Problem of Base
« on: November 14, 2018, 11:42:54 pm »
Two papers of interest:


One by Susan Scheidner ->

The Problem of the Physical Base

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The most heated debates over physicalism tend to concern the fundamental nature of consciousness. I will concentrate on physicalist positions in philosophjy of mind, but I'll raise a new problem for physicalism from different quarters, one stemming from the mathematical nature of fundamental physical theories. I shall argue that for physicalists to provide an account of the nature of the fundamental physical entities in their physical base...that doesn't face direction-of-explanation worries, they must embrace Platonism as an account of the nature of mathematical entities.

One by Phillip Goff ->

Is it a Problem that Physics is Mathematical?

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Physicalism – the view that fundamental reality is entirely physical – is a very popular view. Whilst there is significant opposition to it, this opposition tends to focus on challenging the potential of physicalism to account for consciousness. Susan Schneider, in her timely paper ‘The problem of the physical base’ hones in on another source of metaphysical difficulty for physicalism: its reliance on mathematics to tell the basic story of the universe.
Galileo’s declaration that mathematics is the language in which the great book of the universe is written has been of great practical benefit, allowing us to build mathematical models that predict the behaviour of matter with great accuracy, and leading ultimately to marvellous technology. But this pragmatic leap forward arguably brings with it profound difficulties for those interested in metaphysics: in finding out what reality is really like. Can we make sense of a purely mathematical universe, and even if we can does the resulting view live up to the expectations many philosophers invest in physicalism?

This is a much neglected problem, and Schneider’s paper is to be admired not only for drawing our attention to it, but also for providing insightful analysis of various dimensions of it. I have, however, some disagreement in detail with how we are to understand the problem, which I will try to outline in what follows.

152
Philosophy & Science / Why German Idealism Matters
« on: November 10, 2018, 07:49:29 am »
Why German Idealism Matters

"German idealism is an invitation to exercise our freedom of thought and to consider that what at first appears impossible may become necessary."

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Our sensory experience, attended to in earnest, reveals itself to be infinite, sublime; it is only after reflective consciousness has manufactured for us a finite, determined world that this infinity is obscured. In attempting to descend below the veil of transcendental reflection into the depths of the sensible, Schelling reverses the typical orientation of philosophy toward the intelligible. His aesthetic (un)grounding of philosophy is a challenge to the Hegelian notion that philosophy ought to overcome itself by arriving at a finished “system of science.” His Naturphilosophie is an infinite creative task, not a finished system. It is not a philosophy about nature but “Nature itself philosophizing” (autophusis philosophia), as he put it. Where Kantian philosophy put the human subject at the center, Schelling argued that “Nature is a priori.”

What makes the human being unique among earthly creatures is that it knows reality’s ground is incomprehensible. Wise to our ignorance, we can either use our new found freedom to flee upwards by way of idealistic transcendentalism, or we can fall deeper in love with cosmogenesis via a naturalistic and descendental approach. The former option, freedom without love, quickly devolves into alienation. Idealists like Kant and Fichte tried to overcome this devolution by privileging practical over theoretical philosophy. To save the possibility of love between free humans they had to deny the possibility of a loving knowledge of living nature. Schelling moved away from the modern equation of knowledge with power in favor of what Goethe termed a “gentle empiricism” or loving knowledge. Rather than recoiling from the abyss of the sensible to a supposedly stable intelligible ground, as transcendental philosophy does, Schelling dives heart first into its radiant darkness.

153
Interesting article that talks about arguing from a Rationalist stance, might be a good discussion topic given some of the other threads touching on the importance of at least acknowledging if not honoring our "irrational" aspects:

5 Tactics Used By Passive-Aggressive Arguers (And The Best Forms of Defense)

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The passive aggressive arguer comes armed with tricky tactics. They cannot take the risk that they might be wrong: their self-esteem is too intertwined with their opinions. It is more important to affirm their rightness, and sense of superiority, than to arrive at the truth. And so they become masters at a deflecting attention away from their weak ideas, and at creating the kind of confusion in which they can control the dynamic. They do this by working on people’s emotions. They seek to rankle and push buttons.

154
Are species like ours, largely - for now at least - "condemned" to communicate through intermediaries like TV/Internet/Radio/etc destined to crash against the hard cliff face of technologies incompatibility with our evolved "sensorium"?

To expand:

- We evolved not to solve scientific mysteries nor to figure out the balance between the individual & society, but at the least the latter is necessary for us to move forward as a species.

- Many of our cognitive biases are due to issues we have with meta-cognition, yet short term success favors exploitation of such biases.

- Our fear/combat responses seem to be more and more easily triggered, as is our "ability" to talk past each other.

- Social Media seems to exacerbate the problem, and thus the Internet isn't necessarily a boon over the long term.

However, I wonder if the problems we face in communicating with each other have to do with the boundaries of our subjective experience. Perhaps species that communicate via spores or some symbiote could better manage the issues that face our planet, in that they can exchange their first-person views? Or would they have even made it this far - perhaps that kind of direct communication is where madness lies?

155
Indeterminism, as described in philosophy/science texts, suggests things happen for no reason at all or at best prior factors cause an inexplicable event that is probabilistic without further explanation being possible. (This assumes that indeterminism is part of nature & not just an expression of causal ignorance of course.)

But while it's obvious indeterminism is nonsensical, determinism actually contains the same arbitrariness hidden under brute assertions. The logical argument for determinism is that things happen for a reason, and that an event A can be accounted for by some set of necessary/sufficient prior events (a.1, a.2,...., a.N).

Yet the way to find out what set of prior events accounts for A requires back tracking from A and continually reducing the elements of the set until the removal of some event a.X in the set of all priors (a.1, a.2,...., a.Infinity) results in A not occurring.

But what ensures A should always be the result? Why doesn't some event B sometimes end up as the result instead of A? The usual explanation seems to be that there are brute facts that are called "natural laws". Yet why don't the "laws" change? What keeps them in place? "Meta-laws"?

156
Philosophy & Science / How Quantum Mechanics Could Be Even Weirder
« on: October 22, 2018, 10:18:33 pm »
How Quantum Mechanics Could Be Even Weirder

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Why doesn’t the world make sense? At the fundamental level of atoms and subatomic particles, the familiar “classical” physics that accounts for how objects move around gives way to quantum physics, with new rules that defy intuition. Traditionally these are expressed as paradoxes: particles that can be in two places at once, cats that are simultaneously alive and dead, apparently impossible faster-than-light signaling between distant particles. But quantum rules are perfectly logical and consistent—the “paradoxes” are the result of our trying to impose on them the everyday reasoning of classical physics.

What’s more, over the past several decades we’ve come to understand that the classical and quantum worlds don’t exactly operate by “different” rules. Rather, the classical world emerges from the quantum in a comprehensible way: you might say that classical physics is simply what quantum physics looks like at the human scale.

All the same, we’re confronted with the question: why is the quantum world the way it is? Why do fundamental particles dictate this set of rules and not some other? Normally that question carries an implication that quantum particles are being a bit perverse by not behaving like billiard balls, reassuringly solid and definite and thing-like. But that might be the wrong way to think about it. Last December, I spoke with Romanian-British physicist Sandu Popescu of Bristol University in England, who told me that things could have been even stranger than quantum.

In fact, Sandu said, we’re not even completely sure that things aren’t even stranger. Maybe we just haven’t detected this extra strangeness yet.


157
Philosophy & Science / Free book: Unsnarling the World-Knot
« on: October 22, 2018, 07:32:40 pm »
Unsnarling the World-Knot - Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem

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This book suggests both a formal procedure for making progress on the mind-body problem and a substantive solution to it, with special attention to consciousness and freedom. The mind-body problem, which Arthur Schopenhauer called the "world-knot," has arguably been the central problem in modern philosophy since its inception in the seventeenth century. With regard to the twentieth century in particular, John Searle in The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992) has expressed his considered judgment that, "contrary to surface appearances, there really has been only one major topic of discussion in the philosophy of mind for the past fifty years or so, and that is the mind-body problem" (RM, 29).

158
Philosophy & Science / Sam Harris on why Materialism is Nonsensical
« on: October 20, 2018, 11:31:44 pm »
The Mystery of Consciousness | Sam Harris

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Consciousness—the sheer fact that this universe is illuminated by sentience—is precisely what unconsciousness is not. And I believe that no description of unconscious complexity will fully account for it. It seems to me that just as “something” and “nothing,” however juxtaposed, can do no explanatory work, an analysis of purely physical processes will never yield a picture of consciousness. However, this is not to say that some other thesis about consciousness must be true. Consciousness may very well be the lawful product of unconscious information processing. But I don’t know what that sentence means—and I don’t think anyone else does either.

159
Philosophy & Science / Peer to Peer Hypothesis
« on: October 20, 2018, 11:20:49 pm »
Another philosophical take that I think gives insights into the Bakkerverse:

How the Peer-to-Peer Simulation Hypothesis Explains Just About Everything, Including the Very Existence of Quantum Mechanics

by Marcus Arvan

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In my recently published article, “A New Theory of Free Will” , I argued that several serious philosophical and empirical hypotheses – hypotheses which have all received and continue to receive serious discussion by philosophers and physicists, and which may all turn out to be true – jointly entail that we are living in the functional equivalent of a peer-to-peer (P2P) networked computer simulation. Not only that, I argued that this P2P Hypothesis explains the very existence of almost all of the most puzzling features of our world:

1. Quantum indeterminacy and measurement problems.
2. Quantum entanglement.
3. The apparent irreducibility of conscious experience to physical objects, properties or functions.
4. The intuition that our personal identity, as conscious subjects of experience, is irreducible to any form of physical or psychological continuity.
5. The apparent “unreality of time” in the objective physical world, along with our subjective experience of the passage of time.
6. Our experience of ourselves as having free will despite our experiencing the physical world as causally closed under the laws of physics.

§1 of this essay briefly summarizes (a) the philosophical and empirical hypotheses that jointly entail the P2P Hypothesis, (b) how the P2P Hypothesis explains all six features of our mentioned above, and (c) the P2P Hypothesis’s four distinct empirical predictions.

§2 then shows something new: that even if the P2P Hypothesis is true, our world differs from the kind of P2P simulations we have constructed in one profound, fundamental way: a way that implies that reality cannot be reduced to mere quantitative information of the sort dealt with in the hard-sciences. Reality has fundamentally qualitative elements that cannot be understood as “information” in any traditional sense.

160
Digging into metaphysics that can explain the Bakkerverse, Marshall's Monadology seems to give us an Idealism (God Dreams) that would also explain why the Progenitors mastered the seeming atomic/physical reality before gaining a hint of their eternal fate.

Transforming the World Into Experience: An Idealist Experiment.

by Paul Marshall

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In summary, I pursue an idealist rehabilitation of the external world through the following stages.

    Set up a world of objects external to perceptual experience (representative realism).

    Make the external world purely physical (dualist representative realism).
 
   Observe that causal relations between the physical external world and conscious
    states are problematic (mind–body problem).

    Defuse the problem by transforming the physical external world into an experiential
    external world (experiential realism).

    Accommodate modern physics in the account by organizing external experience from
    a multiplicity of centres (panpsychic experiential realism).

161
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5in5EdjhD0

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Professor Noam Chomsky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: "The machine, the ghost, and the limits of understanding: Newton's contributions to the study of mind" at the University of Oslo, September 2011. Q&A at 45:33

162
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/cover_story/2016/03/ego_depletion_an_influential_theory_in_psychology_may_have_just_been_debunked.html?wpsrc=sh_all_dt_tw_top

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In 2011, Baumeister and John Tierney of the New York Times published a science-cum-self-help book based around this research. Their best-seller, Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength, advised readers on how the science of ego depletion could be put to use. A glass of lemonade that’s been sweetened with real sugar, they said, could help replenish someone’s inner store of self-control. And if willpower works like a muscle, then regular exercise could boost its strength. You could literally build character, Baumeister said in an interview with the Templeton Foundation, a religiously inclined science-funding organization that has given him about $1 million in grants. By that point, he told the Atlantic, the effects that he’d first begun to study in the late 1990s were established fact: “They’ve been replicated and extended in many different laboratories, so I am confident they are real,” he said.

But that story is about to change. A paper now in press, and due to publish next month in the journal Perspectives on Psychological Science, describes a massive effort to reproduce the main effect that underlies this work. Comprising more than 2,000 subjects tested at two-dozen different labs on several continents, the study found exactly nothing. A zero-effect for ego depletion: No sign that the human will works as it’s been described, or that these hundreds of studies amount to very much at all.

This isn’t the first time that an idea in psychology has been challenged—not by a long shot. A “reproducibility crisis” in psychology, and in many other fields, has now been well-established. A study out last summer tried to replicate 100 psychology experiments one-for-one and found that just 40 percent of those replications were successful. A critique of that study just appeared last week, claiming that the original authors made statistical errors—but that critique has itself been attacked formisconstruing facts, ignoring evidence, and indulging in some wishful thinking.

For scientists and science journalists, this back and forth is worrying. We’d like to think that a published study has more than even odds of being true. The new study of ego depletion has much higher stakes: Instead of warning us that any single piece of research might be unreliable, the new paper casts a shadow on a fully-formedresearch literature. Or, to put it another way: It takes aim not at the single paper but at the Big Idea.

Baumeister’s theory of willpower, and his clever means of testing it, have been borne out again and again in empirical studies. The effect has been recreated in hundreds of different ways, and the underlying concept has been verified via meta-analysis. It’s not some crazy new idea, wobbling on a pile of flimsy data; it’s a sturdy edifice of knowledge, built over many years from solid bricks.

And yet, it now appears that ego depletion could be completely bogus, that its foundation might be made of rotted-out materials. That means an entire field of study—and significant portions of certain scientists’ careers—could be resting on a false premise. If something this well-established could fall apart, then what’s next? That’s not just worrying. It’s terrifying.

163
Author Q&A / What's up with Serwe's Burning Heart?
« on: March 09, 2016, 05:22:54 am »
Was the "miracle" of Serwe's heart after the Circumfix accomplished by mundane, arcane or divine means?

164
Comment from Richard Horton in Lancet:

http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736%2815%2960696-1.pdf

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The case against science is straightforward: much of the scientific literature, perhaps half, may simply be untrue. Afflicted by studies with small sample sizes, tiny effects, invalid exploratory analyses, and flagrant conflicts of interest, together with an obsession for pursuing fashionable trends of dubious importance, science has taken a turn towards darkness. As one participant put it, “poor methods get results”

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Can bad scientific practices be fixed? Part of the problem is that no-one is incentivised to be right. Instead, scientists are incentivised to be productive
and innovative. Would a Hippocratic Oath for science help? Certainly don’t add more layers of research redtape. Instead of changing incentives, perhaps one could remove incentives altogether. Or insist on replicability statements in grant applications and research papers. Or emphasise collaboration, not competition. Or insist on preregistration of protocols. Or reward better pre and post publication peer review. Or improve research training
and mentorship. Or implement the recommendations from our Series on increasing research value, published last year. One of the most convincing proposals came from outside the biomedical community. Tony Weidberg is a Professor of Particle Physics at Oxford. Following several high-profi le errors, the particle physics community now invests great eff ort into intensive checking and rechecking of data prior to publication. By fi ltering results
through independent working groups, physicists are encouraged to criticise. Good criticism is rewarded. The goal is a reliable result, and the incentives for scientists are aligned around this goal. Weidberg worried we set the bar for results in biomedicine far too low. In particle physics, signifi cance is set at 5 sigma—a p value of 3 × 10–7 or 1 in 3·5 million (if the result is not true, this is the probability that the data would have been as extreme as they are). The conclusion of the symposium was that something must be done. Indeed, all seemed to agree that it was within our power to do that something. But
as to precisely what to do or how to do it, there were no fi rm answers.

Those who have the power to act seem to think somebody else should act first.

165
Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind

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Abstract.

Although Hilary Putnam has played a significant role in shaping contemporary philosophy of mind, he has more recently criticised its metaphysical foundations as fundamentally flawed. According to Putnam, the standard positions in the philosophy of mind rest on dubious ontological assumptions which are challenged by his “pragmatic pluralism” and the idea that we can always describe reality in different but equally fundamental ways. Putnam considers this pluralism about conceptual resources as an alternative to both physicalism and dualism. Contrary to physicalism, Putnam’s pluralism rejects the ontological priority of physical concepts. Contrary to dualism, pragmatic pluralism denies that equally fundamental conceptual systems refer to ontologically distinct realms of reality.

The aim of this paper is to discuss and clarify the implications of Putnam’s pragmatic pluralism for the philosophy of mind. The first section introduces Putnam’s concept of conceptual relativity and his rejection of an absolute ontology. In the second section, I argue that conceptual relativity leads to a pragmatic pluralism which undermines the common ontological framework of physicalism and dualism. The third section explains how pragmatic pluralists can reject identity claims without being committed to dualism. The last section discusses the implications of Putnam’s pragmatic pluralism for the mind-body problem by focussing on phenomenal consciousness and mental causation.

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