[H]

Is the atomic composition of salt subjective? The gravitational constant? The truth of the Pythagorean theorem?

I realize people claim to be suspicious of, say, mathematical truths, all the while confidently relying on the technology born of that mathematics. But to me this is the distinction between the armchair philosophizing of academia and the real world living of truth claims.

Hmm, well, yes, but also no.  There is an "objective" atomic composition of salt, at least in theory.  In actual practice though, what we have is the notional composition built upon our concept of an atom, our concept of composition, and so on.  What is an atom in-itself?  Well, here again, we get to a place where the answer seems kind of fuzzy.  Are atoms particles or waves?  What is the difference?  What says it should be one or the other?  And so on.  We don't have atoms in-themselves.  We simply employ pragmatic methods of "understanding" in so far as it can predict results to various degrees.

This is where I would use the notion of something "objective seeming."  That is what science largely tends to do, right?  Move knowledge ever toward the thing-in-itself by discarding any sort of "error" or "bias" found.  Still though, throughout this process, we can never get to the thing-in-itself, because it is not accessible.  We still need some Subject to "read" or "interpret" the result.

That said I would agree we could always be wrong about our morality, based on historical shifts...but then why did moral quales bring about changes in history? We can intellectualize this but moral quales seem of a piece with the quales that ground Reason. To me the statement, "Raping a child is wrong" doesn't seem bound by culture or context, and is as true as Pythagoras' Theorem.

I could be wrong, just as the proofs underlying the algorithms we use for flight could be wrong, just as we could be in the Matrix or this could all be a dream...but does anyone really take that seriously in their actual course of life besides maybe the insane?

Well, I would not discount the notion that I might well actually be insane.  But, just because we might engage in pragmatic heuristic thinking to make it though a day, doesn't, to me, mean it must be the case that it is giving us bedrock-like Truth.

The thing is, the assumptions that base how and why the Pythagorean Theorem is true aren't really like the assumptions that go in to deciding if something is, or is not, moral.  I mean, they share the character of assumptions, but because of the manner of human action, determining the constituent parts of why someone take an action or another is not, to me, the same as enumerating the constituent number of sides that constitute a triangle.

So, where the sort of geometrical system can be laid out quite clearly, could we do the same for the moral system?  In fact, isn't this exactly what the speaker of the video is sort of getting at, with how we give deference to quantifiable measures, since they have the sort of "objective character?"

To me, I don't see why we should equate math and morals at all, really.  Again, to me, this is the same sort of move Harris wants to make in his usual, "science can determine 'correct' morals."  No, it can't, in my opinion.  One, because I still don't buy the notion that there is a "moral object" to measure, quantify or experiment with, and two, because even science is still subjective, just an evolutionary sort of move toward notional "objectivity."

As for Euthyphro, I think that specifically is an argument against Divine Command given Plato had no qualms with making a distinction between the Good and mere sophistry. Of course Plato also realized that getting to the Good was itself not an easy task...and he did seem pretty okay with slaver if not some pedo shit...

Well, my typical loose associations likely lead me astray.  I still feel like something is there, leading me to think they are somehow akin, but I will chalk it up to a likely flawed reading on my part.

[H]

Hmm, maybe I have sort of figured why I wanted to bring in Euthyphro.  Could it not be read as sorting asking if the Holy depended on God to make it so, or if God simply favored that which was intrinsically Holy?

In the same way, do we discover what it is that adheres to an Objective Morality, or do we simply ascribe to the Objective Morality that which we already find moral?

Does that make for a sensible reading at all?  I am certainly no Platonic scholar...

[sciborg2]

Hmm, well, yes, but also no.  There is an "objective" atomic composition of salt, at least in theory.  In actual practice though, what we have is the notional composition built upon our concept of an atom, our concept of composition, and so on.  What is an atom in-itself?  Well, here again, we get to a place where the answer seems kind of fuzzy.  Are atoms particles or waves?  What is the difference?  What says it should be one or the other?  And so on.  We don't have atoms in-themselves.  We simply employ pragmatic methods of "understanding" in so far as it can predict results to various degrees.

The particle/wave duality is something that was empirically found to go against the expectation of physicists in their time, insofar as I understand my science history. Isn't that the subjective running up against the objective?

This is where I would use the notion of something "objective seeming."  That is what science largely tends to do, right?  Move knowledge ever toward the thing-in-itself by discarding any sort of "error" or "bias" found.  Still though, throughout this process, we can never get to the thing-in-itself, because it is not accessible.  We still need some Subject to "read" or "interpret" the result.

To say things-in-themselves are not accessible just seems to be question begging to me. For an Idealist, to give the extreme example, the thing-in-itself simply is the collection of phenomenal properties. We simply have to accept that we don't know - in the intellectualizing sense - whether we're in the Matrix, in a dream, etc. But then we might as well accept the rules of Logic themselves have no Ground for the extreme skeptic and there's no point to philosophy at all.

Well, I would not discount the notion that I might well actually be insane.  But, just because we might engage in pragmatic heuristic thinking to make it though a day, doesn't, to me, mean it must be the case that it is giving us bedrock-like Truth.

What is heuristic about mathematics? I think this is a claim that needs some convincing argument for it?

The thing is, the assumptions that base how and why the Pythagorean Theorem is true aren't really like the assumptions that go in to deciding if something is, or is not, moral.  I mean, they share the character of assumptions, but because of the manner of human action, determining the constituent parts of why someone take an action or another is not, to me, the same as enumerating the constituent number of sides that constitute a triangle.

Well if two statements - one moral, the other mathematical - have the same kind of quale, that of Objective Truth, that seems to be a worthwhile commonality?

So, where the sort of geometrical system can be laid out quite clearly, could we do the same for the moral system?  In fact, isn't this exactly what the speaker of the video is sort of getting at, with how we give deference to quantifiable measures, since they have the sort of "objective character?"

To me, I don't see why we should equate math and morals at all, really.

I think the commonality is not at the level of systems but rather commonality of feeling.

Again, to me, this is the same sort of move Harris wants to make in his usual, "science can determine 'correct' morals."  No, it can't, in my opinion.  One, because I still don't buy the notion that there is a "moral object" to measure, quantify or experiment with, and two, because even science is still subjective, just an evolutionary sort of move toward notional "objectivity."

Well Harris is wrong that we can use science to find the exact correct moral position. [OTOH] I think the practice of science does have subjective aspects, but I think no one lives their actual lives with the belief that scientific findings underpinning technology (along with, say, proofs of computational algorithms) are akin to the opinions someone has about the latest pop musician's album.

[H]

The particle/wave duality is something that was empirically found to go against the expectation of physicists in their time, insofar as I understand my science history. Isn't that the subjective running up against the objective?

Honestly, I don't know and I think I am getting beyond myself here.  What I meant was more so that the label of particle or wave isn't an atom, it is a concept we use to try to categorize whatever an atom is, in-itself.

To say things-in-themselves are not accessible just seems to be question begging to me. For an Idealist, to give the extreme example, the thing-in-itself simply is the collection of phenomenal properties. We simply have to accept that we don't know - in the intellectualizing sense - whether we're in the Matrix, in a dream, etc. But then we might as well accept the rules of Logic themselves have no Ground for the extreme skeptic and there's no point to philosophy at all.

I don't know about that sort of slippery slope there.  We keep math and logic because they have practical utility.  I don't know that there is "Objective Logic" or "Objective Math" any more than I know that there is "Objective Morality."  That there is utility in any/all of those isn't "proof" to me, any more than the utility of believing in God proves God's existence.  As for the "use" of Philosophy, well, I don't know that either, but I would probably tend to think of it more as creative than descriptive.

What is heuristic about mathematics? I think this is a claim that needs some convincing argument for it?

Well, no doubt I use the word "wrongly" for certain.  However, working from this sort of definition, of "employing a practical method that is not guaranteed to be optimal, perfect or rational, but which is nevertheless sufficient for reaching an immediate, short-term goal. Where finding an optimal solution is impossible or impractical, heuristic methods can be used to speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution."  So, where math is rational and sometimes even optimal, what lacks, to me, is the guarantee of such, because I don't think math gives us the Noumenal, in-itself.  Now, I think in the actual common parlance of the word, heuristic is used more to specifically call out things that are considered in-exact, so for instance, estimation, or the like.  A formal calculation is largely considered to simply be the answer.  To me though, the math, the calculation doesn't give us the Noumenal though, just what is usually, practically, the "good enough" descriptor that can facilitate the use at hand.

Once again though, perhaps my loose associations lead me astry.

Well if two statements - one moral, the other mathematical - have the same kind of quale, that of Objective Truth, that seems to be a worthwhile commonality?

Well, I personally don't find the similarity to denote a necessarily actual commonality.  Let me pretend for a moment that I have Number-Color Synesthesia, because the number 2 and the color red share qualia, then I should say they must be the same?  I use the edge-case here to point out that, to me, I don't find it necessarily convincing that just because we might, in a collective Subjective manner, share quale, that this must mean that we are getting something Objective, something Noumenal.

But, maybe I am just a radical Skeptic in this, I don't know.

Well Harris is wrong that we can use science to find the exact correct moral position. [OTOH] I think the practice of science does have subjective aspects, but I think no one lives their actual lives with the belief that scientific findings underpinning technology (along with, say, proofs of computational algorithms) are akin to the opinions someone has about the latest pop musician's album.

Well, we know we both agree on the Harris issue and I would agree that most people don't live in a way that discounts quantitative results in the same way they discount qualitative results.  Again, going right back to the video here's point out that we defer to the quantitative, because it has the sort of "objective character" we want to appeal to.  And that is not to say that this approach does not work.  It certainly does.  If it didn't, I could not type this message, let alone send it to you.

That being said, this is where, to me, the notion of the heuristic kicks me.  Because, for all the quantitative, practical use, we get from all that, it still doesn't give (me) the access to the Noumenal.  So, it is still an estimation, but likely a pretty damn good and practical one.  However, we don't really, to me, have the same methods or techniques available with respect to morality.

So, for me, where we want to appeal to the objective mathematical "truth" of how the internet works, we can't really do the same for morals.  Where we can "measure" the spin of an electron, we can't "measure" the moral worth of compassion.  If we could, we would have Harris' paradigm, no?

But we both agree we don't and can't.  So, to me, in the sort of Deleuzian way, math is a great tool on the "plane of reference" but to me, that doesn't make it truly objective, just a strong descriptor of what might be objective.  On the "plane of immanence" though, where we can't make that reference, where we can't measure, math is not of much use, which is where we stand with morals.  Again, because, in the Is-Ought distinction paradigm, measuring the Is will not give us the Ought.  So, the moral is not "out there" to be measured, it is within the Subjective "future" projected "plane of immanence" where we must make it so.

To me, appealing to a "Objective morality" does nothing different, really, than an appeal to God does.  It isn't up to us then, to reason our morals, they are simply "out there" to be uncovered.  I disagree, the morals are "in us" to be brought forth and while we might, in pursuit of this, invoke a notion of "Objective morality" as an appeal to an authority, it does not make it so that such an authority is really "out there."  At least, not to me.  So, since we can't know that God, or "Objective morality" or whatever, is, in fact, out there, we are ultimately left, in my opinion, in the exact same position regardless: the morality must come from us, Subjects, and so be a product of Subjectivity.

I just don't see a way out of this cage, but maybe the bars are just my own bias.

[sciborg2]

Honestly, I don't know and I think I am getting beyond myself here.  What I meant was more so that the label of particle or wave isn't an atom, it is a concept we use to try to categorize whatever an atom is, in-itself.

Well I would agree that we may not be at the level of actual reality, like this could be the Matrix, but underlying a simulation is some Ground. I think our search gives us some feel for the Objective Ground, and perhaps more importantly our inner selves accept the Objectivity of the world around us. Perhaps, to make things tricky, it's a seeming Objectivity to our Subjectivity but we simply don't.

I don't know about that sort of slippery slope there.  We keep math and logic because they have practical utility.  I don't know that there is "Objective Logic" or "Objective Math" any more than I know that there is "Objective Morality."  That there is utility in any/all of those isn't "proof" to me, any more than the utility of believing in God proves God's existence.  As for the "use" of Philosophy, well, I don't know that either, but I would probably tend to think of it more as creative than descriptive.

Even here you seem to be using the assumption of logic to make an argument. This throws shanks to the wolves of my argument - how we actually live is quite different than the sophistry of mere intellectualizing. People can muse about logic or math being subjective, but I've yet to see someone make a coherent argument for why proofs of theorems or modus ponens would fail under a coherent Other-Logic. How could we even, for example, identify the syllogisms if all we ever had were approximations to them?

Well, no doubt I use the word "wrongly" for certain.  However, working from this sort of definition, of "employing a practical method that is not guaranteed to be optimal, perfect or rational, but which is nevertheless sufficient for reaching an immediate, short-term goal. Where finding an optimal solution is impossible or impractical, heuristic methods can be used to speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution."  So, where math is rational and sometimes even optimal, what lacks, to me, is the guarantee of such, because I don't think math gives us the Noumenal, in-itself.  Now, I think in the actual common parlance of the word, heuristic is used more to specifically call out things that are considered in-exact, so for instance, estimation, or the like.  A formal calculation is largely considered to simply be the answer.  To me though, the math, the calculation doesn't give us the Noumenal though, just what is usually, practically, the "good enough" descriptor that can facilitate the use at hand.

I wasn't talking about calculation, but the proofs and theorems underlying all the applied math. We proceed from proof of an algorithm to its implementation, so the Truth of math affects our causal chains. But what does it mean to prove any theorem but to set up an argument that leads to the consensus feeling of a particular quale...yet sometimes even a proof starts with one person feeling the "this is logically sound" quale, and only over time do others come to agree...

Well, I personally don't find the similarity to denote a necessarily actual commonality.  Let me pretend for a moment that I have Number-Color Synesthesia, because the number 2 and the color red share qualia, then I should say they must be the same?

But do they really share a quale? Does a person with synesthesia see the number 2 as red or associate the number with the color?

In any case, my point wasn't that O.M. is a special kind of mathematical system, but rather it is perfectly reasonable to believe in O.M. b/c we already depend on quales giving us access to Truths.

Well, we know we both agree on the Harris issue and I would agree that most people don't live in a way that discounts quantitative results in the same way they discount qualitative results.  Again, going right back to the video here's point out that we defer to the quantitative, because it has the sort of "objective character" we want to appeal to.  And that is not to say that this approach does not work.  It certainly does.  If it didn't, I could not type this message, let alone send it to you.

That being said, this is where, to me, the notion of the heuristic kicks me.  Because, for all the quantitative, practical use, we get from all that, it still doesn't give (me) the access to the Noumenal.  So, it is still an estimation, but likely a pretty damn good and practical one.  However, we don't really, to me, have the same methods or techniques available with respect to morality.

I still don't see where heuristics fit in with mathematical reasoning when it comes to proofs. And again, if it's all estimation, how do we even comprehend (not to mention teach) the syllogisms if we never actually grasp them in our use of Reason?

So, for me, where we want to appeal to the objective mathematical "truth" of how the internet works, we can't really do the same for morals.  Where we can "measure" the spin of an electron, we can't "measure" the moral worth of compassion.  If we could, we would have Harris' paradigm, no?

Well, again, the commonality is meant to counter the idea that O.M. can't exist because it relies on feeling. I mean to even type out an argument refers a similar feeling of Truth with regard to Memory. Everything relies on quales - the feeling of Truth, so O.M. is just of a piece with the rest of our existence.

But we both agree we don't and can't.  So, to me, in the sort of Deleuzian way, math is a great tool on the "plane of reference" but to me, that doesn't make it truly objective, just a strong descriptor of what might be objective.  On the "plane of immanence" though, where we can't make that reference, where we can't measure, math is not of much use, which is where we stand with morals.  Again, because, in the Is-Ought distinction paradigm, measuring the Is will not give us the Ought.  So, the moral is not "out there" to be measured, it is within the Subjective "future" projected "plane of immanence" where we must make it so.

How does one decide which morality to "make it so"...seems like you'd need some kind of Principles about what is right or wrong...oh wait ;-)

To me, appealing to a "Objective morality" does nothing different, really, than an appeal to God does.

 

Appealing to God is saying, "No matter your moral quales this other dude's opinion supercedes it". It is kind of the opposite of appealing to an O.M.?

It isn't up to us then, to reason our morals, they are simply "out there" to be uncovered.  I disagree, the morals are "in us" to be brought forth and while we might, in pursuit of this, invoke a notion of "Objective morality" as an appeal to an authority, it does not make it so that such an authority is really "out there."  At least, not to me.  So, since we can't know that God, or "Objective morality" or whatever, is, in fact, out there, we are ultimately left, in my opinion, in the exact same position regardless: the morality must come from us, Subjects, and so be a product of Subjectivity.

Goes back to the question of how to decide which morality comes from us - seems like you need morality to generate morality?

I just don't see a way out of this cage, but maybe the bars are just my own bias.

Well my critique is the critique against a good bit of modern philosophy, in that we live our lives with bedrock assumptions even philosophers rely on until they start intellectualization. But this to me is is having a map in our heads and confusing it with the territory.

[H]

Appealing to God is saying, "No matter your moral quales this other dude's opinion supercedes it". It is kind of the opposite of appealing to an O.M.?

Well, I'm not using God as "another subject" in this case.  I am talking about God as the Objective Foundation, of sorts, to the Universe.  In reality, what I am more doing is pointing out the external, appeal to the notional "objective source."  That is, the move to shift what I see as the subjective quale to an external, "objective" source.  In this way, I don't see any significant difference between notional "objective morality" and notional deity.  They can both be the same.  Exerternal, "objective" source for the foundational start to morality.  The only thing, to me, that changes is the name we give it and possibly, some other quantities we might want or not want to ascribe to it.  In the case of a deity, we might want to ascribe it intentionality, in the case of objective morals, we might not.  In either case, we are still making the external appeal to "authority."

My posts are just burgeoning though and I am likely getting further and further from an actual point.  Let me see if I can try to summarize what I see your view as and, if you like, you can see if you could summarize mine.

I believe you are making the case that moral quale, or if we like, moral intuition, can and does guide us to objective moral truth, in the same sort of way that you see mathematical "proofs" guide us toward objective truths about nature.

Now, my broad point is that, if there are objective moral truths, or not, we cannot access them in any case, because all we have at our disposal would be subjective moral intuitions, or whatever it is we want to call "reason."  Now, in the case of "moral intuition" I think the case is fairly clear to draw a line to the inherent Subjectivity there.  In the case of "reason" though, I do admit the line is less clear.  Now, broadly speaking, my point is that while it would be nice to say that since we are unsure about the line from reason to Subjectivity, then the line from reason to Objectivity must be more clear.  To that, I cannot really agree, because the line there runs direct to an almost brick wall, to me, of the break between the phenomenal and the noumenal.

Now, I am not well versed in the philosophy of math, by any stretch of the imagination, but I do think that math and logic do tend to, essentially, push right up to that Phenomenal/Noumenal wall, but I do not see how it would break through that wall.  So, once again, I am still finding myself "locked" on the Phenomenal side of the break.  With morals, while we can use logic to push against that wall again, we are still locked on what I can only think of as the Phenomenal and Subjective side of the wall.

This does not mean that I am saying that there can be no actual morality, but rather, that morals are always subjective to some degree.  What we can do, like the scientific method does, is try to, ever more, push on toward something objective, but, asymptotically, we can never get there.  So, perhaps wrongly, I don't think logic or math gives us Objective Truth.  I also don't think that moral intuition gives is access to Objective Moral Truth.

To me, all we have is the Subjective valuation.  Where that comes from, if there is an Objective Source to which we make our Subjective valuations based off of, or not, still must come from we Subjects in the end.  Because, if we are agents at all, we are not bound by this Objective Source, we could only consider our perception of it, not access it immediately.  And that is the key, to me, that it is all mediated.  That mediating factor, to me, must be Subjectivity, as far as I can tell.

And, as a matter of disclosure, I have no inkling that any moral philosopher, current or not, would actually would espouse my likely poor take on things.

[sciborg2]

Appealing to God is saying, "No matter your moral quales this other dude's opinion supercedes it". It is kind of the opposite of appealing to an O.M.?

Well, I'm not using God as "another subject" in this case.  I am talking about God as the Objective Foundation, of sorts, to the Universe.  In reality, what I am more doing is pointing out the external, appeal to the notional "objective source."  That is, the move to shift what I see as the subjective quale to an external, "objective" source.  In this way, I don't see any significant difference between notional "objective morality" and notional deity.  They can both be the same.  Exerternal, "objective" source for the foundational start to morality.  The only thing, to me, that changes is the name we give it and possibly, some other quantities we might want or not want to ascribe to it.  In the case of a deity, we might want to ascribe it intentionality, in the case of objective morals, we might not.  In either case, we are still making the external appeal to "authority."

My posts are just burgeoning though and I am likely getting further and further from an actual point.  Let me see if I can try to summarize what I see your view as and, if you like, you can see if you could summarize mine.

I believe you are making the case that moral quale, or if we like, moral intuition, can and does guide us to objective moral truth, in the same sort of way that you see mathematical "proofs" guide us toward objective truths about nature.

Now, my broad point is that, if there are objective moral truths, or not, we cannot access them in any case, because all we have at our disposal would be subjective moral intuitions, or whatever it is we want to call "reason."  Now, in the case of "moral intuition" I think the case is fairly clear to draw a line to the inherent Subjectivity there.  In the case of "reason" though, I do admit the line is less clear.  Now, broadly speaking, my point is that while it would be nice to say that since we are unsure about the line from reason to Subjectivity, then the line from reason to Objectivity must be more clear.  To that, I cannot really agree, because the line there runs direct to an almost brick wall, to me, of the break between the phenomenal and the noumenal.

Now, I am not well versed in the philosophy of math, by any stretch of the imagination, but I do think that math and logic do tend to, essentially, push right up to that Phenomenal/Noumenal wall, but I do not see how it would break through that wall.  So, once again, I am still finding myself "locked" on the Phenomenal side of the break.  With morals, while we can use logic to push against that wall again, we are still locked on what I can only think of as the Phenomenal and Subjective side of the wall.

This does not mean that I am saying that there can be no actual morality, but rather, that morals are always subjective to some degree.  What we can do, like the scientific method does, is try to, ever more, push on toward something objective, but, asymptotically, we can never get there.  So, perhaps wrongly, I don't think logic or math gives us Objective Truth.  I also don't think that moral intuition gives is access to Objective Moral Truth.

To me, all we have is the Subjective valuation.  Where that comes from, if there is an Objective Source to which we make our Subjective valuations based off of, or not, still must come from we Subjects in the end.  Because, if we are agents at all, we are not bound by this Objective Source, we could only consider our perception of it, not access it immediately.  And that is the key, to me, that it is all mediated.  That mediating factor, to me, must be Subjectivity, as far as I can tell.

And, as a matter of disclosure, I have no inkling that any moral philosopher, current or not, would actually would espouse my likely poor take on things.

This all seems very much like a post-modern take...but I thought you were a Jordan Peterson fan? ;-)

I still see a distinction between Objective Morality as an assumption and the idea that what is Objectively Moral can be determined by the opinions of a particular deity. This is the same distinction I believe Plato to be making, as otherwise there would be no dialogue specifying Euthyphro's Dilemma. In fact Plato's whole reason for writing that dialogue - if my history of philosophy is on point - is that some of his moral quales went against some particular religious dictates.

That said, I don't think we are as far apart as I originally thought. I also think the Good is something society ideally moves toward, MLK Jr.'s Arc of Justice and all that. Though I can't see how you could say Science or any other system could move toward an Objective if all we can grasp is the Subjective.

I think a major point of my disagreement is the notion that the usual examples for neurological heuristics and phenomenal/noumenal distinctions are related to our sensory apparatus and even there mostly seem to revolve around seeing. But it's a quite a leap to note some User Illusion aspects of our interfacing with the world and the idea that mathematics and logic are somehow muddied by our subjective apprehension. Getting past the fact this sort of argument undermines itself by chewing on the foundations of logic the "Everything is muddied by Subjectivity" argument seems hard to disentangle from the assertion of Hyperchaos. (Of course for me Logical Universals are the only good argument against Hyperchaos...)

Additionally, I still don't get what exactly it means to say Mathematics & Logic are muddied by subjective apprehension. It seems to me these come to us "pure", and my reason to bring up such Universals is to note that quales can lead us to such bedrock Truth.

I've seen this sort of argument, that what we think of as Universals are really evolutionary neurology, posited - that aliens could have their own Logic - though this also only seems to come up when someone wants to champion Physicalism by negating the necessary existence of Universals. Meanwhile even grade schoolers seem capable of grokking that the reason SETI sends mathematical knowledge into space is precisely because of said Universals being, well, Universal...

[H]

This all seems very much like a post-modern take...but I thought you were a Jordan Peterson fan? ;-)

Well, I certainly never said I was anything but an idiot.  However, my interest in Peterson was an interest was an interest in a sort of phenomenology into his original reference material, not his "straight out of Stephen Hicks" notion of what post-Modern philosophy is, that is for certain.

I still see a distinction between Objective Morality as an assumption and the idea that what is Objectively Moral can be determined by the opinions of a particular deity. This is the same distinction I believe Plato to be making, as otherwise there would be no dialogue specifying Euthyphro's Dilemma. In fact Plato's whole reason for writing that dialogue - if my history of philosophy is on point - is that some of his moral quales went against some particular religious dictates.

That said, I don't think we are as far apart as I originally thought. I also think the Good is something society ideally moves toward, MLK Jr.'s Arc of Justice and all that. Though I can't see how you could say Science or any other system could move toward an Objective if all we can grasp is the Subjective.

Well, maybe my take is a bad one.  However, I just do not see how we "grasp the Objective" through the Phenomenal/Noumenal gap.  Now, we could simply surmise that there is no gap.  That what we get simply is the Noumenal and that any mediation from/through consciousness/perception is nothing.  However, I have my doubts about that.  I can't "prove" a difference in the Noumenal but not one can "prove" the similarity either.  So, where does that leave me, epistemically?  To me, all we can access is the Phenomenal, so I will say that all we have is the Phenomenal.  Is the Phenomenal influenced by something Noumenal?  That certainly is plausible, but again, what could we say about that but to just assume it so?

I think a major point of my disagreement is the notion that the usual examples for neurological heuristics and phenomenal/noumenal distinctions are related to our sensory apparatus and even there mostly seem to revolve around seeing. But it's a quite a leap to note some User Illusion aspects of our interfacing with the world and the idea that mathematics and logic are somehow muddied by our subjective apprehension. Getting past the fact this sort of argument undermines itself by chewing on the foundations of logic the "Everything is muddied by Subjectivity" argument seems hard to disentangle from the assertion of Hyperchaos. (Of course for me Logical Universals are the only good argument against Hyperchaos...)

Additionally, I still don't get what exactly it means to say Mathematics & Logic are muddied by subjective apprehension. It seems to me these come to us "pure", and my reason to bring up such Universals is to note that quales can lead us to such bedrock Truth.

I've seen this sort of argument, that what we think of as Universals are really evolutionary neurology, posited - that aliens could have their own Logic - though this also only seems to come up when someone wants to champion Physicalism by negating the necessary existence of Universals. Meanwhile even grade schoolers seem capable of grokking that the reason SETI sends mathematical knowledge into space is precisely because of said Universals being, well, Universal...

Well, let me be clear, I am certainly not a logician, nor a mathematician, so I could certainly well be wrong.  However, I do think I have heard the idea from either mathematicians or philosophers, that there are alternate possible mathematics.  That doesn't really mean they aren't all describing the same thing (Reality, for example), but I don't think any of them would give you immediate access to Reality in-itself.  Now, maybe this guy, Stephen Wolfram, is a total crackpot, and if so, if I saw the evidence that he is flatly wrong, or could not be correct, I really would not hesitate to change my view.

So, does Math have some Subjective component?  To me, the answer is yes.  If we can reference Mathematical "beauty" for example, then I think that is a sort of tell that we are not on a "truly" Objective system.  Again, I can't seem to break myself out of the Kantian cage I am thinking of.  So, to me, while Math might, ultimately be only minutely, minisculely subjective, still don't see that getting across the Phenomenal/Noumenal boundary.  Again though, this does not assume that the Phenomena and the Noumenal must be different, but at the same time, provides to real way to say they must be the same.

So, for me, I am left in the lurch here.  To get back to morality, to say that our moral intuitions access noumenal morality, to me, just does not make sense.  Were that the case, how could we, as you point out above, make "moral progress?"  What mediated the access, for example, between Plato and the notion that "slavery is wrong."  Plato's moral quale that this was perfectly justifiable, was the from the Objective Moral?  If so, what happened now?  How do we now get a different answer?  Did the Objective Moral change, or did the Subjective Moral change?  In either case, how can we know which moral quale is closer to, or further away from the Objective Moral?

So, let us pretend that tomorrow, someone takes up Plato's case on slavery.  This person's moral quale says it is perfectly justifiable.  Now, if we have the sort of view that moral quale is pointing to the Objective Moral, how do we refute that?  Assert that this person does not truly have the quale?  We don't have access to that.  Do we say that, for some reason, they are wrongly accessing the Objective Moral?  OK, but on what grounds, when our access to the Objective Moral is our moral quale?  Now we have our Subjective quale versus their Subjective quale, which is the "right" one?  You see how I am not getting out of a Subjective trap here?

As always though, I am likely just doing a poor job explaining my position.  Maybe it is the case that my position is not tennible, but I still can't see how, even if there is Objective Truth out there, we do not get it mediated by Subjectivity.  Not in science, not in math, and definitely not in morals.  Now, one day I will get down the brass tacks and finally read Karl Popper's Objective Knowledge and maybe some of his other work, but, this quote from the SEP on Karl Popper:

"Scientific theories, for him, are not inductively inferred from experience, nor is scientific experimentation carried out with a view to verifying or finally establishing the truth of theories; rather, all knowledge is provisional, conjectural, hypothetical—we can never finally prove our scientific theories, we can merely (provisionally) confirm or (conclusively) refute them; hence at any given time we have to choose between the potentially infinite number of theories which will explain the set of phenomena under investigation. Faced with this choice, we can only eliminate those theories which are demonstrably false, and rationally choose between the remaining, unfalsified theories. Hence Popper’s emphasis on the importance of the critical spirit to science—for him critical thinking is the very essence of rationality. For it is only by critical thought that we can eliminate false theories, and determine which of the remaining theories is the best available one, in the sense of possessing the highest level of explanatory force and predictive power."

Emphasis this their's, not mine, but points to what I am sort of saying, I think.  And to me, part of that mediation is a Subjective gap, the inability to ever completely remove the Subjective from ourselves, or our theory, observation, formulation, or what have you.

While Math is so expressly formal that it gives us a very "unique" ability to lay out, view and consider foundational assumptions, that sort of thing is not, as far as I can tell, the same for morals.  The foundational assumptions in morals lay in a much "darker" less formally drawn out place, so, this might be why our mathematical intuitions are likely closer to something Noumenal than our moral ones are (to me).  Because in moral reasoning, we are likely making foundational assumptions are are very Subjective in nature, where mathematical ones are at least notionally Objective in the sense of being less Subjective (as far as I could tell).

[sciborg2]

This all seems very much like a post-modern take...but I thought you were a Jordan Peterson fan? ;-)

Well, I certainly never said I was anything but an idiot.  However, my interest in Peterson was an interest was an interest in a sort of phenomenology into his original reference material, not his "straight out of Stephen Hicks" notion of what post-Modern philosophy is, that is for certain.

I still see a distinction between Objective Morality as an assumption and the idea that what is Objectively Moral can be determined by the opinions of a particular deity. This is the same distinction I believe Plato to be making, as otherwise there would be no dialogue specifying Euthyphro's Dilemma. In fact Plato's whole reason for writing that dialogue - if my history of philosophy is on point - is that some of his moral quales went against some particular religious dictates.

That said, I don't think we are as far apart as I originally thought. I also think the Good is something society ideally moves toward, MLK Jr.'s Arc of Justice and all that. Though I can't see how you could say Science or any other system could move toward an Objective if all we can grasp is the Subjective.

Well, maybe my take is a bad one.  However, I just do not see how we "grasp the Objective" through the Phenomenal/Noumenal gap.  Now, we could simply surmise that there is no gap.  That what we get simply is the Noumenal and that any mediation from/through consciousness/perception is nothing.  However, I have my doubts about that.  I can't "prove" a difference in the Noumenal but not one can "prove" the similarity either.  So, where does that leave me, epistemically?  To me, all we can access is the Phenomenal, so I will say that all we have is the Phenomenal.  Is the Phenomenal influenced by something Noumenal?  That certainly is plausible, but again, what could we say about that but to just assume it so?

I think a major point of my disagreement is the notion that the usual examples for neurological heuristics and phenomenal/noumenal distinctions are related to our sensory apparatus and even there mostly seem to revolve around seeing. But it's a quite a leap to note some User Illusion aspects of our interfacing with the world and the idea that mathematics and logic are somehow muddied by our subjective apprehension. Getting past the fact this sort of argument undermines itself by chewing on the foundations of logic the "Everything is muddied by Subjectivity" argument seems hard to disentangle from the assertion of Hyperchaos. (Of course for me Logical Universals are the only good argument against Hyperchaos...)

Additionally, I still don't get what exactly it means to say Mathematics & Logic are muddied by subjective apprehension. It seems to me these come to us "pure", and my reason to bring up such Universals is to note that quales can lead us to such bedrock Truth.

I've seen this sort of argument, that what we think of as Universals are really evolutionary neurology, posited - that aliens could have their own Logic - though this also only seems to come up when someone wants to champion Physicalism by negating the necessary existence of Universals. Meanwhile even grade schoolers seem capable of grokking that the reason SETI sends mathematical knowledge into space is precisely because of said Universals being, well, Universal...

Well, let me be clear, I am certainly not a logician, nor a mathematician, so I could certainly well be wrong.  However, I do think I have heard the idea from either mathematicians or philosophers, that there are alternate possible mathematics.  That doesn't really mean they aren't all describing the same thing (Reality, for example), but I don't think any of them would give you immediate access to Reality in-itself.  Now, maybe this guy, Stephen Wolfram, is a total crackpot, and if so, if I saw the evidence that he is flatly wrong, or could not be correct, I really would not hesitate to change my view.

So, does Math have some Subjective component?  To me, the answer is yes.  If we can reference Mathematical "beauty" for example, then I think that is a sort of tell that we are not on a "truly" Objective system.  Again, I can't seem to break myself out of the Kantian cage I am thinking of.  So, to me, while Math might, ultimately be only minutely, minisculely subjective, still don't see that getting across the Phenomenal/Noumenal boundary.  Again though, this does not assume that the Phenomena and the Noumenal must be different, but at the same time, provides to real way to say they must be the same.

So, for me, I am left in the lurch here.  To get back to morality, to say that our moral intuitions access noumenal morality, to me, just does not make sense.  Were that the case, how could we, as you point out above, make "moral progress?"  What mediated the access, for example, between Plato and the notion that "slavery is wrong."  Plato's moral quale that this was perfectly justifiable, was the from the Objective Moral?  If so, what happened now?  How do we now get a different answer?  Did the Objective Moral change, or did the Subjective Moral change?  In either case, how can we know which moral quale is closer to, or further away from the Objective Moral?

So, let us pretend that tomorrow, someone takes up Plato's case on slavery.  This person's moral quale says it is perfectly justifiable.  Now, if we have the sort of view that moral quale is pointing to the Objective Moral, how do we refute that?  Assert that this person does not truly have the quale?  We don't have access to that.  Do we say that, for some reason, they are wrongly accessing the Objective Moral?  OK, but on what grounds, when our access to the Objective Moral is our moral quale?  Now we have our Subjective quale versus their Subjective quale, which is the "right" one?  You see how I am not getting out of a Subjective trap here?

As always though, I am likely just doing a poor job explaining my position.  Maybe it is the case that my position is not tennible, but I still can't see how, even if there is Objective Truth out there, we do not get it mediated by Subjectivity.  Not in science, not in math, and definitely not in morals.  Now, one day I will get down the brass tacks and finally read Karl Popper's Objective Knowledge and maybe some of his other work, but, this quote from the SEP on Karl Popper:

"Scientific theories, for him, are not inductively inferred from experience, nor is scientific experimentation carried out with a view to verifying or finally establishing the truth of theories; rather, all knowledge is provisional, conjectural, hypothetical—we can never finally prove our scientific theories, we can merely (provisionally) confirm or (conclusively) refute them; hence at any given time we have to choose between the potentially infinite number of theories which will explain the set of phenomena under investigation. Faced with this choice, we can only eliminate those theories which are demonstrably false, and rationally choose between the remaining, unfalsified theories. Hence Popper’s emphasis on the importance of the critical spirit to science—for him critical thinking is the very essence of rationality. For it is only by critical thought that we can eliminate false theories, and determine which of the remaining theories is the best available one, in the sense of possessing the highest level of explanatory force and predictive power."

Emphasis this their's, not mine, but points to what I am sort of saying, I think.  And to me, part of that mediation is a Subjective gap, the inability to ever completely remove the Subjective from ourselves, or our theory, observation, formulation, or what have you.

While Math is so expressly formal that it gives us a very "unique" ability to lay out, view and consider foundational assumptions, that sort of thing is not, as far as I can tell, the same for morals.  The foundational assumptions in morals lay in a much "darker" less formally drawn out place, so, this might be why our mathematical intuitions are likely closer to something Noumenal than our moral ones are (to me).  Because in moral reasoning, we are likely making foundational assumptions are are very Subjective in nature, where mathematical ones are at least notionally Objective in the sense of being less Subjective (as far as I could tell).

If you can never be sure you've grasped the Noumenal, why do you think there is one separate from consciousness? Why not just be an Idealist then?

The very idea there could be moral progress would require some kind of Absolute measure right?

As for alternative mathematical systems, these still require Grounding in Logical Universals.

All this, to me, suggests that while we cannot intellectualize our way toward O.M. we use Truth quales so often in life it would seem odd to make a special case against O.M. - especially since any serious argument against O.M. assumes Truth quales are useful in terms of logical reasoning + memory of what just occurred.

Now I agree that the biggest issue for O.M. is the feeling of certainty about things [like slavery in the past] we generally now recognize as unacceptable. But for someone like myself who ascribes to a Hermeticist view of reality this obfuscation and gradual movement toward the Truth is just par for the course.

I also feel O.M. isn't a long list of infinite rules codified somewhere in the universe like a program consisting of countless if-then statements. I suspect it is more an impetus, a suggestive force...but then this will likely only be of interest to my fellow immaterialists...who are out there I hope....Bueler? Buelerrrrrrr....

[H]

If you can never be sure you've grasped the Noumenal, why do you think there is one separate from consciousness? Why not just be an Idealist then?

The very idea there could be moral progress would require some kind of Absolute measure right?

Well, to me, that is the thing.  I don't want to just be an Idealist and I don't want to just be a Physicalist.  This is why the sort of Hegelian "openness" to an Absolute does appeal to me, because it can sort of suppose that the Absolute is not a "completeness" of the unity, but rather an sort of conjunction of opposites.

Now, granted, I am only slightly smarter than a paramecium, so not doubt there are numerous "problems" with this.  Still though, it is what I find myself drawn toward.  One day, perhaps I will have read enough to know how or why this couldn't or shouldn't work.

Still though, the notion that we make "moral progress" does suppose an Absolute morality, I would not contest it.  What I would contest is if that Absolute morality exists Objectively, or as a matter of something more like communal Subjectivity.  I can't possibly tell you that you would be "wrong" in supposing that the Objective Morality we are appealing to exists as a Noumena, but also, I see no (from my perspective) compelling reason to follow along there.  So, as always, I am just left with an indeterminacy.  However, given my bias toward thinking in terms of a Kantian divide, I would err on the side of figuring that even if there is an Objective Morality, that we have nothing but Subjective takes on it, at best.

At this point, I need to just evolve my philosophical view.  Perhaps a couple years more reading and I might be at the point where I could seriously contest my own stance here.  But, at the moment, I am still left largely where I was, Kantian divide in place.  I don't think Idealism or Physicalism are, either, sufficient, nor do a know the bridge to get from one to the other though.

[sciborg2]

At this point, I need to just evolve my philosophical view.  Perhaps a couple years more reading and I might be at the point where I could seriously contest my own stance here.  But, at the moment, I am still left largely where I was, Kantian divide in place.  I don't think Idealism or Physicalism are, either, sufficient, nor do a know the bridge to get from one to the other though.

Hmmmm....But in the actual living of your life, you will raise your children according to a moral standard + make reasoned arguments based on a sense of communicable Logical standard + assume without reflection that memory (like the memory of the post you read & replied to) is largely accurate.

[When I say without reflection I don't mean that as an insult but rather how we have to live our lives - if we continually reflected on every aspect of memory nothing could be accomplished.]

Am I correct in that?

It's kind of like people who don't believe in free will nevertheless seem happy to act as if it were exactly what libertarians purport it to be. :-)

[H]

Hmmmm....But in the actual living of your life, you will raise your children according to a moral standard + make reasoned arguments based on a sense of communicable Logical standard + assume without reflection that memory (like the memory of the post you read & replied to) is largely accurate.

[When I say without reflection I don't mean that as an insult but rather how we have to live our lives - if we continually reflected on every aspect of memory nothing could be accomplished.]

Am I correct in that?

It's kind of like people who don't believe in free will nevertheless seem happy to act as if it were exactly what libertarians purport it to be. :-)

Well, largely, yes.  Although in some cases, maybe not.  I mean, I am not something like a "memory worshiper" or anything, I don't think it is infallible.  But I also don't believe that there is something like "one right way" to live.  I would make appeals to math, or logic, but my stance was not anti-math, or anti-logic.  Or, for that matter, anti-morals.  My only point is that math or logic, appeals to a "hypothetical" (in my view) Objective Morality, does not make it objective.  We can think it is, we can appeal to it as if it were, we could even, somehow, through means of, say, math or logic or something else, press ourselves against that wall of the Noumenal, but I just am highly skeptical that we even break through that wall.

Does it matter?  I don't know.  Do I know there is a wall there?  No, all I can do though is think things through as I am able.  I can't tell you if the difference between Phenomenal and Noumenal morals would be the same or different.  But I am just not, personally, prepared to just assume then, though, that we have the Noumenal.

But, I do have to be somewhat pragmatic.  I mean, I do tend to be a skeptic, but one can't realistically be the apocryphal Pyrro, so skeptical that you nearly die all the time.  I do see value is skepticism, but it, of course, must be tempered.  At some point, you have to just take a sort of Kierkegaardian leap and just have something like faith.  To me, I don't have access to the Objective, I can't and I won't ever, but I have to use what to me seem like sorts of heuristic methods to just get by.  That doesn't really bother me, personally.  I don't feel cognitive dissonance or anything in having one pseudo-intellectual stance and one pragmatic one.  But, maybe that is just me.  Or maybe I am just deluding myself.

[sciborg2]

Hmmmm....But in the actual living of your life, you will raise your children according to a moral standard + make reasoned arguments based on a sense of communicable Logical standard + assume without reflection that memory (like the memory of the post you read & replied to) is largely accurate.

[When I say without reflection I don't mean that as an insult but rather how we have to live our lives - if we continually reflected on every aspect of memory nothing could be accomplished.]

Am I correct in that?

It's kind of like people who don't believe in free will nevertheless seem happy to act as if it were exactly what libertarians purport it to be. :-)

Well, largely, yes.  Although in some cases, maybe not.  I mean, I am not something like a "memory worshiper" or anything, I don't think it is infallible.  But I also don't believe that there is something like "one right way" to live.  I would make appeals to math, or logic, but my stance was not anti-math, or anti-logic.  Or, for that matter, anti-morals.  My only point is that math or logic, appeals to a "hypothetical" (in my view) Objective Morality, does not make it objective.  We can think it is, we can appeal to it as if it were, we could even, somehow, through means of, say, math or logic or something else, press ourselves against that wall of the Noumenal, but I just am highly skeptical that we even break through that wall.

Does it matter?  I don't know.  Do I know there is a wall there?  No, all I can do though is think things through as I am able.  I can't tell you if the difference between Phenomenal and Noumenal morals would be the same or different.  But I am just not, personally, prepared to just assume then, though, that we have the Noumenal.

But, I do have to be somewhat pragmatic.  I mean, I do tend to be a skeptic, but one can't realistically be the apocryphal Pyrro, so skeptical that you nearly die all the time.  I do see value is skepticism, but it, of course, must be tempered.  At some point, you have to just take a sort of Kierkegaardian leap and just have something like faith.  To me, I don't have access to the Objective, I can't and I won't ever, but I have to use what to me seem like sorts of heuristic methods to just get by.  That doesn't really bother me, personally.  I don't feel cognitive dissonance or anything in having one pseudo-intellectual stance and one pragmatic one.  But, maybe that is just me.  Or maybe I am just deluding myself.

Ah I wasn't talking about memory as in "What did I have for lunch?" but rather the memory of the last 30 seconds to ensure a conversation flows - remembering what the last person said as well as whatever part of your reply you've finished so far.

So do you think there's a situation where, "Raping kids is wrong" would not apply? Or the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus would fail to be true within the mathematical context it is presented it? (I realize there could be an unusual mathematical foundation that renders it false, like Geometrical theorems might be false under Non-Euclidean Geometry).

Beyond all that it seems you are trusting your Reasoning ability that leads to the conclusion that there is a gap between the Noumenal and the Phenomenal in all contexts, though AFAIK the known examples all relate to the differences between the Subjective of the First Person and the Agreed Consensus of what is happening "Out there".

So it would seem there is some Ground on which one must stand to even begin to suspect the Noumenal/Phenomenal Gap, and even more pillars are added to said Ground to make any real argument for this Gap?

To bring it all back to the original topic, how can we even say Morality is being "Gamified", and that this is a bad thing, without some assumption of a standard metric itself grounded in some Universals?

[H]

So it would seem there is some Ground on which one must stand to even begin to suspect the Noumenal/Phenomenal Gap, and even more pillars are added to said Ground to make any real argument for this Gap?

To bring it all back to the original topic, how can we even say Morality is being "Gamified", and that this is a bad thing, without some assumption of a standard metric itself grounded in some Universals?

Well, the thing is, I am not "anti-Ground" at all though.  In fact, I am very much pro-Ground!  My qualm is only that I don't, or should I say, I can't seem to, think that we should really call the Ground "objective."  While it is well and good to have a Ground, and the appeal of the "authority" of the "objective" serves us well, I do have my sort of "technical" nit-picks on that.  In the end, maybe that is all it is, but to me, it seem noteworthy to note that.

To me, the "issue" of the gamification is that, to me, it absolutely lowers the bar of conversation and discourse.  Also, since it presupposes a notion of "winning" and "scoring points," for example, it flattens the whole plurality of Being, in a way.  That is, it establishes a Ground of Being as Winning.  Not to mention, presupposes that then there must be "One Right Way To Be" because there can only be "one" winner, of course. 

[sciborg2]

To me, the "issue" of the gamification is that, to me, it absolutely lowers the bar of conversation and discourse.  Also, since it presupposes a notion of "winning" and "scoring points," for example, it flattens the whole plurality of Being, in a way.  That is, it establishes a Ground of Being as Winning.  Not to mention, presupposes that then there must be "One Right Way To Be" because there can only be "one" winner, of course. 

So gamification is bad? As [in] actually bad or just something you dislike but is perfectly fine for others to participate in?

Personally I think this gamification is a result of academia's obsessive usage of post-modernism, atheism, and materialism as weapons against religious authoritarianism. Problem is these are weapons that, in combination, chew away at any sense of Ground. But humans then attach themselves to moral differences in "battle" with their neighbors, and so we have the tendency toward extremism in discourse that we see to day.

This isn't to rant about Cultural Marxism or some other silliness the Anti-SJWs peddle as a way to get Patreon dollars. I think the original intent was to some degree sound, as Russell notes Materialism was a dogma meant to challenge religious dogma. And of course the danger of moral certainty leads to a temptation toward Evil as "Greater Good". But to even have this conversation requires some appeal to O.M. of some variety as we're noting the negative course of assuming one has sussed out the correct O.M. and using that assumption to do Evil.

No one who doubts O.M. can hope to make a dent in Gamification, as all too few (if anyone) are going to abandon the rush of moral self-righteousness for an Ocean of Meaninglessness. There's a reason the Ctrl-Left and Alt-Right have gained so many followers while university philosophy departments are losing funding or at best are seen as amusing but fundamentally irrelevant institutions. Extremists appeal to Noumenal access where philosophy departments in the West seem to by & large fellate the assumed materialism of the STEM departments or just dither about in a circle jerk of intellectual co-masturbation.

If you want to save the human species, you have to commit to the idea that humanity's well being has objective worth.