More on Sheldrake's work.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpudgs9ZTfgThe idea is interesting, and I'd be curious if he could carry out more experiments. Dismissing the idea out of hand seems to be nothing more than Mean Girls style antics. As Kaku said of Penrose's Orch-OR, "science isn't a popularity contest."
The only argument I could see is that some other, supposedly more important science, might not be done if money is given to Sheldrake. If this argument is coming from definitive materialists I can only laugh. Everything is meaningless, the world and our very selves are disenchanted, but nevertheless we must be true to the paradigm!

As an aside, seemed to relate to two other things I read:
The Mathematical Forms being in this reality, as argued in "The Mathematical World".Aristotelian realism stands in a difficult relationship with naturalism, the project of showing that all of the world and human knowledge can be explained in terms of physics, biology and neuroscience. If mathematical properties are realised in the physical world and capable of being perceived, then mathematics can seem no more inexplicable than colour perception, which surely can be explained in naturalist terms. On the other hand, Aristotelians agree with Platonists that the mathematical grasp of necessities is mysterious. What is necessary is true in all possible worlds, but how can perception see into other possible worlds? The scholastics, the Aristotelian Catholic philosophers of the Middle Ages, were so impressed with the mind’s grasp of necessary truths as to conclude that the intellect was immaterial and immortal.
Feser's conception of the soul as Form of the body, as described in his discussion about the problem of intentionality.Now, for the Thomistic or hylemorphic dualist, the soul is to be understood, not as pure thought, but rather as the substantial form of the living human body. And qua form, it is not a complete substance in the first place, much less a material or quasi-material one. (Talk of the soul as an “immaterial substance” is thus for the Thomist at least misleading, though he does hold that the soul subsists beyond the death of the body as an incomplete substance.) Here too, though, talk of interrelated quasi-material parts, “causal pathways,” and the like is completely out of place. But for the Thomist, the Cartesian’s talk of inner “representations” is out of place too; as I have discussed elsewhere (e.g. here and here) the “representationalist” conception of the mind is an essentially modern one that the ancients and medievals generally would have rejected. As a consequence, the ancients and medievals would reject too the essentially modern way of framing the issue of intentionality that I have, for the sake of argument, been following up to now in this post.